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Patients' rights to free and informed choice of their own health care
providers is severely limited by contemporary managed care imperatives.
Most persons covered by employer-related health insurance plans, for
example, have very little meaningful right to select either physicians or
hospitals for their health care needs. Because of the loss of patient
autonomy in coping with highly technologized medical systems, the
author believes the federal and state legislation that provides statutory
rights to private, religiously affiliated hospitals to refuse patient requests
for health care services must be now reconsidered, especially where those
services are legally permissible, medically indicated and reasonably
expected by insurance purchasers. This is particularly important in the
area of reproductive medicine, where the ethical exemptions protecting
private religious hospitals are virtually unlimited.
The result of rapidly changing hospital corporate transformations and
competitively negotiated managed health care contracts is that patients
are so collectivized, that they no longer enjoy the decisional freedom that
traditionally served as the foundation of the distinctive pluralism
characterizing American organized health care. In the balance of hospital
exemptions and diminished patient rights, institutional privileges cannot
remain absolute. Private hospital exemptions should be re-written, with
clear limitations conditioned upon newly evolving public policy
imperatives for informed choice in comprehensive patient health care
plans.
* Professor of Law, The University of San Francisco; S.T.L., 1959, St. Mary of
the Lake, Mundelein; J.C.D., 1965, Gregorian University, Rome; J.D., 1972, The
Catholic University of America. I am very grateful for the expert assistance of
Lee Ryan, Senior Reference Librarian, as well as for the helpful suggestions of
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This article will address the problem of health care delivery where
reproductive services indicated are the most sensitive and controversial,
that is, abortion, sterilization, prescription of contraceptive drugs and
treatments, AIDS counseling, and various types of fertilization
procedures. Religious hospitals serving as contract providers, ethically
bound to limit their own participation in the provision of these health care
services, should be free to refuse limited medical procedures only where
patient choices of hospitals for their acute care needs are free. Otherwise,
not.
This is not a new or undebated problem; it comes now, however, in a
new scientific, social and managerial context. Until now the legislative
focus has been upon the protection of hospital and provider choices;
today, however, I believe the public policy focus must be shifted to
patients' rights.2 While the rights of conscience of each and every health
care professional must be securely safeguarded at law, institutional
ambiguities should be resolved in favor of the individual patient.
If patients could freely choose the hospitals they want for all their acute
care needs, as, indeed, historically was the case, there would be no
friends and colleagues. Thanks to Richard Weinblatt and Carrie O'Neill for their
exacting editorial work. Brooke Gillardi, Tim Ahearn and Sean Broderick
provided me valuable research support in recovering and checking sources for this
study.
1. Federal and state freedom of conscience statutes for health care providers
are found in Section V.C., infra.
2. At its annual meeting in Chicago, June 12-16, 2000, the
American Medical Association's House of Delegates, by a 247-184
vote, adopted a very cautious resolution to ensure patient access to
reproductive services when private hospitals merge with or acquire
other hospitals. The resolution also affirms a policy that physicians,
hospitals and hospital personnel, should not be forced to do anything
that violates their moral principles. Resolution 218, brought by the
Committee on Legislation, reads, in part, as follows:
Resolved: That in the case of mergers and/or acquisitions of health care
systems, our AMA support action to ensure continued patient access to
pregnancy prevention services within the community, including tubal
sterilization and vasectomy...
Resolved: That our AMA reaffirm its policy that neither physician,
hospital, nor hospital personnel shall be required to perform any act
which violates personally held moral principles.
See AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, HOUSE OF DELEGATES, REPORT OF
REFERENCE COMMITTEE B (June 16, 2000) available at
http://www.ama.assn.org/meetings/public/annualOO/reports/hodactions/rcbannot.d
oc (last visited May 5, 2001).
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problem of institutional autonomies in the balance of public policy
requirements for comprehensive health care. The free exercise rights of
medical service organizations and patients both could be protected.
Where patients can no longer choose acute care providers, however, or
are deceived by insufficient disclosures of restricted services, religious
hospitals serving large, mixed patient bases and paid for services by health
maintenance organizations or insurance carriers cannot alone be
privileged by law to limit the services they are willing to provide. The
modern imperative of personal autonomy as well as the public policy goal
of comprehensive, quality medical services to meet the fundamental civic
right to health care demand some restrictions in balancing public/private
spheres of interest in the delivery of health care services.
I. THE Loss OF INDIVIDUAL PATIENT CHOICE OF HOSPITAL
SERVICE PROVIDERS
The corporate transformation of hospitals and acute care medical
facilities under the impetus of managed care imperatives, as we know, has
serious legal repercussions upon patients' rights to choose the medical
service options they desire. Rights to competent medical care, prices, and
availability, are negotiated in employee benefit plans now, for the most
part, collectively, sometimes annually, for persons forming patient bases
often numbering tens of thousands of participants. There are both private
and governmental subscriber groups of enrollees serviced by tiers of
separate corporate entities. The majority of covered participants today
deal, not individually, but in groups, through their employers, professional
or union administrators,3 with insurance and health maintenance
3. The number of people served by health management organizations
(HMO's) has doubled in this decade to about 160,000,000 in 1999. Nearly three-
fourths of American workers with health insurance, 48,000,000, receive their
coverage in HMO's or other managed care plans. http://www.aahp.org (last visited
July 15, 1999). The remaining with health insurance are privately insured by state-
regulated insurance plans. The Census Bureau reported that in 1997 43,448,000
Americans, i.e., 16.1%, were without health care insurance of any kind. U.S.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1999
HEALTH AND NUTRITION, Nos. 185 & 190 (2000). Since most employer-sponsored
benefit plans including HMO's are regulated by the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994), federal standards
are essential to secure patient rights where ERISA is preemptive of the states'
traditional role in regulating insurance. These standards, however, are meager. See
Jack K. Kilcullen, Groping For the Reins: ERISA, HMO Malpractice, and
Enterprise Liability, 22 AM. J. L. & MED. 7 (1996). The significant tax advantages
to employer-based health insurance make other forms of private insurance
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organizations. These intermediaries, in turn, utilize care providers that
themselves are institutional members of labyrinthine systems of medical
facilities formed by mergers, consolidations, acquisitions, joint ventures
and other legal forms of resource-sharing. With time, only a diminishing
minority of patients using the services of religious hospitals will carry
private medical insurance. The problems of individual, informed choice
for patients caught in the cost-conscious and often profit-driven world of
medicine may be so intractable that federal or state patients' bills of rights
legislation at the present time may be no more than palliative.
The issue of hospital provider choice is central to the balance of patient
economically unattractive. Federal preemption also precludes or blunts state
legislative attempts to regulate or reform employment-related health care plans.
Margaret G. Farrell, ERISA Preemption and Regulation of Managed Health Care:
The Case For Managed Federalism, 23 AM. J. LAW & MED. 251 (1997). Exemption
from general state regulation under ERISA combines with very few federal
restrictions to provide enormous impetus to the growth of very large employer-
based group health plans. See Pegram v. Herdrich, 520 U.S. 211 (2000) (holding
that mixed eligibility and treatment decisions made by HMO, acting through its
physician employees, were not fiduciary acts within meaning of ERISA and, thus,
could not form basis for breach of fiduciary duty claim under ERISA - 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1002(21), 1109(a)); Christiantielli v. Kaiser Foundation Plan of Texas, 113 F.
Supp. 2d 1055 (N.D. Tex 2000) (finding that ERISA preempts state medical
malpractice claim against insurance coverage denial); Rutledge v. Seyforth, Shaw,
Fairweather & Geraldson, 201 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2000) (deciding that ERISA
preempts state law claim that law firm overcharged for services to employee
benefit plan).
4. Patients' Bill of Rights legislation has failed in every session of Congress,
notwithstanding strong support from the Democratic Administration. President
Clinton announced its reintroduction in his State of the Union address, January
19, 1999. The most recent bill contained no provisions directly ameliorating the
difficulties of patient informed choice we address here. On June 11, 2000, the
Senate rejected the Democratic bill, sponsored by Sen. Edward Kennedy, by vote
of fifty-one to forty-eight, a more narrow margin than the fifty-three to forty-
seven vote in favor of a Republican alternative last July. Jonathan Gardner,
Senate Again Rejects Patient-Protection Bill, MOD. HEALTHCARE, June 12, 2000, at
4. Patients' bills of rights have been enacted, at least partially, in thirty-four states
as of this writing. In none of these statutes, however, is there clear protection of
patients' rights to full disclosure of services offered, or restricted, by health care
providers, enabling them to make a free choice of hospital providers. For a very
insightful analysis of the difficulties in drafting and enforcing patients' bills of
rights statutes to regulate managed care, see David A. Hyman, Regulating
Managed Care: What's Wrong With a Patient Bill of Rights, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 221
(2000); Alycia C. Regan, Regulating the Business of Medicine: Models For
Integrating Ethics and Managed Care, 30 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBs. 635 (1997).
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rights and organizational imperatives where religiously affiliated hospitals
enter into participatory contractual arrangements with general service
HMOs as medical service providers. In this area patient medical choices
that become limited as a result of private religious hospital-HMO
contracts and corporate transformations through mergers and acquisitions
should be protected over institutional autonomies as a matter of principle,
if not from the prudential viewpoint of public policy approbation and
licensing. Statutory privileges protecting organizational moral choices,
the so-called federal and state "conscience clauses," should be revisited by
courts and legislative bodies in an entirely new context in these cases,
from a perspective that, in many ways, is far different from that originally
justifying the legislation. Changes in contemporary health care financing
and delivery compel this reevaluation.
A growing body of legal literature frames the parameters of choice
protected under the religious freedom safeguards of the First
Amendment5 for medical-moral decisions made by administrators of
5. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; .. " U.S. CONST. amend. I. In the free
exercise jurisprudence of the Supreme Court limitations upon religiously-
motivated conduct, not belief, struck the fundamental parameter of choice as early
as Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878) and Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S.
398, 402 (1890) (enforcing federal anti-polygamy statutes). Too much should not
be made of the distinction, however, in view of the First Amendment's express
protection of religious "exercise," denoting religious practice or religious
observance. This seems to have been the case in Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S.
599, 603-04 (1961), in which the Court rather cavalierly played down the
significance of religiously-motivated conduct in upholding Sunday closing laws,
which proved to be extremely onerous to Orthodox Jews and other sabbatarians.
That jurisprudence concerns criminal -activities that may be religiously motivated,
and was summarized by the Supreme Court in Employment Div., Dep't of Human
Res. of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (upholding state criminalization of the
sacramental use of peyote), affirmed in City of Boerne, Texas v. Flores, 521 U.S.
507 (1997) (upholding municipal historical preservation ordinance that prohibited
expansion of a church and striking down the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
of 1993). The jurisprudence of the Supreme Court that mandates conduct that is
religiously prohibited, however, is uneven. See e.g., West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (finding that pledge of allegiance in public schools
cannot be forced on students contrary to religious belief); Wooley v. Maynard, 430
U.S. 705 (1977) (holding that forced government speech violates free exercise); cf
Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986) (forcing payment of tax withholding and Social
Security assessments even against employers' religious beliefs); United States v.
Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (requiring submission of Social Security numbers). In
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972), the Court acknowledged that
religious practices are, indeed, protected, and that it is wrong to emphasize a
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private, church-related hospitals when these hospitals form cooperative
ventures with non-profit public or community hospitals.' A smaller
number of studies analyze the problem where private religious hospitals
are sold to for-profit corporations. Several studies propose helpful public
policy considerations to ground legislative initiatives.8
distinction clearly contrary to the text of the Amendment ("belief and action
cannot be neatly confined in logic-tight compartments"). In Smith, Justice
O'Connor, concurring, said "Because the First Amendment does not distinguish
between religious belief and religious conduct, conduct motivated by sincere
religious belief, like the belief itself, must therefore be at least presumptively
protected by the Free Exercise Clause." 494 U.S. 872, 893 (1990). The
faith/conduct dichotomy continues in use, however, as a practical decisional
standard notwithstanding sustained criticism by jurists and theoreticians of the
sociology of religion. See, e.g. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 526 (1993); Fred P. Bosselman, Extinction and the Law:
Protection of Religiously-Motivated Conduct 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 15 (1992);
Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience:
The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1245
(1994).
6. In Deciding the Fate of Religious Hospitals In the Emerging Health Care
Market, 31 Hous. L. REV. 1429 (1995), Kathleen M. Boozang focussed a study on
the ethical directives of the Catholic Health Association and constitutional
dilemmas caused in cases of monopolized provision for healthcare. See also,
Lawrence E. Singer, Realigning Catholic Health Care: Bridging Legal and Church
Control In A Consolidating Market, 72 TUL. L. REV. 159 (1997) (examining the
issue of free exercise and public interest); Lynn D. Wardle, Protecting the Rights
of Conscience of Health Care Providers, 14 J. LEGAL MED. 177 (1993) (providing a
helpful survey of the so-called "conscience clauses" in federal and state statutes
and urging legislative extension of these to all religiously affiliated hospitals); Lisa
C. Ikemoto, When a Hospital Becomes Catholic, 47 MERCER L. REV. 1087 (1996)
(a symposium on rural health care outlining legal support for the concerns of the
public for reproductive health services where local general service hospitals
become affiliated with Catholic hospital systems).
7. See, e.g., Phillip P. Bisesi, Conversion of Nonprofit Health Care Entities to
For-Profit Status, 26 CAP. U. L. REV. 805 (1997); Shannon M. Hernandez,
Conversions of Nonprofit Hospitals to For-Profit Status: The Tennessee
Experience, 28 U. MEM. L. REV. 1077 (1998); Shelley A. Sackett, Conversion of
Not-for-Profit Health Care Providers: A Proposal for Federal Guidelines on
Mandated Charitable Foundations, 10 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 247 (1999); Eric S.
Tower, Directors' Duty to Obtain a Fair Price in the Conversion of Nonprofit
Hospitals, 6 ANNALS HEALTH L. 157 (1997).
8. See Kathleen M. Boozang, Developing Public Policy for Sectarian
Providers: Accommodating Religious Beliefs and Obtaining Access to Care, 24 J.
MED. & ETHICS 90 (1996); Kathleen A. White, Crisis of Conscience: Reconciling
Religious Healthcare Providers' Beliefs and Patients' Rights, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1703
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In today's rapidly changing health services market the independent
private hospitals that formed the paradigm for largely-unrestricted
religious privilege, locally-owned institutions that were obviously
performing religious ministries, serving, for the most part, their own co-
religionists, built by sectarian philanthropy and financed by privately
insured or uninsured fee-based services, are almost anachronisms. 9
In addition to changes in the formulation of group benefit policies and
the look of competing corporate technologies, publicly-funded contract
services, Medicare, Medicaid and parallel state programs, administered by
private, religious hospitals, alter the legal nature of funds financially
supporting the work of religious hospitals. 0 These new, permanent
transformations of institutionalized health care occasion the need for
ongoing legal analysis and public policy reconsideration.
A. Restructuring Health Care Realigns the Balance of Public Values
The restructuring of the non-profit sector of the health care industry,
hospital mergers, joint ventures and shared resources is now creating huge
conglomerates to be used as cost-cutting and market-maximizing devices
for hospitals to compete in managed care markets. As for-profit
organizations, insurance companies, and other health maintenance groups
race to obtain market share, they do so at the expense of not-for-profit
providers." To remain financially viable, non-profit hospital systems"2
(1998).
9. Frank Cerne, The Fading Stand-Alone Hospital, Hosp. & HEALTH
NETWORKS, June 20, 1994, at 28.
10. See Carl H. Esbeck, A Constitutional Case for Government Cooperation
With Faith-Based Social Service Providers, 46 EMORY L.J. 1 (1997). Esbeck
provided two earlier studies of the effect of government financing and regulation
of public benefit services provided by religious charities upon the churches' free
exercise of religion in Government Regulation of Religiously-Based Social
Services: The First Amendment Considerations, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 343
(1992), and State Regulation of Social Services Ministries of Religious
Organizations. 16 VAL. U. L. REV. 1 (1991). These and further research were
published separately as The Regulation of Religious Organizations As Recipients
of Governmental Assistance (1996).
11. Deanna Bellandi, Profitability a Matter of Ownership Status: For-Profit
Systems See Earnings Rise, While Not-for-profits Lag, MOD. HEALTHCARE, June
12, 2000, at 26, lists the top for-profit health care systems as:
Hospitals
1999 1998
1. Columbia/HCA Healthcare 203 299
Corp.
2. Tenet Healthcare Corp. 130 122
3. Universal Health Services 21 21
20011
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must bid successfully for patient bases to pay for delivery of service
packages. 3  This necessarily entails at least two major factors in the
4. Triad Hospitals 29 -
5. Health Mgmt. Assoc. 32 28
6. Quorum Health Group 21 18
7. Cmty. Health Systems 46 43
8. LifePoint Hospitals 23 23
9. New Am. Healthcare Corp. 11 8
10. Province Healthcare Corp. 15 10




1. U.S. Dept. of Veterans Aff. 172 172
2. Ascension Health* 60 -
3. Catholic Health Initiatives 71 65
4. Christus Health** 27 -
5. Catholic Health East 32 31
6. Catholic Healthcare West 48 36
7. Mercy Health Services 17 17
8. Sutter Health 25 24
9. NY Presbyterian 16 16
Healthcare Sys.***
10. Catholic Healthcare 27 22
Partners
* In Nov. 1999, Daughters of Charity National Health System, St. Louis, and
Sisters of St. Joseph Health System, Ann Arbor, Mich., merged to form Ascension
Health, St. Louis.
** Christus Health was formed through the merger of Sisters of Charity, Houston,
and Incarnate Word Health System, San Antonio.
Previously known as New York Presbyterian Health Network.
13. The American Hospital Association listed 195 mergers involving 404
hospitals between 1980 and 1991. All but 14 of these involved nonprofit hospitals.
Howard J. Anderson, AHA Lists Hospital Merger Activity for 12-Year Period,
HOSPITALS, June 20, 1992, at 62 (quoting American Hosp. Ass'n, Hospital Mergers
and Consolidations, 1980-1991 (1992)). In 1996, there were 595 merger and
acquisition deals involving HMOs, hospitals and physician groups, up forty-five
percent since 1994. Between 1994 and 1996 the value of those transactions jumped
thirty-eight percent to $29 billion in 1998. The rapid expansion of for-profit
corporations into the feverish merger and consolidation market with non-profit
hospitals and HMOs is also being driven by the growing push to put Medicare and
Medicaid beneficiaries into HMOs. Shorter inpatient stays and declining
admissions are a result of Medicare's Diagnosis-Related Group (DRG)
reimbursement scheme, which pays providers on a per-patient basis based on
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negotiations: (1) the quality, kind, comprehensiveness and cost of medical
services; and (2) the needs, demands and expectations of employers,
union leaders and other kinds of group service administrators for health
benefit packages satisfying to their employees and members. Group
service negotiators must be able, in turn, to offer attractive benefits
packages to prospective applicants to be competitive within their own
industry, union or profession. In other words, private religious hospitals
today compete in a fiercely tough financial market where the array of
quality, cost-effective services provided is the key to success to all the
organizational players in the system.14 If medical services are curtailed by
religious hospitals for ethical reasons, that fact must be known not only by
the health plan negotiators, but also clearly and unmistakably by the
persons comprising their prospective patient subscribers. A limitation
upon services provided entails the corollary that the religious hospitals
must offer strong alternative values of quality and attractiveness to
remain financially viable and competitive.
Today, the other side of the negotiating table from employers,
professional and employee group agents, insurance carriers and HMO
administrators is occupied, not by the individual religious hospital
struggling to stay alive financially, but rather by representatives of the
combined resources of increasingly large and strong non-profit hospital
systems. Individual hospitals cannot compete in this market. Large
systems, however, combining both religious and community, or non-profit
hospitals of other religious sponsorship affiliations, strive to match the
commercial HMOs in both quality and range of services provided. What
individual hospitals are reluctant to provide, the plurocratic systems
supply by way of contracting out and referrals, often within the systems
themselves, increasingly less often to facilities outside the systems. Thus,
the religious non-profit hospital systems can match the commercial giants
in the array of services offered, avoid contractual disclosure of restricted
services, and capitalize on their strengths of community and physician
loyalties. As non-profit corporations, they also have cost savings, of
course, in property, sales and excise tax exemptions. In the large systems,
diagnosis, not on the actual cost of treating the patient. JOHN J. MILES, 2 HEALTH
CARE AND ANTITRUST LAW: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE § 12-2 (1994).
14. Total profits of for-profit hospital systems rose to 3.5% in 1999, up from
2.8% of the year before, while the total profits for the private, not-for-profit sector
sank to 2.2% last year from 3.4% in 1998, according to the 24th annual Hospital
Systems Survey, formerly the Multi-unit Providers Survey. A total of 193 systems
reported data for both years, including nine for-profits, 165 private non-profits
and 19 public systems. The biggest non-governmental system is Columbia/HCA
with $16.7 billion in net patient revenue in 1999. See, Bellandi, supra, note 11.
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therefore, in theory, services need not be absolutely restricted, as patients
can be triaged to different facilities using less restrictive ethical norms in
the area of reproductive medicine.
Religiously affiliated hospital systems are major corporate players in
the non-profit health care market."
Adding to the transformation of non-profit hospitals and long-term
care facilities is the creation of for-profit subsidiaries, joint ventures,
acquisitions, mergers or other contractual affiliations with for-profit
hospital systems, and/or mergers involving public and community
hospitals.
Complete absorption of formerly independent religious hospitals into
for-profit systems tilts the edge of secularity, leaving some protection for
15. MODERN HEALTHCARE (June 12, 2000) listed the top 20 health care
systems ranked by net patient income as follows:
Net Patient Total Revenue Total
(millions) Hospitals
1999 1998 1999
1. U.S. Dept. of Veterans Affairs 20,709.0 20,027.1 172
2. Columbia/HCA Healthcare 16,700.1 18,700.0 207
Corp.
3. Tenet Healthcare Corp. 9,958.0 8,997.0 130
4. Ascension Health 5,485.5 - 70
5. Catholic Health Initiatives 4,756.1 4,787.3 71
6. Catholic Healthcare West 3,963.5 3,301.3 48
7. NY City Health & Hosp. Corp. 3,691.7 3834.5 11
8. NY Presbyterian Health Sys. 3,038.5 3,121.7 16
9. Mayo Foundation 2,775.1 2,417.0 18
10. N. Shore Long Island Jewish 2,331.3 2,174.7 13
Health System
11. Sisters of Mercy Health 2,291.1 2,341.4 24
System, St. Louis
12. L.A. City Dept. of Health 2,239.1 2,341.4 6
Services
13. Sutter Health System 2,128.0 2,010.0 27
14. Catholic Health East 2,063.2 1,683.8 33
15. Adventist Health System 2,044.8 1,740.4 29
16. St. Joseph Health System 2,016.7 1,345.7 15
17. Marian Health System 2,010.0 2,106.0 35
18. Catholic Healthcare Partners 1,984.1 1,833.4 30
19. Providence Health System 1,970.0 1,712.0 21
20. Mercy Health Services 1,969.4 1,943.9 20
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personal faith-based options by medical staff, but hardly any for the
administrators of commercial organizations as such.16 Federal and state
statutory "conscience clauses" do not protect commercial, for-profit
health care providers. Thus, in the commercial health care sector the
religious mission of private hospitals may be temporarily preserved,
perhaps, on a voluntary and individual basis; the institutional mission of
disinterested charity, with its public interest exemptions, however, is no
longer viable where hospital services are sold for shareholders' profit.
Prospective patients who buy into private or company plans managed
by health insurance corporations using managed care networks have
limited choices among professional and institutional providers."
Individuals, with families and enrolled dependents, form patient bases,
numbering in the thousands, or tens of thousands, assigned by corporate
health care purchasers to contract delivery systems evaluated by capitated
costs, classification and quality of services offered. Physicians, nurses,
16. See Section VI.B.4, infra.
17. Limited, that is, by services provided by carriers or contract bases for
private or company plans measured by cost-efficiency analyses.
18. See, generally, Symposium: Health Care Capitated Payment Systems, 22
AM. J.L. & MED. 167 (1996). Freedom to choose one's caregivers is universally
agreed-upon as a necessary part of a desirable health plan. See THEODORE R.
MARMOR, UNDERSTANDING HEALTH CARE REFORM 179 (1994). Patients, on the
other hand, the consumers of services in the health care sector,'generally lack the
expertise to make informed choices among acute care hospitals when they
purchase healthcare services. Furthermore, when the need arises patients not only
lack specialized knowledge of complicated and, perhaps, protracted medical
treatments, but are too sick, too old or lack the energy necessary for such
decisions. Patient bases also lack the organized clout to override or change
employer, provider and physician choices. Physicians typically control the course
of treatment and the choice of hospital. See GEORGE ANDERS, HEALTH AGAINST
WEALTH: HMOs AND THE BREAKDOWN OF MEDICAL TRUST (1996). Though
physician autonomy is being diminished by the pressure of managed care, one of
the major risks hospital corporations run is not only disaffection of referring
physicians, but conflicts with insurers with close ties to physician associations. In
the 1980's, for example, Humana, Inc., ran into conflicts when doctors in some
cities boycotted Humana Hospitals. Humana then split off its hospitals as a
separate company that later joined with Columbia/HCA. See James F. Blumstein,
Health Care Reform and Competing Visions of Medical Care: Antitrust and State
Provider Cooperation Legislation, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1459, 1470-71 (1994).
Physicians in New York, New Jersey, California, Connecticut and at least ten
other states are forming unions rapidly now to gain collective strength to
counterbalance HMO/hospital bargaining power. Most of the union activity is
among salaried staff doctors at hospitals, both public and private. The AMA
endorsed physician unionization at its July, 1999, annual meeting. See, Steven
20011
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pharmacists, hospital administrators, in this narrowing world of patient
choice, determine quality and comprehensiveness of services, availability,
costs, and, in some cases, referral support.
Rapidly evolving health care systems created by private non-profit
hospitals to share resources are increasingly coming under government
scrutiny, not only by the Federal Trade Commission and the Anti-Trust
Division of the Department of Justice,' 9 but also by state legislatures
alarmed at the growing economic power of managed health care
corporations to set prices, as well as coerce and restrict medical
Greenhouse, Angered By HMOs Treatment, More Doctors Are Joining Unions,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1999, A-i; Frances H. Miller, Capitation and Physician
Autonomy: Master of the Universe or Just Another Prisoner's Dilemma, 6 HEALTH
MATRIX 89 (1996).
19. Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits proposed mergers involving any
acquisition of another firm's ("person's") assets, stock, or share capital that "may
substantially lessen competition, or tend to create a monopoly." 15 U.S.C. § 18-21
(1988 & Supp. V 1993). Challenges to mergers are filed also pursuant to the
Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 44-58 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
United States v. Rockford Mem. Corp., 898 F. 2d 1278 (7th Cir. 1990); FTC v.
University HealthInc., 938 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1991); Adventist Health
System/West, 114 F.T.C. 458 (1991). HEALTH, EDUC. & HUMAN SERV. Div.,
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-94-220, HEALTH CARE: FEDERAL &
STATE ANTITRUST ACTIONS CONCERNING THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY 3 (1994).
The 1992 Department of Justice/Federal Trade Commission Merger Guidelines
contain government enforcement policy concerning horizontal mergers and
acquisitions. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, MERGER
GUIDELINES (1992). Most hospital mergers require Hart-Scott-Rodino filings. See
18 U.S.C. § 18A (1988 & Sup. V 1993)(requiring that the FTC receive prior notice
of most mergers in which the value of the acquired entity is over $10 million). See
Symposium: Antitrust Policy and Health Care Reform, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 365-
559; Laura L. Stephens, Nonprofit Hospital Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton
Act. Closing An Antitrust Loophole, 75 B.U. L. REV. 477 (1995); Gordon H.
Copland & Pamela E. Hepp, Government Antitrust Enforcement In the Health
Care Markets: The Regulators Need An Update, 99 W. VA. L. REV. 101 (1996);
Michael D. Belsley, The Vatican Merger Defense--Should Two Catholic Hospitals
Seeking to Merge Be Considered A Single Entity For Purposes of the Antitrust
Merger Analysis? 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 720 (1996); William M. Stelwagon, Does a
Healthy Patient Need a Cure? A Response to Health Care Industry Proposals to
Reform Antitrust Analysis of Horizontal Hospital Mergers, 69 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
553 (1995); Edward Hirschfield, Interpreting the 1996 Federal Antitrust Guidelines
for Physician Joint Venture Networks, 6 ANNALS HEALTH L. 1 (1997); Amanda J.
Vaughn, The Use of the Nonprofit Defense under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 52
VAND. L. REV. 557 (1999).
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decisions. °
As community-based non-profit hospitals are sold off, merged or enter
into joint ventures with for-profit providers, government agencies fear for
loss of the non-profit sector or are concerned for the recoupment of taxes
• 21
foregone by years of exemption. Similarly, where community and
20. For example, under California law any foreign corporation or state-
chartered public benefit corporation owning or controlling health facilities is
required to provide notice to and seek the consent of the State Attorney General
before disposing of assets or transferring control, responsibility or governance to
any other entity. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 5914, 5917, 5959 (West 1999).
21. Nonprofit hospitals are organized and operated for federal tax exemption
purposes under Internal Revenue Code § 501(c)(3). Health Maintenance
Organizations are § 501(c)(4) "social welfare" organizations. While both are
required under federal tax regulations, Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(4) (see Rev.
Proc. 82-2, 1982-1, CB 367), as well as mirroring state law, e.g. see, Cal. Corp.
Code §§ 5130, 6719 (West 1990) and Cal. Rev. & Tax Code § 23701f (West 1992),
to contain in their articles of incorporation provision that upon liquidation,
dissolution, or abandonment, the assets of the public benefit corporation will be
distributed exclusively to another charitable organization. 501(c)(4) organizations
are not prohibited from engaging in interested-party transactions, per se, such as
for-profit conversions involving private inurement. See Lee A. Sheppard, "HMO
Conversion and Self-Dealing," Tax Analysis, Oct. 6, 1993 [LEXIS, Fedtax
Library, TNT File]. Self-dealing transactions, such as HMO conversions, may be
authorized by the Department of Corporations in California under Corp. Code §
5233(d) (West 1990). Contributions to §501 (c)(4) organizations are not tax-
deductible, though the organizations are tax exempt. I.R.C. § 501(a). In
California, conversion of nonprofit corporations to for-profit status is governed
generally under supervision of the Department of Corporations by Cal. Corp.
Code § 5813.5, which permits conversion to for-profit status under certain
conditions, among which is the dedication of their current asset value to charity:
"A public benefit corporation may amend its articles to change its status to that of
... a business corporation ... by complying with this section... . If the public
benefit corporation has any assets, an amendment to change its status... shall be
approved in writing by the [Commissioner of Corporations]." A converting public
benefit corporation must prepay its minimum tax liability and set aside the fair
market value of its assets for charitable purposes. See also CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 1399.72(c)(1) (West Supp. 1999). Valuation of corporation assets
generally follows accepted Valuation Methods under IRS Revenue Ruling 59-60
(Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1, C.B. 237). Conversion of health maintenance
organizations is specifically regulated by rules set forth by Cal. Health & Safety
Code §§ 1399.70-1399.76 (West Supp. 1999). For-profit conversions have been
permitted, or even encouraged, by both federal and state government agencies in
the past in the thought that the public may better be served by allowing these
organizations access to capital markets, ensuring their financial viability and the
continued availability of health care to the public. See Health Maintenance
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religious hospitals are sold off to become parts of commercial for-profit
conglomerates there is concern for assets, which are dedicated to public
service charities and are required by law to be re-distributed for similar
charitable purposes upon termination or liquidation."
The same serious public policy concerns have marked the states'
attempts to regulate for-profit conversion of non-profit health
maintenance and insurance organizations."
State legislatures are being pressured by special interest groups to
mandate ever-more comprehensive coverage in health services to the
public by a licensed and closely-regulated industry. 24 These mandates
come in packages with more stringent disclosure requirements and
restricted participatory rights in state-subsidized medical programs and
tax and employment policy exemptions.
Private, non-profit religious hospitals, thus, play on financial fields of
increasingly competitive markets, growing patient demands and closer
governmental scrutiny. 5 State mandated patient services, as well as
Organization Act of 1973, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300e-300e-14a (1974).
22. I.R.C. 501(c)(3). IRS Publication 557. Revised Model Nonprofit
Corporation Act, § 14.06 (ABA, 1988); Holden Hosp. Corp. v. Southern Ill. Hosp.
Corp., 174 N.E. 2d 793 ( I11. 1961). See Theresa McMahon, Fair Value? The
Conversion of Nonprofit HMOs, 30 U.S.F. L. REV. 355 (1996).
23. IRS Guidelines require that joint ventures between for-profit and
nonprofit hospitals give the "charitable purpose" priority over "maximizing
profits", that the nonprofit needs to hold a majority of seats on the hospital's
board, and there must be evidence of ongoing charitable commitments. See
Health Care News Servers, www.healthcareserver.com/stories, Mar. 5, 1998. See
also, Milt Freudenheim, As Blue Cross Plans Seek Profit, States Ask a Share of the
Riches, N. Y. TIMES, March 25, 1996, p. A-1 (detailing New York's legislative
response after Empire Blue Cross and Blue Shield received state approval to
establish a for-profit subsidiary).
24. Where state Medicaid programs, for example, have converted to managed
care, some states have been unwilling to award contracts to hospitals which do not
provide, or arrange for the provision, of contraceptive drugs, devices and
sterilization services. For an limited overview of state-mandated health coverage
and their projected economic effects, see Jonathan Gruber, The Incidence of
Mandated Maternity Benefits, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 622 (1994). See also Katie C.
Morgan, Leaving the Management of 'Managed Care' Up to the States: The Health
Insurance Industry and the Need for Regulation of the Regulators, 65 U. CIN. L.
REV. 225 (1996); William J. Barr, Although Offering More Freedom to Choose,
'Any Willing Provider' Legislation is the Wrong Choice, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 557
(1997).
25. The growth of private accreditation agencies monitoring and evaluating
hospital and physician services to provide information for administrators buying
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training programs, add to the mix of public forces pushing against the
envelope of private hospital ethical autonomy.
To date attacks on acute-care provider-HMO contracts, particularly
under the so-called "exclusivity" clauses commonly employed restricting
enrolled physicians to choice of hospitals within the circle of HMO
into health maintenance insurance contracts and healthcare organizations adds to
the mix of pressures to multiply comprehensive service packages and better
quality/price ratios. For example, the National Committee for Quality Assurance,
NCQA, is a growing power source providing accreditation information on
hundreds of HMOs to employers, unions and interested parties. NCQA, of
course, exerts great pressure on religious hospitals and health-care organizations
to get high ratings to enhance their bargaining position in getting contracts for
patient bases. The National Board of NCQA includes leaders of business, the
HMO industry, and consumer organizations. To date it has no representation of
religious ministries in health-care. See www.ncqa.org. Three new players in the
information supply business providing consumer reports about the performance of
hospitals and physicians should also be mentioned: America's Health Network, a
cable TV network that provides health-related programming, is developing
hospital report cards for 15 cities in conjunction with the health information
company HCIA (http://www.ahn.com); Healthcare Report Cards, Inc., a division
of a Colorado physician practice management company, in fall, 1997, put its
hospital report cards on the internet (http://www.healthcarereportcards.com); and
Patient Watch, a New York company, started selling hospital and physician
reports in 1998 as part of a patient advocacy service
(http://www.patientwatch.com). Patient Watch, for example, gives each hosptial
an overall rating based on staffing ratios and other criteria. Consumers pay $35
per hospital or per doctor report. The cost for a patient advocate who visits the
patient in the hospital is $200 per day.
26. The Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education (ACGME) in
February, 1995, issued a directive that ob/gyn training programs include a
mandated abortion training component as a condition for accreditation. This
directive was to take effect on January 1, 1996, but was withdrawn due to
opposition in Congress. The effect of accreditation requirements, however, it
should be noted, is to set standards that teaching programs must obey to qualify
for government-conferred benefits. Loss of ACGME accreditation, for example,
may adversely effect a teaching hospital's ability to receive Medicare payments.
Only residents enrolled in ACGME-accredited programs can defer payment of
their federally subsidized Health Education Assistance loans. Most states,
moreover, will license only doctors who have graduated from a program of
ACGME accreditation. Thus, as a nation-wide accreditation agency ACGME
exerts quasi-governmental power over hospitals and state public health licensing
agencies to conform to their standards. See St. Agnes Hosp. of Baltimore v.
Riddick, 748 F. Supp. 319 (D. Md. 1990). See footnotes 274-75 infra. See Barry R.
Furrow, Regulating the Managed Care Revolution: Private Accreditation and a
New System Ethos, 43 VILL. L. REV. 361 (1998).
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contract providers, have served largely to litigate physician-hospital
staffing rights, employment termination, gag rules and appeals.17 It should
be emphasized here, however, that these same contractual provisions
binding enrolled physicians limit even more drastically the choices their
28patients are allowed to make. The recent spate of cases challenging the
enforceability of the "exclusivity" clauses on anti-trust bases, indeed,
punctuates the loss of patient rights to make meaningful hospital choices
for their medical needs.29
If patients are restricted in their right to chose a hospital of preference
because of insurance or physician limitations, or achieve an adequate
understanding of quality and range of services offered antecedently to
execution of health insurance contracts in a thoughtful way, how can they
be said to participate meaningfully and freely in the religious restriction of
medical choices for their care? In this context patients are constrained by
the pertinent markets to purchase medical services that they may never be
able to receive.
One must emphasize that the choices hospital administrators make to
enter into arrangements to serve as contract health care providers for
insured patient bases directly affect the hospitals' own rights of ethical
autonomy. If patients have little or no choice of hospitals, hospitals
cannot retain a distinctive ethical autonomy to deny patients their rights
to comprehensive medical care.
The interest of churches and religious organizations who have built and
sponsored the hospitals that are now major participants in this emerging
27. See generally, Summit Health v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322 (1991) (termination
of a ophthalmologist's staff privileges); BCB Anesthesia Care v. Passavant Mem.
Area Hosp.Ass'n., 36 F. 3d 664 (7th Cir. 1994) (no antitrust violation in hospital
staffing decisions). Also the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, 42
U.S.C. §§ 11101-52, providing qualified immunity from money damages for
persons involved in decisions to deny staff privileges to physicians based on
competence or professional conduct. Following expressions of concern by the
AMA, at least 16 states passed laws in 1996 prohibiting HMOs from including in
their contracts so-called gag clauses intended to prevent physician-patient
discussions of treatment options or cost-cutting measures by the insurer. In
December, 1996, the Department of Health and Human Services added a federal
regulation stating that any contract that limits a doctor's ability to advise and
counsel a Medicare beneficiary violates Medicare rules. Bryan A. Liang, An
Overview and Analysis of Challenges to Medical Exclusive Contracts, 18 J. LEG.
MED. 1 (1997).
28. Rebekah K. Campbell, Hospital Collaboration Laws, Antitrust, and State
Action Immunity: Will These Statutes Pass Muster? 47 EMORY L.J. 1003 (1998).
29. See supra note 17.
Private Religious Hospitals
market is to accentuate the religious ministry traditionally linked to health
care services as a core manifestation of belief broadly protected by the
First Amendment.0 The very success of the voluntary religious sector in
creating vast philanthropies to serve the general public, however, serves
to undercut the force of the free exercise argument. Private
philanthropies, however large, serve the general public, not only the
faithful of the individual denominational sponsors.
Currently acceptable market strategies enable non-profit hospital
systems to underwrite medical technology and spread costs in enviable
competition with the for-profit sector and government-sponsored or
community-based secular providers.3' The more successful religious
health care systems become as quasi-businesses and the more they
monopolize local health care accessible to the public the less compelling is
their claim to religious exemption." Exemption runs in tandem with the
preservation of free choice for patients, as well as the disinterested service
of public charity." Religious exemption as a public policy issue runs both
to the substance of freely-conferred ministries and to their evident
30. Peter Campbell, Evolving Sponsorship and Corporate Structures: Canon
Law Considerations For Changing Organizations, HEALTH PROGRESS, July-
August 1995, at 35.
31. What Paul Starr noted in 1982 as the growing tendency of nonprofit
hospitals to reorganize to add profit-making subsidiaries as a source of revenue,
e.g., for-profit laboratories, rehabilitation centers, retirement homes, hospices,
stress management centers, etc., has continued unabated by the accountancy
demands of the unrelated income taxation regulations of the Internal Revenue
Service. See I.R.C. §§ 511-514 PAUL STARR, supra note 31, at 437. A
recommended overview of hospital development is V. CLAYTON SHERMAN,
CREATING THE NEW AMERICAN HOSPITAL: A TIME FOR GREATNESS (1993).
32. See Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital, 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir.
1963); Corum v. Beth Israel Medical Center, 373 F. Supp. 550 (S.D. N.Y. 1974);
Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976). A major
component of the movement to remove property tax exemption from nonprofit
hospitals is the perception of their similarity to businesses, and thus, their
competitive advantage over the for-profit health care sector, as well as a general
lack of sustained unpaid service to the indigent. See Bruce R. Hopkins & Thomas
Hyatt, The Law of Tax-Exempt Healthcare Organizations, Ch. 6 (1996 and Supp.);
see also Bruce R. Hopkins, The Law of Tax Exempt Organizations, § 25.1(f) (7th
ed. 1998).
33. Jennifer Preston reports on state efforts to reimburse hospitals for revenue
losses in providing below cost treatment for ininsured patients, mostly the working
poor, and numbering nationally close to 50 million persons, in Hospitals Look On
Charity Care As Unaffordable Option Of the Past: Squeezed By Managed Care and
Reduced Aid, N.Y. TIMES, April 14, 1996.
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appearance to the legislative agents of the taxpaying public.
Public pressures outside the denominational context of voluntary
adherence to religious belief, most notably, from competitive economic
needs, further constrain limitations upon religiously-based moral choices
in monopolized provision for public health care. Market factors forcing
down costs and sharpening competition for patients tend to level the
playing field with for-profit counterparts.34 This competition plays out in
the need to offer more attractive and more comprehensive service plans.
Modern medicine, thus, provides valuable services to the public in a
fiercely complex First Amendment zephyr. The law must bridle the
admittedly core exercise of religious freedom and ministry that is
institutional care of the acutely-sick and dying to three principled
limitations: 1) the right of the public to accessible, licensed and accredited
health care; 2) the right of patients to informed choice and freedom from
coercion in the delivery of health care services; and 3) the accepted
jurisprudential balance between custodial religious choice and the
paramount public interest in safeguarding the health and wellbeing of
children, disabled persons, and emergency patients whose lives may be
saved by alternative, medically acceptable procedures even within
religiously-operated facilities.
These limitations form the content of compelling state interests under
the jurisprudence of the Free Exercise clause allowing states to place
some limits upon church-related hospitals' free exercise of religion.
Religious exemption goes hand in hand with maintenance of the integrity
of free patient choice of services and providers.
When non-profit religious hospitals are sold to commercial health care
organizations local communities have expressed two pressing concerns:
(1) Will medical services continue to be provided for the poor and the
uninsured on a below-cost or cost-free basis; and (2) will the institutions
retain their historical religious identity so that religious ministries, not
only chaplaincies, but ethical medical-moral choices, may be made by the
institutions as such?35
34. See Donna Bellandi et al., Profitability A Matter of Ownership Status,"
MODERN HEALTHCARE, June 12, 2000; Bradford H. Gray, The Profit Motive and
Patient Care: The Changing Accountability of Doctors and Hospitals (1991).
35. For example, on November 23, 1998 the boards of two Alexian Brothers
Hospitals in Santa Clara County, California, announced a sale/exchange with
Columbia/HCA. In exchange for 2 Chicago-area Columbia hospitals, the Catholic
hospitals would leave San Jose, California, and receive in turn two for-profit
hospitals owned by Columbia in the Chicago area, converting them to private,
nonprofit Catholic hospitals. The sale was completed and the hospital exchange
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Market forces, continued governmental financing and its compliance
demands, and expansion of mandated covered services, will hedge the
parameters of religious choice. While the First Amendment affords
maximum protection for the free exercise of core religious beliefs,
countervailing patient rights may supply compelling state interests in
setting peripheral limitations upon institutional providers' choices in
individual cases. This article will attempt an orderly examination of the
balancing forces in institutional and personal choice, with some tentative
suggestions for future development.
We must make a distinction between the delivery of elective health
services and emergency life-sustaining care; between hospitals that are
obviously recognizable as religious and those that appear, to all intents
and purposes, the same as their secular non-profit or for-profit
counterparts; and between monopolized and alternative delivery systems
of health care. The current scenario in the national movement of health
care reform is so complex, so much in flux, and so locally differentiated
36that there is no simple answer to fit all cases. Religiously affiliated
hospitals cannot be squeezed into a single box. What is needed, and, I
believe, possible now, however, is the outline of a principled statement of
policy.
B. Religious Health Care Ministries Exercised in Varied Corporate
Configurations
To set the discussion into a practical context, let us take the example of
ten private hospitals. Each is a religiously affiliated hospital, built and
operated with faith-based motivation and dedication. Each hospital has a
generational dedication to public service in the community it serves. Each
hospital was built by the labor and risk capital of committed women and
men of religious faith who gave an essential part of their lives to the
spiritual ideals of ministry to the sick and dying." Each of these hospitals
became final January 15, 1999. Note also the sale of Catholic university medical
centers to Tenet Healthcare by Creighton in Omaha, Nebraska, and St. Louis
Universities, two Jesuit universities. Michael Place, Planned Sale of St. Louis
University Hospital to For-Profit Chain, 27 ORIGINs 497 (Jan. 14, 1998).
36. Paul M. Ellwood, Jr., and George D. Lundberg, Managed Care: A Work In
Progress, 276 J.A.M.A. 1083, 1083 (Oct. 2, 1996).
37. In addition to Paul Starr's work, supra, note 31, see the remarkable new
work of Guenter B. Risse, Mending Bodies, Saving Souls: A History of Hospitals
(1999); Odin Anderson, Health Services In the United States: A Growth Enterprise
Since 1875 (1985); Charles E. Rosenberg, The Care of Strangers: the Rise of
America's Hospital System (1987); and Eli Ginzberg, The Medical Triangle:
Physicians, Politicians and the Public (1990). See also Catholic Health
Association, Inventorying Church Property and Other Administrative Matters
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makes available to its patients chaplaincy and religious services of choice
on a noncoercive, ecumencial and cooperative basis. Each hospital has
teaching programs as well as community outreach services for the sick and
chronically ill. Each of these hospitals was originally founded by private
religious philanthropy to minister as an institution to the particular bodily
and spiritual needs of the sick and dying of the church or denomination
that sponsored it, though today a major component of its patient services
is to the general public. Each hospital retains specialists in medical ethics
to assist patients and professional staff with difficult moral choices in
treatment and care.
Revenue and financial support, for the most part, come from
government-funded programs, insured and contract services with health
maintenance organizations, though each hospital has an endowment
created over the years by investment of private philanthropies and surplus38
revenues. None of these hospitals discriminates among persons in any
way in provision of licensed services of the highest professional quality.
All are or were organized and operated as tax-exempt charities under the
provisions of Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code.3 9
Currently, there are at least four different kinds of corporate
configurations used by private religious hospitals: (1) As autonomous,
self-standing religious or non-profit public benefit corporations; (2) as
hospitals that share resources as part of systems of hospitals and health
care institutions of the same religious affiliation; (3) as hospitals that are
part of joint ventures and merged management systems with non-profit or
for-profit nonreligious or public hospitals under a unified governing
(1990) (a guide to segregating private from public funds contributed to the
building of medical facilities for purposes of allocation upon merger, acquisition
or termination).
38. While religious hospitals are unique in their histories and community
service records, and some churches, such as the Seventh-Day Adventist Church,
eschew entirely almost any kind of public funding, the assets of most religious
hospitals can be traced to four sources: 1) the contributions in money and donated
services of the sponsoring religious order or church; 2) corporate and private
donations; 3) public campaign financing, e.g., United Funds, etc.; and 4) federal
and state government grants or low-interest, long-term construction loans. A
substantial portion of the corporate and private donations are made based on
hospitals' specific religious affiliation. National Coalition On Catholic Health
Care Ministry, Catholic Health Care Ministry In Transition: A Handbook For
Responsible Leadership (1995).
39. I.R.C. § 507(a)(4) exempts from federal income taxation organizations
defined in Section 501(c)(3): "organized and operated exclusively for religious,
charitable... or educational purposes."
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board;40 (4) as hospitals sold to or merged with a for-profit commercial
health care corporations under contractual terms allowing them to retain
original names and religious services. Some of these may be involved
with multi-leveled businesses, whether subsidiaries or joint ventures, that
are aggressively purchasing PPOs, HMOs, etc. or have for-profit spin-offs
involving medical technologies, e.g., MRIs, etc. Some hospitals may have
acquired minority ownership rights in health plans or delivery systems or
contractual participation in them.
A large number of hospitals bearing denominational names, originally
established by the churches, are no longer institutionally affiliated with
the churches. They have become secular institutions or are now parts of
commercial healthcare systems. Our focus will be upon those hospitals
41
and health care systems retaining strong religious linkages.
The American Hospital Association Guide (2000) lists two hundred
and forty-four multi-hospital health care systems. Of these fifty-nine are
church-related. Forty-eight of these systems are sponsored and operated
by Catholic organizations, though not all of these include exclusively
42Catholic hospitals.
Providence Hospital in Washington, D.C., was founded in 1861 and
continues to be operated by a Catholic order of sisters, the Daughters of
Charity. The congressional charter of incorporation of the hospital was
signed by President Abraham Lincoln, making Providence Hospital the
oldest, continuously operating hospital in the nation's capital.
Providence Hospital, a 382-bed general service medical facility, with
Carroll Manor Nursing and Rehabilitation Center, with 240 beds, forms
the core of Providence Health System on its northeast Washington, D.C.
campus. Providence is a teaching hospital affiliated both with Howard
University School of Medicine and Georgetown University School of
Medicine. Georgetown Medical Center, across the city, a nationally
recognized research and graduate medical education university, is one of
40. There are a large number of faith-based hospitals that are affiliated with
secular nonprofit or forprofit hospitals in systems that are secular in title. For
example, two Catholic hospitals in California continue to bear their original
religious names and missions as acquired members of Columbia HCA, Inc., a
commercial health care system.
41. These brief institutional profiles have been compiled from information
supplied by the hospitals themselves, chiefly through their web sites and
brochures, or from cited cases and secondary sources provided and personal
experience.
42. Healthcare Infosource, Inc., American Hospital Assocation, AHA Guide
to the Health Care Field, Sec. 6, Classification Code #21--Church-operated (1999).
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four Jesuit, Catholic medical schools in this country. It is also home of the
first center for medical ethics, the Joseph and Rose Kennedy Institute of
Ethics.
Providence Hospital came before the Supreme Court in 1899 in
Bradfield v. Roberts," a pivotal decision holding that public funds
allocated by Congress for providing construction assistance to a hospital
operated under the auspices of a church or religious order do not violate
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. Since that decision
the hospital has grown to include among its services distinguished
programs in cardiology, geriatrics, maternity, oncology, orthopedics, and
palliative care, a great variety of outreach programs, such as the OB/GYN
Center for Life, offering prenatal and gynecologic services to women on a
cost-free basis, community based alcohol and drug rehabilitation
programs, and in-home visitation to the elderly.
Providence Hospital is obviously religious. Morning and evening
prayers are recited over the audio system; each room has a crucifix. Mass
is offered several times daily in the hospital chapel and sacraments are
brought to patients by chaplains and their assistants. Providence Hospital
is a member of the Catholic Health Association, headquartered in St.
Louis. 5 The hospital is also one of eighty hospitals, nursing homes and
clinics that form the Ascension National Health System.The Daughters of
Charity National Health System was formed in 1994 to consolidate
resources and revenues. Since then, in addition to Catholic hospitals, the
46
system has acquired several public or community hospitals. In 1999
43. The National Reference Center for Bioethics Literature is a specialized
collection of 22,000 books and over 130,000 classified articles available as a
research source for scholars and the general public. Available at
http://georgetown.edu/research/nrcbl (last visited Apr. 25, 2001), or 800-MED-
ETHX.
44. 175 U.S. 291 (1899); see Section V.B, infra.
45. The Catholic Health Association currently numbers 2000 hospital and
extended care facilities as members, making it the largest private health-care
provider association in the United States, accounting for about sixteen percent of
hospital services nationwide. (2000 statistics) This number includes 57 multi-
institutional networks, 247 health care centers, and 1556 specialized care facilities,
such as hospices, sanitoria, and AIDS care institutions, in addition to more than
600 hospitals. CHA, 4455 Woodson Road, St. Louis, MO 63134-3797.
46. For example, in 1998 Niagara Falls Memorial Medical Center, a nonprofit
community hospital serving many of Niagara Falls' poorest residents, in an effort
to stave off financial collapse, joined the Daughters of Charity. Lucette Lagnado,
Religious Practice: Their Role Growing, Catholic Hospitals Juggle Doctrine and
Medicine, WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 1999 at A-1.
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Daughters of Charity and Sisters of St. Joseph Health System merged to
form Ascension Health, based in St. Louis. Ascension Healthcare is the
largest non-profit healthcare system in this country.47
Ascension Health is one of forty-seven hospital systems developed out
of individual hospitals built and sponsored by Catholic religious orders or
dioceses in the past fifteen years.
Providence Hospital, as most other Catholic hospitals, adopted in its
Charter and Mission Statement a dedication to the aims and objectives of
the Catholic Health Association, as well as a determination to follow the
Ethical and Religious Directives of the Association for religious and
ethical decisions.48
Loma Linda Medical Center located in Loma Linda, California, just
thirty miles east of Los Angeles, is owned and operated by the Pacific
Conference of the Seventh-Day Adventist Church. Loma Linda Medical
Center is a part of Adventist Health System/West, an eight-member non-
profit hospital system, related to the national Adventist Health System of
thirty-three facilities currently.49 Adventist Health System [West was
challenged in California in 1994, in In the Matter of Adventist Health
System/West and Ukiah Adventist Hospital,0 in which the Federal Trade
Commission, relying on F.T.C. v. University Health, Inc.5" and United
States v. Philadelphia National Bank 2 held it had jurisdiction to enforce
47. See supra note 12.
48. The most recent revision of the Directives is cited as: U.S. Catholic
Bishops' Conference, Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care
Services (1994), reprinted in 24 ORIGINS 449 (1994).
49. See Arriaga v. Loma Linda University, 10 Cal. App. 4th 1556, 13 Cal. Rptr.
2d 619 (1992) (holding Loma Linda Medical Center exempt from California's Fair
Employment Practices Act as a "religious employer." CAL. Gov. CODE §
12926(d)(1)) (West Supp. 1999). Glendale Adventist Hospital is also a member of
the Adventist Health System/West. Elizabeth Ann Bouvia, suffering crippling
advanced-stage multiple sclerosis, was a patient at Glendale Adventist when she
asked for removal of her feeding tubes so she could die. The hospital staff refused
on ethical grounds. Ms. Bouvia was then moved to a public hospital, where the
staff also resisted her request. Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127,
225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1986). Ms. Bouvia is alive and residing in private care at this
writing. Note also Bartling v. Superior Court,163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 209 Cal. Rptr.
220 (1984) (vindicating patients' rights to refuse medical treatment even against
hospital providers' medical-moral judgment).
50. F.T.C. No. 9234 (April 1, 1994) (involving purchase of assets of a hospital
by two nonprofit religious corporations).
51. 938 F. 2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1991).
52. 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
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anti-trust regulations under Section 7 of the Clayton Act against business
combinations of non-profit corporations.
Loma Linda Medical Center itself, a part of Loma Linda University, is
incorporated autonomously as a religious corporation under California
law. Loma Linda Hospital is not a public benefit non-profit corporation,
but a corporation organized and operated "exclusively for religious
purposes" under state law.53 It is a constituent part of the Seventh-Day
Adventist Church. The Medical Center, with nearly 5,200 employees, is a
leading national research hospital and tertiary care center. Loma Linda is
a national leader particularly in infant heart transplants and cancer
treatment. The medical center was founded in 1905 by members of the
Seventh-Day Adventist Church and has taken no public funds for
subsequent construction of the vast hospital complex. Not only is Loma
Linda chartered as a religious corporation, it specifically subscribes to the
beliefs and moral directives of the Seventh-Day Adventist Church.54
Loma Linda is a hospital serving the general public and embracing
outreach services linked to seventeen hospitals and medical centers in
California, Arizona, Nevada, Utah and Hawaii."
Beth Israel Deaconness Hospital in Boston was formed by the merger of
Beth Israel and Deaconness Hospitals in Boston in November, 1989, and
re-incorporated in 1996. Beth Israel Hospital was conceived by members
of several Jewish congregations in Boston in 1901 forming the Mount
Sinai Hospital Association in order to provide hospital services to the
city's immigrant communities and to the public in an atmosphere in which
their own sick would not have to bear the indignity of conversion attempts
and could peacefully follow the rituals, prayers and dietary regulations of
56the Jewish faith. The original effort failed, but the hospital's resources
were transferred in 1916 to the newly-dedicated Beth Israel Hospital in
Roxbury. In 1928 the hospital moved to a new 200 bed facility on
Brookline Avenue and became a teaching affiliate of Harvard Medical
53. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 9110 et seq. (West 1999).
54. Seventh-Day Adventist Church, General Conference, Statement,
Guidelines & Other Documents: A Compilation (n.d.).
55. In addition to Loma Linda Medical Center, there are two other Seventh-
Day Adventist Health Care systems, with eighteen hospitals headquartered in
Rosewill, CA, and with another eighteen hospitals, based in Winter Park, FLA.
http://www.ahss.org (last visited Apr. 25, 2001); http://www.adventisthealth.org
(last visited Apr. 25, 2001).
56. SAMUEL GOROVITZ, DRAWING THE LINE: LIFE, DEATH, AND ETHICAL
CHOICES IN AN AMERICAN HOSPITAL 3-7 (1991). See also TINA LEVITAN, ISLANDS
OF COMPASSION 29-30 (1964); PAUL STARR, supra note 31, at 153-54.
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School. By 1990 it had grown into Boston's largest private hospital, with
500 beds, sixteen buildings, its staff physicians organized into two dozen
clinical departments, with a nursing staff of over 800 nurses, providing
ambulatory care in fifty different units. As a major research center, Beth
Israel supports several libraries and forty or more laboratories.
Until the merger and reincorporation of Beth Israel-Deaconness
Hospital in 1996, trustees of Beth Israel Hospital, as well as donors, were
prominent Jewish members of Boston's business and professional
community. After the merger, Beth Israel remains a Jewish hospital and
the preferred acute care provider for the Jewish community in Boston,
while technically incorporated as a non-sectarian public benefit health
care organization.
Beth Israel hospital was reorganized as a public benefit corporation
under Massachusetts law in its by-laws and statement of purpose clearly
espousing adherence to the beliefs and practices of Judaism. The
hospital's internal policy statements covering ethical issues are available
to staff and patients and interpreted by a board of medical ethicists, both
Jewish and non-Jewish.57
Deaconness Hospital was, independently, one of the Boston area's
largest and most honored Christian hospitals. In 1896, as part of their
missionary charter, Methodist deaconnesses founded Deaconness
Hospital to care for the city's residents. Deaconness remains affiliated
with the United Methodist Church. Over the years the public dedication
of the Hospital has been to the ethical principles and ministries of healing
in the context of Christian faith commitments. The merger of Beth Israel
and Deaconness in 1996 did not create a health care institution that is
entirely secular in purpose, but rather the fusing and conjoining of these
great religious traditions in the healing arts.
Beth Israel Hospital came before the Supreme Court in 1978 after the
1974 congressional amendment extending National Labor Relations
Board coverage and protection to employees of non-profit health care
institutions.18 Beth-Israel Deaconness Hospital is part of a shared
57. See Gorovitz, supra note 56.
58. Coverage was achieved by deleting from the definition of "employer" in §
2 (2) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152 (2), the provision that
an "employer" shall not include "any corporation or association operating a
hospital, if no part of the net earnings inure to the benefit of any private
shareholder or individual." Act of June 23, 1947, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136. Beth Israel
Hosp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 437 U.S. 483 (1978) (on the issue of the
hospitals no-distribution and solicitation rules). Beth Israel Hospital was decided
in close conjunction with National Labor Relations Board v. Baptist Hospital, Inc.,
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resource health care system of hospitals in New England, staffed by
eighteen hundred physicians. 9 Included in the system are six Deaconness
hospitals, as well as the New England Baptist Hospital. Beth-Israel
Deaconness is affiliated with community health centers in Boston,
Dorchester, Roxbury, Quincy and other areas.
Baylor University Medical Center in Dallas, Texas, is a Baptist
hospital.60 It forms the core of the Baylor Health Care System,
established in 1981, a seven member hospital group, which, in turn, is
related to nine other major systems of Baptist hospitals, headquartered in
Montgomery, Little Rock, Pensacola, San Antonio, Louisville,
Birmingham, Coral Gables, Phoenix, Memphis and Atlanta. There are
seventy Baptist hospitals in these systems.
Baylor University Medical Center began in Dallas in 1903 as Good
Samaritan Hospital.6  A year later it was purchased by the Baptist
General Convention of Texas, and re-named Texas Baptist Memorial
Sanitarium. Fifty-five years later, as Baylor University Medical Center, it
comprised five connecting patient hospitals and a cancer center as the
second largest non-profit hospital in the United States.6' Baylor
University Medical Center was split in 1943, when Baylor College of
Medicine moved to Houston. In Dallas medical education continues,
however, as the hospital is still a teaching and research hospital of Baylor
University College of Medicine.
On March 3, 1997, Baylor Health Care System established legal
autonomy from the Baylor University Board of Regents in Waco, Texas,
while continuing to support the University's nursing and medical
education programs. The Medical Center continues its union with the
Southern Baptist General Convention of Texas. Baylor's articles of
incorporation indicate that the trustees are appointed by the church body
and the hospital is dedicated to the religious mission and beliefs of the
Baptist faith.
Advocate Lutheran General Hospital in Park Ridge, Illinois, is a six-
hundred bed hospital in Chicago's northwestern suburbs. It is a teaching
hospital for the University of Illinois at Chicago Health Sciences Center, a
442 U.S. 773 (1979) (unfair labor practice to refuse to bargain with employee
union).
59. Id.
60. Lana Henderson, BAYLOR UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER (1978).
61. Susan Hall, Baylor University Medical Center, THE HANDBOOK OF TEXAS
ONLINE, available at http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/handbook/online/
articles/view/BB/sbb3.html (last visited Apr. 25, 2001).
62. Id.
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Level I Trauma Center for both adult and pediatric care, and Level III
perinatal and neonatal services. The medical staff consists of more than
one thousand physicians, practicing in sixty-five specialties.
Advocate Lutheran General Hospital is the hub of the largest health
care system in Chicago, Advocate Health Care, Inc. Advocate was
incorporated in 1995, but actually traces its origins to hospitals founded by
predecessor churches of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America and
the United Church of Christ. Advocate has eight hospitals with over
three thousand beds and is Illinois' largest privately held full-service home
health care company among its more than two hundred sites of care. In
1995, Evangelical Health Systems and Lutheran General HealthSystem,
two faith-based organizations, joined to create Advocate Health Care. A
common mission, values and philosophy were developed from the similar-
mission oriented histories of both organizations.
In 1906 the Evangelical Synod of North America formed the German
Evangelical Deaconess Hospital in Chicago. In 1934, the Evangelical
Synod and the Reformed Church in the United States merged to form the
Evangelical and Reformed Church. A subsequent merger with the
Congregational Christian Churches formed the United Church of Christ
(UCC) in 1957, and the health care organization became a UCC affiliate.
The formation of the organization was a direct response of the church to
the Christian imperative to include healing as part of its ministry.
Lutheran General HealthSystem was founded in 1897, originally as the
Norwegian Lutheran Deaconess Home and Hospital. In 1904 the hospital
came under the control of the Norwegian Lutheran Church, which later
evolved into the Evangelical Lutheran Church, The American Lutheran
Church, and now the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America.
In 1959 the Lutheran Institute of Human Ecology was formed to
establish ministries in alcoholism and substance abuse, senior services,
parish nursing, bio-ethics and medical education. Lutheran General
HealthSystem grew after 1961 into a vertically integrated service
organization committed to providing a continuum of health care for its
communities.
Advocate Health's website declares: "The mission of Advocate Health
Care is to serve the health needs of individuals, families and communities
through a holistic philosophy rooted in our fundamental understanding of
human beings as created in the image of God."63
Affiliated with Advocate General Lutheran Hospital is the famous
63. Advocate Health Care, What is MVP?, available at
http://www.advocatehealth.com/about/mvp.html (last visited Apr. 25, 2001).
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Park Ridge Center for the Study of Health, Faith and Ethics.64 The
Center publishes a journal of bio-medical ethics quarterly, entitled Second
61Opinion.
Some religious hospitals have been sold to business enterprises
operating vast commercial hospital systems. St. Francis Hospital in
Charleston, South Carolina, is now a part of the Columbia/HCA, a
Nashville-based for-profit health maintenance system. Columbia/HCA is
the nation's largest for-profit health care chain, with reported net patient
revenue of $16,700,100,000 in 1999.
6
In 1995, financially strained and $56 million in debt, the St. Francis
hospital board sought merger with another of Charleston's three
hospitals. When merger negotiations failed, St. Francis Hospital directors
agreed to enter a joint partnership agreement with Columbia/HCA as the
only way to preserve its financial viability.
7
Columbia/HCA paid $200 million in a deal jointly to own and operate
St. Francis, St. Vincent Charity Hospital and St. John West Shore
Hospital in Cleveland, Timken Mercy Medical Center in Canton, Ohio,
and Providence Hospital in Columbia, South Carolina, all hospitals
wholly owned by the Sisters of Charity of St. Augustine Health System.
The transaction marked the first time a Catholic health system signed
such an agreement with an investor-owned health care chain.6
64. The Park Ridge Center, Our Mission, available at
http://www.parkridgecenter.edu (last visited Apr. 25, 2001).
65. Id.
66. Bellandi, supra note 11.
67. M. Rita Schroeder & John I. Mansfield, Creating a Private Association:
The St. Francis Experience, HEALTH PROGRESS 41-57 (Sept. 1996).
68. The agreement also included Ohio Health Choice, the second largest
preferred provider organization (PPO) in Ohio, and Professional Medical
Equipment Services, a durable medical and fitness equipment corporation. BNA
HEALTH REPORTER, Nov. 9, 1995. There have been instances in which public
hospitals have been staffed under state contracts by religious organizations. For
example, in 1959 the Daughters of Charity withdrew from a contract to operate
City Hospital in Mobile, Alabama (now the University of South Alabama Medical
Center). The original contract was patterned on an agreement with the State of
Louisiana for operating Charity Hospital in New Orleans. Neither hospital
became a member of the Catholic Health Association or was recognized as a
religious hospital. Similarly, the North Philadelphia Health System, formed after
the bankruptcy of St. Joseph Hospital and Girard Medical Center, both innercity
facilities, as a system agreed to observe the Ethical and Religious Directives for
Catholic Health Facilities and St. Joseph's continues to follow these principles,
although it is no longer recognized as Catholic by the Archdiocese of Philadelphia,
even though the Archdiocese supports its work to provide quality health care to
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Columbia/HCA agreed to a fifty-fifty joint venture partnership, in
which Columbia/HCA purchased half of the Catholic charity's assets.
The Sisters reserved the right to nominate half of the partnership board,
and retained a fifty percent interest in the assets of the new partnership.
In the agreement Columbia/HCA made a commitment to continuance of
the religious traditions and affiliation of the hospitals and their adherence
to the Religious and Ethical Directives of the Catholic Health Association.69
The symbolism of religion, religious prayers and chapel services
continue. 0
St. Francis Hospital is no longer a member of the Catholic Health
Association, which prohibits sale of a member hospital to any for-profit
corporation." Additionally, it has lost its tax exempt status. The Catholic
Health Association highlights the differences between offering health care
services as a ministry and offering them as a means of obtaining
shareholder dividends. Health care, the Association says, is a ministry,
not part of an industry.
Each of these major hospitals is one of several in the market (or
community) it serves. There are alternative hospitals and out-patient
clinics in each city. Each hospital is unmistakably religious in character
and purpose. Each is an organization affiliated with a larger
denomination that subscribes to, teaches and observes a code of medical
ethics rooted in religious belief and tradition.
There are, however, many religiously affiliated hospitals that are the
sole medical service providers in the communities in which they serve. In
these communities patient choice of acute care providers for needed or
requested reproductive medical care is drastically constricted.
Sacred Heart Hospital in Eugene, Oregon, a subsidiary of a parent
corporation, PeaceHealth, Inc., which is wholly owned as a non-profit
corporation by the Sisters of St. Joseph of Peace, is in exactly this
situation. In 1994 Sacred Heart began merger plans to integrate three
innercity patients. 4 BNA HEALTH LAW REPORTER 1451, Sept. 28, 1995.
69. Schroeder & Mansfield, supra note 67.
70. Id.
71. Transition to for-profit status entails a necessary shift in governance from
the sponsoring religious organizations to shareholders. Loss of essential control is
incompatible with continuing religious identity. See, Section VII,B,3, infra. Code
of Canon Law, canon 301 (1983). Tony and Susan Alamo Foundation v. Sec. of
Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1984). See also Francis G. Morrisey, What Makes an
Institution 'Catholic'? 47 THE JURIST 538 (1987).
72. See Jane Hochberg, The Sacred Heart Story: Hospital Mergers and Their
Effects On Reproductive Rights, 75 OR. L. REV. 945 (1996).
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other medical groups in Eugene: the Eugene Clinic, the Oregon Medical
Group and the Medical/Specialists Group. Sacred Heart, the only general
hospital in the community, would own the practices and take over the
facilities and assets of these providers.73 Part of the plan involved
announced restrictions on abortions and artificial insemination services by
affiliated physicians. A coalition of community advocates initiated strong
protests and a campaign to stop the merger. Among the obvious reasons
given, was that the closing of these clinics to abortion services would
single out other providers as targets of protest and violence, and
"deprive[s] women of the option of turning to their own doctors for
assistance in terminating unwanted pregnancies.
In July 1995, PeaceHealth completed the merger. The following fall,
ten more physicians joined PeaceHealth. 7' The result was that seventy
percent of the hospital services in the entire county, in addition to
outpatient clinics and physician networks, were controlled by
PeaceHealth. Prior to the merger, the Eugene area was the only place for
much of the State of Oregon in which a woman could receive an abortion.
After the merger, the majority of the population of the City of Eugene, in
which the Catholic population numbers about four percent, was
significantly restricted in its choice of women's health services by the
limitations of Catholic ethical norms. PeaceHealth merged with
73. In 1974 Sacred Heart Hospital was a defendant in the most famous of the
"conscience" cases brought under the free exercise clause of the First
Amendment, Chrisman v. Sisters of St. Joseph of Peace, 506 F. 2d 308 (9th Cir.
1974). A 23-year old married woman, Barbara Ann Chrisman, sought a tubal
ligation after her second birth at the hospital. Sacred Heart refused to allow the
procedure to be performed there, so the woman received the operation at a
nearby hospital. The woman brought a civil rights case in federal court
subsequently against the hospital, alleging that the hospital deprived her of her
civil rights under color of law. The hospital was tax exempt, regulated by the state
and received funds under the federal Hill-Burton Act. The Ninth Circuit held that
the state was not involved in invidious discrimination and refused to grant the
plaintiff equitable relief because of the recently-enacted Church Act. See note 362
infra. The opinion concluded that, since the plaintiff received the procedure in
another local facility, the issue was moot.
74. C.H.O.I.C.E., a leading opponent, included membership by Planned
Parenthood, the American Civil Liberties Union, the National Abortion and
Reproductive Rights Action League of Oregon, the Feminist Women's Health
Center, and Republicans for Choice. See Hochberg,, supra, note 72.
75. Id. (citing CYNTHIA GiBSON, CATHOLICS FOR A FREE CHOICE, RISKY




Providence Healthcare after the Eugene transactions, adding hospitals in
Portland, Medford, Seaside and Newberg, Oregon, and gaining affiliations
in Washington State and Alaska. The consolidation of rural and small
community hospitals" poses similar problems of restricted choice where
the ultimate provider affiliates with a religious hospital." Currently, there
are forty-six communities in which Catholic hospitals are the sole
providers.79 Catholics make up less than one-fourth of the population in
• • • 80
twenty-nine of these forty-six communities.
Some private hospitals can be recognized by prospective patients only
with great difficulty and after careful investigation, as serving a religious
mission, let alone as non-profit charities.
Mercy Healthcare, Sacramento, California, was formed in 1987 to
provide management and support functions for the Sacramento,
77. The Health Care Financing Administration (HFCA) in 1996 revised its
criteria under the Medicare and Medicaid programs for rural hospitals to be
qualified as Essential Access Community Hospitals (EACH). Under the revised
criteria, the HCFA may designate a hospital as an EACH if the hospital cannot be
so designated by the state because it has fewer than 75 beds and is located 35 miles
or less from another hospital. Hospitals in rural areas that are designated as
EACHs by the HCFA are treated, for payment purposes, as sole community
hospitals, which typically entitles the facilities to a higher level of payment for
their inpatient services than they would otherwise receive. The Regulations are
designed to facilitate development of network affiliations between rural EACHs
and small rural facilities, known as Rural Primary Care Hospitals (RPCHs).
Among criteria for EACH designation is that the hospital have "in effect an
agreement, with each rural primary care hospital participating in the rural health
network of which it is a member, to accept patients transferred from such primary
care hospital, to receive data from and transmit data to such primary care hospital,
and to provide staff privileges to physicians providing care at such primary care
hospital ...." EACH designation, thus, provides pooling of resources by creating
acute care monopolies in the designated rural areas. The program is restricted to
those states (7) that have been given federal grants for their activities to support it.
The individual states provide certification of what constitutes adequate medical
services at the designated hospitals. Rules and Regulations, Dep't. of Health and
Human Services, Health Care Financing Administration: Medicare and Medicaid
Progam: Criteria for a Rural Hospital to be Designated As an Essential Access
Community Hospital (EACH), 42 CFR Part 412, cited as: 61 F.R. 21969 (No. 93).
As of this writing forty-six Catholic hospitals located in rural areas are designated
by the Health Care Financing Administration as "sole community providers." 42
C.F.R. §§ 412.90, 412.92; Ikemoto, supra note 6.
78. See Ikemoto, supra note 6.
79. Id.
80. Hospital Mergers: The Threat to Reproductive Health Services, REPROD.
RTS. UPDATE, Oct. 1995 at 2. (ACLU/Reprod. Freedom Project, New York).
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California area Mercy hospital facilities. The core hospital is Mercy
General Hospital, formerly Mater Misericordiae (Mother of Mercy)
Hospital, founded in 1897 by the Sisters of Mercy. Most of the financing
for the original Mercy Hospital buildings, as well as for subsequent
additions and new buildings, was contributed by members of the Roman
Catholic faith.
MHS is sponsored now by three religious orders of the Catholic
Church: The Sisters of Mercy, Burlingame; the Sisters of Mercy, of
Auburn; and the Sisters of St. Dominic of the Most Holy Rosary of
Adrian, Michigan. The sponsoring orders of sisters "are organized under
the auspices, and as an integral part, of the Roman Catholic Church for
the purpose of furthering the Church's teachings and tenets."'" MHS's
articles of incorporation and bylaws reflect its religious mission: "MHS's
mission is to continue to incorporate the healing ministry of the Church
and the values and principles of the Ethical and Religious Directives for
Catholic Health Facilities into the practice of medicine."82 MHS's bylaws
require that its activities be "carried on subject to the moral and ethical
principles of the Roman Catholic Church," and "[n]o activities and
procedures shall be permitted within the facilities owned by the
corporation which are contrary... to the Ethical and Religious
Directives. ' The sole member of MHS is Catholic Healthcare West, a
non-profit public benefit corporation.
81. McKeon v. Mercy Healthcare, Sacramento, 19 Cal. 4th 321, 323, 79 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 319 (1998).
82. Id.; see also Seventh-Day Adventist Church, supra note 54.
83. McKeon, 19 Cal. 4th at 324.
84. Catholic Healthcare West is a merged management corporation with 48
hospitals in California, Arizona and Nevada. In 1992 CHW acquired its first non-
Catholic facility, Methodist Hospital in Sacramento. In addition to hospitals, it
has bought eight medical groups and a small stake in MedPartners, Inc., the
physician-practice management giant based in Birmingham, Alabama. In 1997 it
combined with Samaritan Health Systems of Phoenix, Arizona's largest health-
care provider with six hospitals. In October, 1999, CHW purchased South Valley
Hospital in Gilroy, California, from Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., enabling it
to close its nearby St. Louise Hospital in Morgan Hill, and move all its operations
to the larger facility in Gilroy. Both South Valley and St. Louise lost over $65
million in the last ten years. The consolidation will reduce annual overhead costs
by an expected $13.7 million and result in positive net income. CHW's combined
1999 annual net patient revenues approached $4 billion, making it one of the five
largest U.S. hospital companies. In 1996 CHW paid out $174 million for charitable
and community programs in the various communities it serves. Catholic
Healthcare West is governed by a board, known as the corporate member board,
composed of 10 nuns appointed by their sponsoring orders. Direct management is
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In 1987 California's Non-profit Corporation Act provided
incorporation of non-profit organizations in one or other of three
exclusive categories: (1) Non-profit public benefit corporation; 85 (2) non-
profit mutual benefit corporation; 86 or (3) non-profit religious
corporation. 7 Since at that time the third category was thought to apply
to parish churches and closely-related religious organizations serving
principally the members of the churches themselves, MHS chose to
incorporate as a non-profit public benefit corporation. MHS is a health
care corporation serving the public in general, not just its co-religionists.
MHS recently appeared as a defendant in an employment
discrimination case filed by a terminated registered nurse on gender and
racial grounds. MHS obtained summary dismissal at the trial level on the
basis of the exemption from the California Fair Employment and Housing
Act 8' for "a religious association or corporation not organized for private
profit."89  The Court of Appeal reversed, holding the exemption
applicable only to entities organized under the Non-profit Religious
Corporation Act,9° not charities organized and operated as Public Benefit
Corporations. The California Supreme Court reversed, in a unanimous
decision, holding the exemption applicable regardless of the particular
kind of corporate formation used by the hospital corporation. 9 In other
words, the California Supreme Court held that the form of incorporation
is irrelevant to institutional religious exemption. 9
in the hands of CHW's separate 17-member management board of mostly lay
directors. Day-to-day operations are in the hands of professional managers,
however, the nuns must sign off on all major decisions, such as new acquisitions or
corporate developments.
85. 26 U.S.C. § 501 (c)(3) (1994).
86. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 7110 et seq. (West 1990).
87. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 9110 et seq. (West 1990).
88. CAL. Gov. CODE §§ 12900 et seq. (West Supp. 1998).
89. CAL. Gov. CODE § 12926(d)(1) (West 1990).
90. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 9110 et seq. (West 1990).
91. McKeon v. Mercy Healthcare Sacramento, 19 Cal. 4th 321, 79 Cal. Rptr.
2d 319 (1998).
92. The Court found that neither the language nor the history of California's
Fair Employment Practice Act, Cal. Gov. Code § 12926(d)(1) require
incorporation at all, let alone a particular kind of corporate structure. To take
advantage of the exemption under state law, an employer need only be "religious"
and "not organized for private benefit." Id. The Fair Employment Practice Act
antedated the Nonprofit Corporation Law by twenty years and was not amended
subsequently. Only after 1977 in California did nonprofit corporations have a
choice of three corporation forms, that is, public benefit, mutual benefit, or
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The importance of the McKeon decision for our purposes is not that
the hospital won dismissal of a race and gender discrimination case on the
basis of state-mandated religious exemption, a sad and arguably
disallowed exemption had the case been brought under fair employment
practices provisions of federal law,93 but, rather, that the employee could
build a plausible case for the Court of Appeal that the hospital was
organized and operated as a secular entity.
Added to the fact that many, if not most, of the hospital employees did
not share the religious faith of the hospital board was a board decision
made by Catholic Healthcare West, the parent group headquartered in
San Francisco, the previous summer to advertise "comprehensive
women's health care services" as "CHW," rather than "Catholic"
Healthcare West, in order to disguise its identity to prospective patient
subscribers." While the board vote to actually change the name of the
hospital chain to fit a secular image narrowly failed, television
commercials in California still run, advertising women's health services
and sports medicine programs sponsored by "CHW" hospitals. Interested
individuals must probe to discover the meaning of the "C", as, indeed,
individual subscribers through group health insurance plans must
religious corporation. Religious nonprofit corporations have always been
accorded separate treatment under California's nonprofit laws because of their
unique protected status under the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution. See also Arriaga v. Loma Linda University, 10 Cal. App. 4th 1556, 13
Cal. Rptr. 2d 619 (1992) (hospital incorporated as a religious corporation); Kelly
v. Methodist Hospital of S. Cal., 22 Cal. 4th 1108, 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 514, 997 P. 2d
1169 (2000) (religious hospital was an exempt "religious employer" under
California's Fair Employment and Housing Act).
93. Title VII, Section 710 of the Equal Employment Opportunities Act, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1994). See the Civil Rights Act of 1991, adding 42 U.S.C. §
1981(a) covering lawsuits for intentional discrimination under Title VII, the ADA,
and the Rehabilitation Act. See also Pacific Union Conference of Seventh-Day
Adventists v. Marshall, 434 U.S. 1305 (1977); Elbaz v. Congregation Beth Judea,
Inc., 812 F. Supp. 802 (N.D. I11, 1992); EEOC v. Fremont Christian Schools, 609 F.
Supp. 344 (D. Cal. 1984); William W. Bassett, 1 RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS AND
THE LAW, Chap. 6, Employment Standards and Policies, §§ 6:15, 6:18 (and
Supplement 1998); Consumer Attorneys of California, Religious Charities As
Employers in California: The Supreme Court's Stretch of Immunity from Work-
Related Discrimination Suits, 30 FORUM 10-14 (2000).
94. Aside from the name, Catholic Healthcare West's website, print and
electronic media advertising contain no notice to prospective enrollees of any
ethically restricted services or mention of the Ethical and Religious Directives of
the Catholic Health Association. See http://www.chw.edu (last visited Apr. 25,
2001).
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investigate lists of preferred provider hospitals to discover where
particular services may be available."
Employees, as a matter of course, do not read mission statements in the
articles of incorporation and bylaws of employing corporations. Neither
do patients.
If religious identity is obscured, shall the constitutionally-protected
rights of patients, as well of employees, be lost by default?
After the McKeon decision the state legislature revisited the "religious
employer" exemption of the Fair Employment and Housing Act.
Amendments, effective January 1, 2000, eliminate the exemption from
employment discrimination law for religious hospitals serving the general
public. The result of the new legislation is that public benefit non-profit
religious health care organizations in California are fully subject, as other
employers, to the anti-discrimination provisions of state labor law, except
where religion is a bona fide occupational qualification for employment.96
Many non-profit religious hospitals have formed systems with other
local hospitals affiliated with different denominations.
Iowa Methodist Medical Center (IMMC) in Des Moines, Iowa, is
affiliated with the United Methodist Church. It is a member of the
Methodist Health Systems, served by the United Methodist Association
of Health and Welfare Ministries in Dayton, Ohio. The Association
95. Ironically, it should be noted that, while the hospital system's own
advertising eschews the "Catholic" appellation, to give it broader patient and
physician appeal, its unions, in a series of continuing acrimonious campaigns
against the hospital system, in their advertising, to embarrass the hospital
administration chide the system for its personnel failures as a "Catholic" hospital
group! Kelly St. John & Benjamin Primental, Hospital Chain's Woes Continue to
Mount, SAN FRAN. CHRON., Aug. 2, 2000, at A17.
96. On October 9, 1999, Governor Davis signed into law a bill revising the
religious-entity exemption by adding Sections 12922 and 12926.2 to the
Government Code (Stats. 1999, ch. 913, 1,2). Section 12922 provides that an
"employer that is a religious corporation may restrict eligibility for employment in
any position involving the performance of religious duties to adherents of ... the
religion for which the corporation is organized." Section 12926.2 provides
statutory definitions for the terms "religious corporation", "religious duties" and
"employer." That section further provides that employers covered by FEHA
include "a religious corporation or association with respect to persons employed
by the religious association or corporation to perform duties, other than religious
duties, at a health care facility operated by the religious association or corporation
for the provision of health care that is not restricted to adherents of the religion
that established the association or corporation." (12926.2, subd. (c)). These
modifications to the religious-entity exemption went into effect on January 1,
2000.
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numbers more than fifty Methodist hospitals. It is currently engaged in a
self-study program, dubbed EAGLE, to provide guidelines towards
hospital excellence. There are four Methodist multi-hospital systems
identified as such. Many more Methodist hospitals share resources in
systems with community, non-denominational and denominational
hospitals of other churches.
Iowa Methodist Medical Center is Iowa's largest private hospital. It
was opened in 1901 by deaconesses of the Methodist Church with thirty
beds; it now has 710 beds on a forty-two-acre campus, and employs nearly
four thousand people. In 1998 the Medical Center formed the Iowa
Health Foundation and merged with Iowa Lutheran Hospital and Blank
Children's Hospital.
Iowa Lutheran Hospital opened in 1914. Today it is a 465-bed acute
care facility averaging more than nine thousand inpatient admissions and
seventy thousand outpatient admissions every year. Christian chaplains,
as well as local rabbis, minister to the religious needs of patients in the
hospital, and the hospital broadcasts a daily in-house sermon for the
benefit of patients, staff and visitors.
In 1987 IMMC figured in the Iowa Supreme Court's now classic
decision adopting the "patient rule" in all informed consent cases.97 The
hospital itself, however, was released of liability for negligent failure to
inform on grounds that the institution "does not practice medicine," thus,
has no immediate "duty to inform a patient of matters that lie at the heart
of the doctor-patient relationship." 98
The corporate service of each of these hospitals, as far as the religious
order, church or denomination under whose auspices it was founded and
continues to operate, is not a business. It is a fundamental and essential
religious ministry, first provided historically to its own members, but
contemporarily extended to the public in general without distinction." In
97. Pauscher v. Iowa Methodist Medical Center, 408 N.W.2d 355 (Iowa 1987)
(rejecting the so-called "professional rule", holding the physician's duty to disclose
is measured by the patient's need to have access to all information material to
making a truly informed and intelligent decision concerning the proposed medial
procedure). Holding a Methodist hospital a "religious employer" under
California's employment discrimination laws is Kelly v. Methodist Hospital of
Southern California, 22 Cal. 4th 1108, 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 514 (2000).
98. Pauscher, 408 N.W.2d at 361; see Section VII, infra; see also Kenneth
Abraham & Paul Weiler, Enterprise Medical Care Liability and the Evolution of
the American Health Care System, 108 HARv. L. REV. 381, 390 (1994).
99. "For the church, health and the healing apostolate take on special
significance because of the church's long tradition of involvement in this area and
because the church considers health care to be a basic human right which flows
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fact, the financial and regulatory reality is that any kind of corporation,
including acute-care hospitals, receiving federal funds, cannot serve its
own faith communities without at the same time serving the general
public on a nondiscriminatory basis.
All of these religious hospitals subscribe to the articulated ethics and
beliefs of their church sponsors. Their healing ministry, indeed, is
motivated and infused with an integrated conception of human life of
which medical ethics is a vital component.' 1 Needless to say, the nearly
one thousand church-affiliated hospitals in this country are an
indispensable component of the nation's health care system overall.
II. HEALTH CARE MINISTRY IS A RELIGIOUS SERVICE INVOLVING
BOTH CARE OF INDIVIDUALS AND GOVERNANCE OF INSTITUTIONS
In truth, religion, in St. Augustine's words, aliquid totum esse, is
not a department of life, but a totality of vision and perspective."' The
substantive and radical value of religious freedom is not individual
choices, but the liberty to believe in human life as a transcendent totality
and act upon that belief, whether individually or in cooperative
endeavors. One cannot lop off a particular practice or two by relativizing
their relationships to the whole. While the particulars of religious
ministry to the sick may change over time, with advancing technology or
changing financial constraints, inspired and gratuitous service to the sick
as such is an essential component of all Abrahamic denominations.
Religious ministry to the sick, injured and dying is not peripheral, nor are
the particularized moral conclusions directing medical interventions
unrelated to the core content of faith.
When free exercise is in the balance, the issue is not whether or not a
particularized constraint is reasonable, or exceptions may be drawn to it,
or whether other religious providers do or do not go along with it, but,
from the sanctity of human life." Health and Health Care: A Pastoral Letter of the
American Bishops, Nov. 19, 1981, p. 3. United States Catholic Conference (1982).
100. See National Coalition On Catholic Health Care Ministry, supra note 38.
101. See generally, ELLIOT N. DORFF, MA-17ERS OF LIFE AND DEATH: A
JEWISH APPROACH TO MODERN MEDICAL ETHICS, 14-33 (1998).
102. Augustine, De Doctrina Christiana, 1, II; see also Louis DUPRt, THE
OTHER DIMENSION: A SEARCH FOR THE MEANING OF RELIGIOUS ATTITUDES,
25-30, 50-61 (1972). St. Augustine is paraphrased by the United States Supreme.
Court in Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion in Wisconsin v. Yoder, speaking
of the Old Order Amish, "religion pervades and determines the entire mode of
life of its adherents." 406 US. 205, 210 (1972). Note also Judge Arlin Adam's
description of religion in Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F. 2d 197, 208 (3d Cir. 1979), the
Ninth Circuit's ruling in Thomas v. Anchorage Fair Employment and Housing
Commission, 165 F.3d 392 (9th Cir. 1999).
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rather, whether the individual health care provider may be free of the
burden of the state to make practical decisions compelled by the core
religious vision that he or she espouses.
Every religiously affiliated entity generally is both secular and religious
to some extent, from small organizations like soup kitchens and parochial
schools to large organizations like religiously affiliated universities and
the Christian Science Monitor. The organizations are not legally
disqualified for religious protections under federal and state constitutional
jurisprudence simply because some of the services they perform may be
duplicated in some manner by secular institutions. The courts are
incapable of parsing out various levels of religious sufficiency among the
myriad types of religiously affiliated entities in order to determine when
free exercise protections apply. Attempts to create religious sufficiency
tests by the courts pose problems of impermissible theological conjecture
and chilling government entanglement in religion. Any organization
organized and operated with colorable religious motivation and
substantial bona fide religious affiliations is presumptively the object of
First Amendment solicitude under the religion clauses.
The government is incompetent, furthermore, to evaluate the link
between religious faith and moral norms. Justice Brennan's concurring
opinion in Presiding Bishop of the Church of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos,' °4
that religious organizations, not just individuals, are protected under the
free exercise clause of the First Amendment, is on point:
What makes the application of a religious-secular distinction
difficult is that the character of the activity is not self-evident.
As a result, determining whether an activity is religious or
secular requires a searching case-by-case analysis. This results
in considerable ongoing government entanglement in religious
affairs. Furthermore, this prospect of government intrusion
raises concern that a religious organization may be chilled in its
free exercise activity. While a church may regard the conduct of
certain functions as integral to its mission, a court may disagree.
A religious organization therefore would have an incentive to
characterize as religious only those activities about which there
likely would be no dispute, even if it genuinely believed that
that religious commitment was important in performing other
tasks as well. As a result, the [religious] community's process of
self-determination would be shaped in part by the prospects of
litigation. A case-by-case analysis for all activities therefore
103. Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 343-45 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring).
104. 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
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would both produce excessive government entanglement with
religion and create the danger of chilling religious activity.
The risk of chilling religious organizations is most likely to
arise with respect to nonprofit activities .... This substantial
potential for chilling religious activity makes inappropriate a
case-by-case determination of the character of a nonprofit
organization, and justifies a categorical exemption for nonprofit
activities.
0 5
Justice Scalia announced a similar principle of deference in crafting the
majority opinion in Employment Division, Department of Human
Resources of Oregon v. Smith:
It is no more appropriate for judges to determine the 'centrality'
of religious beliefs before applying a 'compelling interest' test in
the free exercise field, than it would be for them to determine
the 'importance' of ideas before applying the 'compelling
interest' test in the free speech field... [R]epeatedly and in
different contexts, we have warned that courts must not
presume to determine the place of a particular belief in a
religion, or the plausibility of a religious claim.'06
The religious beliefs of hospital founders and administrators cannot be
compromised without the state's literally confiscating the hospitals. It is,
therefore, a radical mistake to suggest that a private hospital can alter its
ethics and remain essentially the same, suspend its moral judgment and
remain a part of the church sponsoring it. The religious ministry to the
sick is not individuated and compartmentalized. It emanates from a
pervasive belief system as a practical corollary of faith-based conduct.
Thus, religious ministry to the sick combines both personal care and the
governance of institutions. Religious ministry seeks the overarching
ambience of the faith community in support of the care of individuals. In
this context it is pivotal to know what we are talking about. A Catholic
hospital is sponsored by, and in a very real sense, belongs to the Church as
a whole; it is not just a private, non-profit entity that happens to be
administered by persons who happen to share the Catholic faith. Jewish
hospitals, not just hospitals where Judaism is respected and its ritual
observances followed, Protestant hospitals, not just private institutions
employing Protestant chaplains--these corporate entities are the focus of
this discussion. Thus, the faith-context of health care is not individuated
105. Id. at 343-45 (emphasis added).
106. 494 U.S. 872 (1990); see United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 262-3 (1982)
(Stevens, J., concurring); Hernandez v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 490
U.S. 680 (1989).
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in passing eponymous personal and idiosyncratic beliefs, but, rather, in
the healing religious beliefs of the historic religious traditions.
Institutional exercise of the health care ministry within the religious
communities is tied to the essential tenets of faith and morals of the
churches as these are articulated and interpreted by proper authorities in
the respective ecclesiastical polities. Characteristic of the hierarchical
churches is that the episcopal leadership establishes basic principles that
members voluntarily accept and to which they conform the direction of
officially sponsored ministerial institutions.
Order and discipline in all denominations are protective of the religious
integrity of sponsored agencies, organizations and institutions. The canon
law of the Catholic Church may serve as an illustration of a more broadly
followed pattern of institutional discipline and stewardship. The religious
names of hospitals, indeed, proclaim, in most cases, their identity and
affiliated mission. The canon law, church ordinances, books of discipline
and rabbinical tradition, are particularized to ensure that the ownership,
sponsorship, and control of the ministry reflect the faith of the sponsoring
communities. In this sense, basic moral principles are translated into
institutional governance. Health care ethical directives are enacted and
agreed upon not only to assist the formation of individual conscience, but
also to direct governing decisions in the administration of the hospitals.
The Code of Canon Law for the Roman Catholic Church, promulgated
January 25, 1983, by the Apostolic Constitution, Sacrae disciplinae leges,'0 7
thus, forms an integral part of the governance structure of all Catholic
hospitals. The various canonical institutes, religious orders of women and
men, who administer Catholic hospitals do so, not as owners of these
institutions, but, rather, as representatives of the Church itself under the
authoritative directives of the canon law. Thus, they are not free to pick
and chose among moral imperatives.
The hospitals, thus, in canon law are not simply corporate shells in
which individuals may more efficiently serve the public charity as they
wish, but properties entrusted to the Church to be used only for the
ecclesiastical ministries of the care of bodies and souls.'0
107. English translation will be found in The Code of Canon Law--Latin-
English Edition, (CLSA, 1983), pp. xi-xvi.
108. 1983 Code of Canon Law, C.577, C.676, C.1254 § 2. I will use the word
"religious orders" as an accepted general term in common parlance. Technically,
in the canon law there are major organizational differences between communities
of the common life. Most of the Catholic hospitals in the United States were
founded and continue to be operated by members of "religious institutes", as
technically defined in the 1983 Code of Canon Law. 1983 Code C.573-606. The
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In addition to the general prescriptions of the canon law, the practice of
the Catholic health care ministry in the United States is governed, as
stated, by the Ethical and Religious Directives of the Catholic Health
Association.' 9 The Directives are operative in all Catholic hospitals.
The Directives are a concise statement of the Roman Catholic teaching
on health care ethics, to be applied in contemporary American society.
The regulations are designed to assist and promote sound ethical
reflection that leads to informed decision-making from a Catholic
perspective.
Conscience, of course, is not a uniquely religious idea. Most people
subscribe to the notion of an interior faculty that guides our moral
judgments. The major religious traditions generally maintain, however,
that judgments of conscience are more than natural insights. They are
judgments illumined by faith (or darkened by error and vice). These
judgments carry centuries of prayer and reflection. The churches teach
their members that they are bound to obey certain judgments of their
consciences." ° To suspend one's conscience in the face of decisions of
profound human importance is simply to cut oneself off from one's ethical
moorings. It is to mechanize life, becoming inhuman.
Medical ethics, therefore, in guiding religious health care organizations,
relies on a number of fundamental moral principles, among which are: the
dignity of the human person, the social nature of the person, the right to
life, principles of double effect and of legitimate cooperation; the totality
and integrity of the human person; growth through the acceptance of
suffering; stewardship and creativity."'
Tangible signs of religious faith and identity in an institution, as
required by the custom of the sponsoring church bodies, include the
availability of religious worship and counseling, and the prominence of
the various symbols of faith; a priority given to pastoral care and mission
education; church ownership and/or management; recognition by the
proper hierarchical authorities, such as the bishop, the judicatory,
internal operating structures of these organizations will be found in their
respective Constitutions, Bylaws and Directories
109. See U.S. Catholic Bishops' Conference, supra note 48.
110. I Tim. 1:19: ("hold fast to faith and a good conscience. Some men, by
rejecting the guidance of their conscience, have made shipwreck of their faith.")
See also 1 Tim. 2:9; Romans 14:22. See Catechism of the Catholic Church, at 1790,
1800 ("A human being must always obey the certain judgment of his
conscience.").
111. CATHOLIC HEALTH ASS'N, THE SEARCH FOR IDENTITY: CANONICAL
SPONSORSHIP OF CATHOLIC HEALTHCARE (1988).
20011
496 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 17:455
rabbinical association, conference, or the conference of church leaders,
that the institution is an integral part of the work of the church and, for
hospitals, application of the ethical beliefs of the denomination. Without
these elements an institution as such would not only lose membership in
the church community, but would be disaffiliated as a church-sponsored
institution. The hospital would not be a religious hospital, but rather a
private hospital administered by individuals, many or most of who may
share a common belief system.
In the discipline of all churches and synagogues it is a primary
obligation of institutional administrators of all kinds bearing church
affiliation to protect and ensure the religious identity of the institution
and the religious use of its assets. " 2 The canon law positively prohibits
officers and directors of church-affiliated hospitals from disguising their
identity or allowing that identity to be eroded through contractual or
personnel management decisions."'
For the state, therefore, to deny the religious autonomy of the
churches' organized ministries not only violates the free exercise of
religion, but on an institutional level is confiscatory. It would stop in
process vital coordinating efforts of persons to bring health care services
to the public on a professional, permanent and enduring basis.
11 4
It is very important for a statement of principle that we see medical-
ethical decisions as part of a religious ministry intimately and inextricably
tied to the governance of institutions themselves. Medical-ethical
decisions are not just private acts of conscience. These decisions are
motivated largely by religious traditions and convictions that are
historically denominational in nature. Thus, the state cannot limit ethical
decisions in isolation without striking at the very core of the religious
institutions themselves.
There must be no doubt that without moral independence the religious
sector in health care in this country will disappear. The essential legal
structure of a private, religious institution is fundamentally corroded
112. 1983 Code C.601 (general obligation to observe canon law); Canon 1282
(dedication of church properties to religious uses); C.1284 (duty of diligence in
stewardship); C.1254, C.634 § 1 (dedicated use of assets); C.1267 § 3 (observing
intent of donors); and C. 1293 § 1, 1 (alienation of property) with C. 1336, 1377
and 1389 § 2 (sanctions). Adam J. Maida & Nicholas P. Cafardi, CHURCH
PROPERTY, CHURCH FINANCES, AND CHURCH-RELATED CORPORATIONS, 179-188
(1984).
113. William W. Bassett, A Note On the Law of Contracts and the Canonical"
59 PROC. CLSA 61 (1997).
114. CATHOLIC HEALTH ASS'N, supra note 111.
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where the institution is forced to reject or violate the ethical norms,
themselves the product of faith commitments, of its sponsoring
congregation or church. It is, therefore,.not only no solution, but also a
destructive move, to relegate religion to a chaplaincy, to individual
choices, or the mission of medical ministry to counseling sessions and
prayers recited over public address systems in hospitals contracting for
publicly-funded medical programs. Ethically acceptable medical decisions
in the treatment of patients are a primary prerogative of a faith-based
health care provider. A governmental attack upon an organization's faith
commitment is an attack on the organization itself.
Labels and nostalgia should not be touchstones of decision in this area
of the law. Neither should be monochromatic ideologies of standardized
and homogenous public benefit or individualized constitutional rights
considerations. A woman's constitutional right to an abortion, for
example, does not translate into the obligation of the public,1' or all
licensed medical professionals, to supply or refer it out in violation of
their consciences. " 6 The Supreme Court's decision in Vacco v. Quill"7
and Washington v. Glucksberg1 8 that competent adults have no
constitutional right to assisted dying, necessitate as a corollary that
private, religious hospitals cannot be forced by the state into providing
direct death-inducing drugs or services." 9 The free exercise of religious
115. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
116. 1 say this in response to contrary opinions expressed by Sylvia A. Law,
Silent No More: Physicians' Legal and Ethical Obligations to Patients Seeking
Abortions, 21 N.Y.U. L. REV. & SOC. CHANGE 279 (1994-95); Mary Ann Becker,
The Politics of Women's Wrongs and the Bill of Rights, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 453,
484-487 (1991). Emphasis upon public policy dicta taken from the Supreme
Court's decision to permit the I.R.S. to withdraw tax exempt status from Bob
Jones University for racially-discriminatory practices, Bob Jones University v.
United States, 461 U.S.574 (1983), I believe, is exaggerated and misplaced when
religious institutions are pushed, as a condition of tax exemption, to comply
without scruple to the demands of extreme advocates of access for abortion-
related services.
117. 521 U.S. 793 (1997) (holding that there is no constitutional right to
physician-assisted death services).
118. 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (holding a state statute prohibiting assistance or
cooperation in the suicide of another is not unconstitutional).
119. President Clinton signed the federal Assisted Suicide Funding Restriction
Act of 1997 on April 30, 1997, according to which no funds appropriated by
Congress for the purpose of paying (directly or indirectly) for the provision of
health care services may be used to provide any health care item or service
furnished for the purpose of causing, or for the purpose of assisting in causing, the
death of any individual, such as by assisted suicide, euthanisia, or mercy killing. In
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choice protected by the First Amendment applies to the states and is
preemptive of state laws burdening religion."2
A. Hospital Ethics and Religious Choices
For private, non-profit hospitals the service of justice for the sick and
disabled, public advocacy of services and quality of care, and serving the
underserved poor are paramount values closely tied to the health care
mission. Religious hospitals add accessibility of pastoral care for patients
in an ambiance wherein patients can be confident of the security and
dignity of their religious choices. All the religious hospitals studied
provide patients the services of ethical counselors of their choice, whether
religious or not, to assist them in ethically-perplexing decisions.
One may look at organizational moral choice as a derivative personal
decision. Membership in the church implies consent to its ethical
directives. The religious hospital decides moral issues professionally
consistently with the doctrine of the church-sponsors.12' For members of
the church who freely and knowingly accept membership in the church,
122the denominational choice is a personal choice. In this society, anyone
can freely leave a church, disaffiliate or differ conscientiously with matters
of discipline or belief. Continuing use of the churches' ministries and
addition, federal funds may not be used to pay (in whole or in part) for health
benefit coverage that includes any coverage of such an item or service or of any
expenses relating to such an item or service. Some of the programs to which the
restriction applies include: Medicare and Medicaid; Title XX Social Services
Block Grants; the Public Health Service Act; the Federal Employees Health
Benefits Program: Veterans Medical Care; Medical Services for Federal Prisoners;
and grant programs under the Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of
Rights Act. The limit on payments does not apply to abortion, the withholding or
withdrawing of medical treatment or medical care, the withholding or withdrawing
of nutrition or hydration, or the use of an item, good, benefit, or service furnished
for the purpose of alleviating pain or discomfort, even if such use may increase the
risk of death, so long as such item, good, benefit, or service is not also furnished
for the purpose of causing, or the purpose of assisting in causing, death, for any
reason. P.L. 105-12, 111 Stat. 23 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 14401 et seq.).
120. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
121. See generally, amicus briefs submitted by various religiously affiliated
organizations, including the General Board of Church and Society of the United
Methodist Church, Agudeth Israel of America, the Rutherford Institute, the
United States Catholic Conference, in the case of Nancy Cruzan, a constitutional
issue of informed consent based on state procedural and evidential standards.
Cruzan v. Director of Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 264 (1990).
122. See Guinn v. Church of Christ, 775 P. 2d 766 (Okla. 1989); Richard L.
Cupp, Jr., Religious Torts: Applying Conseflt Doctrine, 19 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 949
(1986).
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organizational agencies implies, at least, a minimal level of personal
acquiescence in its customs and order.
The hospital is an outreach agency of the church, deriving its religious
identity from the sponsoring church. Whether one is a believer or not, the
choice of a hospital should be an informed and uncoerced choice to use
the resources of the facility. Whether the hospital is or is not dedicated to
the doctrinal bases of religious choice in the meaning of life and the
integrity of the human person a patient wishes to share should be no more
unexpected or intrusive than the personal beliefs of the primary physician.
What is at issue here are the moral decisions made by religious
hospitals that generally are prohibitive, rather than mandatory, where
what is prohibited would be acceptable medical practice in a non-religious
context. At present, the sensitive restrictions are in the provision of
abortion, reproductive health services, some kinds of fertility procedures,
and refusal to cooperate with physician-assisted suicide, where state law,
such as that adopted by referendum in Oregon in 1989,"' may permit.
State intervention, then, is aimed at forcing private hospitals to do some
things they object to, not to refrain from doing things that are medically
unacceptable by any reasonable standard.
Religious hospitals, even, indeed, as individual persons themselves, do
not take their ethical instructions from the government. As private
entities making religious choices to refrain from services to which they
have moral objections, they fall outside the constraints of constitutional
imperatives. The religion clauses of the First Amendment protect
religion, individually and collectively practiced, not economic, social or
secular choices.
Private religious hospitals have particularized the healing ministry in
different ways, always, however, under the overarching paradigm of
preservation of life with self-sacrificing service to the person of those who
are sick, injured and dying. 1
4
123. Physician assisted suicide may be permitted by state law, such as that
adopted by referendum in Oregon in 1989.ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800 et seq.
(1996); see also Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1429 (Ore. 1995) (Oregon "Death
With Dignity" Act does not provide sufficient safeguards for terminally-ill persons
and, therefore, violates the Equal Protection Clause), vacated, Lee v. Oregon, 107
F.3d 1382 (9th Cir. 1997).
124. See Pope John Paul II, Ency. Lett., Donum vitae: Instruciton on Respect
for Human Life In Its Origin and On the Dignity of Procreation, (Feb. 22, 1987)
and Ency. Letter, Evangelium vitae: The Gospel of Life (Mar. 25, 1995). Directive
23, of the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Service, speaks
of the primary ethical concern in hospital care as the protection of human dignity
in all cases. See note 48, supra. For a good comparative study of tort law and
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B. Ethical Issues In Reproductive Medicine
All major religious traditions in America find abortion to be an issue of
profound moral significance.125 Termination of a human life in the womb
is not simply an ethically indifferent act. Nor is it only transitory, personal
and without societal concern."' Direct abortion is regretted, prohibited
entirely in some religious hospitals, allowed under certain conditions in
others, preceded by counseling, or, simply, on assurance of informed
consent, or performed as a matter of physician-patient choice to avoid
serious alternatives.12' Definitional issues divide the churches, such as
beginning points of human life, potential personhood and categories of
balancing, substantial human values or trauma to the mother justifying
intervention to destroy the fetus.
Similarly, the major religious traditions find embryo cell research
intensely problematic and fraught with moral dangers. Contemporary
reproductive bio-ethics is driven by modern technology. Major moral
dilemmas appear now without historical precedent because modern bio-
medical technologies create procedures and fertilization controls
previously unthinkable. There is no store of historical religious reflection,
for example, on vasectomies, tubal ligation, the pill, in vitro fertilization
or embryonic research. What reflection exists is drawn largely from
imaginative reflection upon grave bodily mutilations or the significance of
the felt "quickening" of fetal life."" The mutilations no longer occur in
modern medicine and embryonic implantation we know occurs weeks
Jewish moral perspectives on the imperative to preserve and protect life, see
Daniel Pollack, Chaim Steinmetz and Vicki Lens, Anderson v. St. Francis-St.
George Hospital: Wrongful Living From an American and Jewish Legal
Perspective, 45 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 621 (1997).
125. J. GORDON MELTON, THE CHURCHES SPEAK ON ABORTION: OFFICIAL
STATEMENTS FROM RELIGIOUS BODIES AND ECUMENICAL ORGANIZATIONS
(1989).
126. RONALD DWORKIN, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES (1990); John
T. Noonan, Jr., "Abortion: An Almost Absolute Value In History," in The
Morality of Abortion 1 (J. Noonan, ed., 1970.
127. SAMUEL GOROVITZ, supra note 56, at 49. Because only 36% of all
hospitals provide abortion services, women seeking an abortion find a serious
shortage of hospital providers willing to perform them. 87% of all abortions are
performed in clinics or in private doctors' offices. 84% of all United States
counties have no identifiable abortion providers. National Abortion Federation,
Access to Abortion Fact Sheet, at http://www.prochoice.org/Facts/FS5.htm (last
visited Jan. 30, 2001).
128. See JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., CONTRACEPTION: A HISTORY OF ITS
TREATMENT BY CATHOLIC THEOLOGIANS AND CANONISTS (1986).
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before movement can be detected. Just twenty-five years ago Justice
Harry Blackmun, in crafting the majority opinion in Roe v. Wade, found a
second historical reason in prohibiting abortion to have been that it was
extremely hazardous to pregnant women. 29 That argument carries little
moral weight today beyond the necessary doctor-patient dialogue. So,
ethical theories in reproductive medicine, beyond abortion itself, evolve
from analogous reasoning.3 There is less consensus than in previous
years among religious bodies upon the cogency of the various analogic
links to scriptural passages or traditional theological responses in modern
reproductive technologies.
Whether the various contraceptive, as well as fertilization technologies,
currently in use contain lines of grave moral concern seems to depend on
both scientific perspective and the comprehension of ideational context.
Ethical decisions in the religious bodies must clearly be distinguished
129. 410 U.S. 113, 148 (1973).
130. There is some confusion about the definition of abortion. Spontaneous
abortion, or miscarriage, refers to the spontaneous loss of a pregnancy before
viability (at about twenty-five or twenty-six weeks of gestation). Losses after that
point are termed "preterm deliveries," or, in the case of delivery of a fetus who
has already died, "stillbirths." In the terminology commonly used for induced
abortions viability is not at issue. Rather, any termination of a pregnancy by
medical or surgical means is termed an abortion, regardless of the stage of the
pregnancy. The most common early-trimester abortion procedure is suction
curettage, usually performed in free-standing clinics or outpatient centers in
hospitals. At twelve to twenty weeks gestation, the most common method is
dilation and evacuation (D&E), which, because it takes more time and has higher
risk of complications, is often done in a hospital setting. The other abortion
procedure used in the second trimester is instillation abortion, in which a solution
instilled into the amniotic cavity through the abdomen via amniocentesis results in
the death of the fetus and termination of the pregnancy. Contractions signalling
labor usually begin twelve to twenty-four hours later and culminate in expulsion
of the dead fetus. For late term pregnancies, dilation and extraction procedures
(D&X) are used, whereby the fetus is pulled from the uterus into the birth canal
and the skull crushed to facilitate extraction. These latter procedures require
ambulatory surgical services in a hospital setting. Gary S. Berger, William E.
Brennar, and Louis G. Keith, Second Trimester Abortion (1981); Stephen L.
Corson, Thomas V. Sedlacek, and Jerome J. Hoffman, "Suction Dilation and
Evacuation," in Greenhill's Surgical Gynecology, (5th ed. 1986); David A. Grimes,
"Surgical Management of Abortion," in Te Linde's Operative Gynecology (8th ed.
1992). Until the 1980s, the only available means for performing abortions were
surgical. The development of a medical abortifacient, antiprogestin drugs (e.g.,
RU-486), accompanied by the hormone prostaglandin, presents less invasive
procedures. Baulieu, ttienne-tmile, ARU-486 As An Antiprogesterone Steroid:
From Receptor to Contragestation and Beyond, 262 JAMA 1808 (1989).
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from social and political understandings of the role of government in
regulating human reproduction. In respect for the plurality of consciences
on these terribly sensitive issues, most favor legal rights to abortion and
women's rights of reproductive self-determination. There is a difference131
between morality and law. The religious traditions, in the best sense, are
instructive not judgmental.
Here we must set out, briefly and summarily, of course, a ethical
perspective upon the major issues in reproductive medicine today, indeed,
from the viewpoint of the large religious traditions maintaining
institutional health care systems in this country.
1. Elective Abortion
In private hospitals retaining strong ties to their religious traditions
abortion is rare and performed only for very serious therapeutic reasons
or concern for the physical or mental wellbeing of the mother. Abortion
on demand or simply as a remedy for contraceptive failure is neither
advised nor routinely provided.
Jewish hospitals, as, indeed, the various branches of Judaism itself, are
divided in interpreting the religious law in the face of a request to
terminate an unwanted pregnancy.
According to the Mishnah, which is the record of oral interpretations of
the Hebrew Scriptures, abortion is only permitted when a woman is in
"hard travail" and her life is in danger. 32 This, of course, would not
include the vast majority of abortions actually performed in the United
States. Not even in the most lenient interpretation of the halakha is there
anything that allows abortion on demand, or as a means of post factum
birth control.
There is certainly a bottom line in the Jewish religious tradition beyond
which abortions are clearly not permitted. Late-term intact dilation and
extraction, when the head or a majority of the body of a child has
emerged, is the line at which that child cannot be killed, even if the
mother's life is in danger, because, at that time there are two persons, two
living souls. M
In Jewish law, as in Roman law, the fetus has no independent "juridical
personality" and would not be considered a person until birth. Thus,
131. John Courtney Murray, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC
REFLECTIONS ON THE AMERICAN PROPOSITION (1960).
132. See Dorff, supra note 101, at 128-133.
133. Mishnah, Oholot, 7:6. J. DAVID BLIECH, BIOETHICAL DILEMMAS: A
JEWISH PERSPECTIVE (1998); Immanuel Jakovovits, Jewish Views On Abortion, in
ABORTION AND THE LAW (D. Smith, ed. 1967).
134. DAVID M. FELDMAN, HEALTH AND MEDICINE IN JEWISH TRADITION:
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feticide was not considered murder. Therefore, a liberal tradition allows
therapeutic abortion or abortion during the first forty days of pregnancy
in cases of grave fetal abnormalities. Maternal rather than fetal welfare in
these cases remains the criterion. Rabbinic rulings on abortion thus may
be generalized: not the right to life, but the right to be born is not
absolute, but may be abridged for serious reasons of the welfare of the
mother. "Once the fetus has emerged .. .," however, "we may not set
aside one life for another."'35
Catholic moral teaching on abortion is traditional and conservative,
treating direct and intentional abortion as a serious sin and an
unwarranted interference with the natural outcome of the reproductive
process. Under the principle of double effect, indirect (permitted)
abortions are those operations that have as their primary effect the health
or wellbeing of the mother, with the death of the fetus a foreseen but not
directly intended secondary effect. For example, removal of a cancerous
uterus from a pregnant woman, or fallopian tube in cases of ectopic
pregnancy, would be permitted. The principle is that the life of the
mother is at least as precious as that of the fetus. She has no duty to
assume a serious risk to her own life in order to sustain the child.
3 6
Catholic teaching does not depend on theories of personhood or
moments of ensoulment of the fetus."' Rather, the concern is that respect
for human life itself is the most fundamental of all goods, and the
condition of their realization. 118 Thus, incipient human life is entitled to
the benefit of the doubt in respect to its continuing right to live and have
birth.
Catholic hospitals are explicitly prohibited from providing services
"whose sole and immediate effect is the termination of pregnancy before
viability." 139 Thus, direct termination of a pregnancy by killing the fetus is
never permitted. Furthermore, "Catholic health care institutions are not
L'HAYYIM - To LIFE (1986).
135. Mishnah, supra, note 133.
136. See Pope Pius XI, Casti connubii in THE PAPAL ENCYCLICALS 1903-1939
(1981; (1933). Vatican Cong. for the Doctrine of the Faith, Declaration on
Abortion, 4 ORIGINS 186, 186 (1974).
137. See Thomas A. Shannon & Allan B. Wolter, Reflections On the Moral
Status of the Pre-Embryo, 51 THEOLOGICAL STUDIES 603 (1990).
138. Lisa S. Cahill, The Embryo and the Fetus: New Moral Contexts," 54
THEOLOGICAL STUDIES 124 (1993); Carol A. Tauer, The Tradition of Probabilism
and the Moral Status of the Early Embryo, 45 THEOLOGICAL STUDIES 33 (1984).
139. "Abortion, that is, the directly intended termination of pregnancy before
viability or the directly intended destruction of a viable fetus is never permitted."
Ethical Directives, supra note 50, Directive 45.
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to provide abortion services, even based upon the principle of material
cooperation." 140 They may not condone intervention in extrauterine
pregnancies if such intervention constitutes a direct abortion. 41
Hysterectomies, as other invasive gynecological interventions, however,
may be performed when necessary to cure a serious pathological
condition, even when they will result in the death of the fetus.1
41
The teachings of the Eastern Orthodox Churches on the issue of
abortion coincide with those of the Roman Catholic Church.
143
Seventh-Day Adventist Hospitals, as a matter of policy, follow the
General Conference Guideline on abortion J"
The Church does not serve as conscience for individuals;
however, it should provide moral guidance. Abortions for
reasons of birth control, gender selection, or convenience are
not condoned by the Church. Women, at times however, may
face exceptional circumstances that present serious moral or
medical dilemmas, such as significant threats to the pregnant
woman's life, serious jeopardy to her health, severe congenital
defects carefully diagnosed in the fetus, and pregnancy resulting
from rape or incest. The final decision whether to terminate the
pregnancy or not should be made by the pregnant woman after
appropriate consultation. She should be aided in her decision
by appropriate information, biblical principles, and the guidance
of the Holy Spirit. Moreover, these decisions should be made
within the context of healthy family relationships.
4
1
No elective abortions are performed in Seventh-Day Adventist
hospitals. 4 6 Abortion is considered only if the mother's life is in serious
physical jeopardy if the pregnancy is allowed to continue; it is considered
140. Id.
141. "In case of extrauterine pregnancy, no intervention is morally licit which
constitutes a direct abortion." Directive 48, id.; see also Directive 50. "Prenatal
diagnosis is not permitted when undertaken with the intention of aborting an
unborn child with a serious defect."
142. Id., Directives 47, 53.
143. Stanley S. Harakan, Eastern Orthodox Bioethics, THEOLOGICAL
DEVELOPMENTS IN BIOETHICS (Baruch A. Brody, et al eds. 1991).
144. GENERAL CONFERENCE OF THE SEVENTH-DAY ADVENTIST CHURCH,
STATEMENTS, GUIDELINES & OTHER DOCUMENTS, GUIDELINES ON ABORTION 68
(1996).
145. Id. at 69.
146. I am grateful to Mr. W. Augustus Cheatam, Vice-President of Loma
Linda University Medical Center, for this communication (on file with the
author).
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if rape or incest are involved. It is also considered if severe genetic or
structural abnormalities of the fetus are diagnosed at an early stage of
pregnancy. Extensive counseling is required. Thus, for example, Loma
Linda University Medical Center does a very small number of abortions.
The Medical Center serves as a major referral point for these genetic and
structural abnormalities.
The Southern Baptist Convention, with approximately 14,000,000
members, a major linking influence in religious hospital systems, has
147issued a number of resolutions concerning abortion over the years.
These resolutions uniformly uphold the sanctity of developing human life
and oppose abortion on demand. Abortion is morally permissible in rare
cases of substantial danger to maternal life and health, serious fetal
abnormalities and in cases of rape or incest. The 1982 Resolution on
Abortion said:
Therefore, be it Resolved, That the messengers to the 1982
Southern Baptist Convention affirm that all human life, both
born and unborn, is sacred, bearing the image of God, and is not
subject to personal judgments as to "quality of life" base on such
subjective criteria as stage of development, abnormality,
intelligence level, degree of dependency, cost of medical
treatment, or inconvenience to parents.'
The Evangelical Lutheran Church in America, formed in 1988, by the
merger of the American Lutheran Church and the Lutheran Church in
merca,49 share with the Lutheran Church, Missouri Synod, a morally
conservative and traditional doctrine on abortion and prenatal medical
interventions endangering the integrity of fetal life.15
Conservative Protestant views on the ethics of abortion generally
coincide with those of the Seventh-Day Adventist guidelines, and are part
of hospital policies of the more conservative Southern Baptist and
American Baptist hospitals as well.'
The teachings of the leaders of the Reformation, including Martin
Luther and John Calvin, remained uniquely authoritative in discerning
principles of personal morality in the principal Protestant denominations
until a generation ago. The moral consensus condemning abortion
coincided with what pastors and church leaders took to be the early
Christian theological teaching on the fully human nature of the unborn
147. See Melton, supra note 125, at 153-55.
148. See id. at 152.
149. See id. at 51-52.
150. Id. at 60.
151. Id.
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child and the sacredness of its life.15 Emphasis upon personal autonomy,
freedom of conscience, and the importance of the family as the focal point
of procreation formed the larger context for theological reflection upon
the bioethics of reproductive medicine. The strong pronatalist disposition
of traditional Protestant spirituality was thus balanced by a degree of
pastoral compassion, even if abortion was condemned at a formal level."'
Protestant unanimity in this country broke in the 1960s under the
influence of the situation ethics of Joseph Fletcher's attack upon Catholic
"casuistry"1 54 and the changing cultural ethos in which scientific
developments in reproductive biology and feminist aspirations coincided.
This provoked the abortion debates that continue to divide the American
Protestant churches. 55  Lutherans, Episcopalians, Methodists,
Presbyterians and the United Church of Christ, among others, have
maintained their public position favoring the legality of abortion, while
strongly pressed from within by traditionalists to develop an ethics of
"justifiable reasons" for its choice. 56 Stanley Hauerwas suggested that
Scripture is normative as "narrative", against Paul Ramsey's
fundamentalist theme of embodiment, the coinherence of body and soul
from conception, as explicitly tied to the express teachings of Scripture.'57
Among Protestants, only Unitarian/Universalists have adopted the
position that women alone are the moral agents of free abortion
152. JOHN P. FRAME, MEDICAL ETHICS: PRINCIPLES, PERSONS, AND
PROBLEMS. (1988) (Presbyterian and Reformed); James F. Gustafson, A
Protestant Ethical Approach, ON MORAL MEDICINE: THEOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVES IN MEDICAL ETHICS, 403-412 (eds. Lammers & Verhey, 1987)
(Lutheran).
153. THEOLOGICAL VOICES IN MEDICAL ETHICS (Allen Verhey & Stephen E.
Lammers 1993).
154. JOSEPH FLETCHER, MORALS AND MEDICINE: THE MORAL PROBLEMS OF
THE PATIENT'S RIGHT TO KNOW THE TRUTH. Contraception, Artificial
Insemination, Sterilization, Euthanasia (1960).
155. E. BROOKE HOLIFIELD, HEALTH AND MEDICINE IN THE METHODIST
TRADITION: JOURNEY TOWARDS HOLINESS (1986); BIOETHICS YEARBOOK:
THEOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN BIOETHICS: 1990-1992 (B. Andrew Lustig, et al
eds. 1993); MARTIN E. MARTY, HEALTH AND MEDICINE IN THE LUTHERAN
TRADITIOn (1983); HEALTH/MEDICINE AND THE FAITH TRADITIONS: AN INQUIRY
INTO RELIGION AND MEDICINE. (1982); PAUL RAMSEY, THE PATIENT As PERSON:
EXPLORATIONS IN MEDICAL ETHICS (1970) (Presbyterian); KENNETH L. VAUX,
HEALTH AND MEDICINE IN THE REFORMED TRADITION: PROMISE, PROVIDENCE,
AND CARE (1984); MEDICAL ETHICS (Robert M. Veatch ed. 1989).
156. KAREN LEBACQZ, GENETICS, ETHICS AND PARENTHOOD (1983).
157. STANLEY HAUERWAS, A COMMUNITY OF CHARACTER: TOWARD A
CONSTRUCTIVE CHRISTIAN SOCIAL ETHIC (1981).
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decision. Unitarian/Universalists operate no hospitals.
Thus, in general, hospital systems affiliated with Protestant churches in
this country have adopted policies limiting abortion to serious cases
affecting the physical or psychological health of the mother. Elective
abortions for gender selection, or birth control failure, are generally not
condoned, while psychological trauma to the mother may be provided an
expansive definition.
The largest pro-choice Protestant denomination, in the United States,
the United Methodist Church, in its 2000 General Conference, voted by
an overwhelming majority of 622-275 to oppose late term abortion. The
exact wording of the legislative action is:
We oppose the use of late-term abortion known as dilation and
extraction (partial birth abortion) and call for the end of this
practice except when the physical life of the mother is in danger
and no other medical procedure is available or in the case of
severe fetal anomalies incompatible with life."'
In the 2000 edition of The Book of Discipline of the United Methodist
Church, this sentence will be added to the standing paragraph on
abortion.'6 Most religious traditions, of course, are much more stringent
than this. In no religious tradition involved in the provision of health
care, however, is there a complete ethical indifference to the fate of
human fetal life, or, indeed, to the implications of conspiracy in acts to
destroy it.
2. Rape Trauma Intervention
Standard emergency room protocols for the treatment of victims of
rape, and, particularly in cases of children and disabled adults, in cases of
incest, involve the cooperation of medical personnel, hospital
administrators, social workers and the police. There are four immediate
objectives to treatment, all of which are urgent and time-centered.
Medical assistance to the victim is foremost, as healing is directed both to
physical and psychological injury. Health care personnel try to prevent
infection of the victim from sexually transmitted diseases, foremost, of
course, AIDS, as well as prevent a violently imposed pregnancy as a
primary invasive effect of the assault. Sperm samples are collected to
provide DNA evidence for subsequent prosecution of the perpetrator.
Social service personnel collect history and triage the patient to
158. DAVID H. SMITH, HEALTH AND MEDICINE IN THE ANGLICAN TRADITION:
CONSCIENCE, COMMUNITY, AND COMPROMISE (1986).
159. Boozang, supra note 6; Ikemoto, supra note 6.
160. Paragraph 36J, Social Principles, Resolutions, in the 1996 edition of the
Book of Discipline of the United Methodist Church.
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appropriate posttraumatic counseling services. Each case, of course, is
different. All have two things in common: time is of the essence in every
respect and the victim rarely has a choice of emergency facilities for care.
The victim places herself totally in the hands of the hospital's trauma
specialists.
The most common form of postcoital contraception for rape victims is
the use of the morning-after pill, an estrogen or estrogen-progestrogen
combination, marketed as Estinyl and Ovral."6 The morning after pill
prevents fertilization or implantation of the fertilized egg in the uterine
wall. The morning-after pill is a vital part of the standard care for rape
victims. Accepted emergency facility licensing directives require hospitals
to provide rape victims "with anticonception and antivenereal disease
• • 162
treatment" unless medically contraindicated. Since state laws generally
limit the number of Level I trauma center designations in each region,
for rape victims whose range of treatment choice is narrowed to
practically zero, compliance with state law is vitally important. State laws
allowing hospital compliance by referral to other hospitals are patently
impractical, if not cruel to the victims themselves•
Only Catholic hospitals, out of concern for the probable life of the
fertilized embryo, have serious concerns about use of the "morning-after"
pill in rape trauma intervention.
Directive 36 of the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic
hospitals allows use of the morning-after pill as a postcoital hormonal
treatment to prevent conception if the victim is in a stage of her menstrual
cycle before ovulation, but not after ovulation.16 ' After ovulation,
161. Eugene F. Diamond, Rape Protocol, LINACRE QUARTERLY, Aug, 1993,
at 8, 9. Postcoital insertion of intrauterine devices is also effective, but may be
contraindicated by the victim's injuries.
162. CHI. MUN. CODE § 4-84-240 (1990); see also Boozang, supra note 6, at
1447.
163. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT., ch. 210, para. 50/27 (Michie Supp. 1994);
Boozang, supra note 6.
164. 77 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 545.60(d)(3), app. A, pt. B(50(e)) (West 2000);
see also Brownfield v. Daniel Freeman Marina Hosp'l, 208 Cal. App. 3d 405, 256
Cal. Rptr. 240 (1.989) (rape victim sues hospital for not providing her information
and access to the morning-after pill; holding victim may have medical malpractice
claim for the hospital's failure to provide information vital to her choice of
treatment; the right to receive important information should prevail over
hospital's protection under the state's conscience clause - CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 25955 (c)).
165. Directive 36, ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES, supra note 48.
A female who has been raped should be able to defend herself against a
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inhibition of implantation of an already fertilized egg by the use of the
pill, in Catholic theology, may be abortifacient. The obvious difficulty
with this ethical norm, of course, is that few rape victims know with
certainty whether or not they have ovulated and the fact cannot be
ascertained quickly by any extant diagnostic device. Thus, bishops and
church authorities differ among themselves on the ethical use of the
morning-after pill in all traumatic rape and incest interventions.
3. Fertility Control
Medical-moral ethicists attach a greater moral significance to
permanent male (vasectomy) and female (tubal ligation) forms of fertility
control, than to those of a temporary nature, such as the use of
contraceptive pills, condoms, diaphragms, etc. They also distinguish the
use of contraceptives by married persons and outside of marriage, based
on the moral principle confining sexual relations to marriage. Overall, the
principle of monogamous family life contextualizing the duty of
procreation, in the value structure preeminently favoring human life,
forms the traditional basis of ethical decision. There is a logical link
between the ethical evaluation of contraception and contraceptive
sterilization. Concern that anovulant drugs may also prevent
implantation, for example, bring in considerations of the possibility of
abortifacient effects allowing destruction of incipient embryonic life after
fertilization. There are, obviously, significant moral differences between
abortion and contraception.
Neither the Hebrew Scriptures nor the New Testament contain express
potential conception from the sexual assualt. If, after appropriate testing,
there is no evidence that conception has occurred already, she may be
treated with medication that would prevent ovulation, sperm
capacitation, or fertilization. It is not permissible, however, to initiate or
to recommend treatments that have as their purpose or direct effect the
removal, destruction or interference with the implantation of a fertilized
ovum.
ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES, supra note 48.
The explanation offered by the Bishops' Conference for the acceptability of pre-
ovulation use of the morning-after pill is:
Such efforts to prevent conception following rape need not be, morally
speaking, acts of contraception such as have been excluded from
Christian life by the constant and very firm teaching of the church.
Rather, they can be undertaken as efforts to remove or neutralize the
assailant's sperm or seminal fluid, whose continuing presence in the
victim's body is a continuation of the assault which violated her bodily
integrity.
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norms against fertility control methods used in contemporary family
planning.
4. Contraceptive Drugs or Devices
Orthodox Judaism gives a limited acceptance to some forms of
contraception, based upon early Talmudic rabbinical consent to a
woman's use of root potions to control fertility. Jewish law puts the duty
of procreation on the male, and this obligation militates against a
permanent impairment of fertility. The most acceptable contraception is
that which interferes the least with the natural sexual act.1 Conservative
and Reform Judaism fully accept and endorse contraception as an
acceptable method of family planning and to avoid abortion, provided it is
not harmful to the parties involved."'
The Eastern Orthodox Churches generally accept reasonable
contraception, while condemning abortion. The multiple purposes of
marriage, the lack of any definitive statement against contraception by the
church, a synergistic cooperation between God and humans, and the need
for responsible parenthood serve as the bases for the responsible use of
contraception in marriage.1 6
The Catholic moral tradition condemning artificial birth control was
reiterated after four years of intense study by 'two international
commissions of women and men by Pope Paul VI in 1968 in the encyclical
Humanae Vitae. The rationale for the condemnation appears in
paragraph 11, stating that the natural law "teaches that each and every
marriage act must remain open to the transmission of life." In the next
paragraph the pope refers to "the inseparable connection, willed by God
and unable to be broken by man on his own initiative, between the two
meanings of the conjugal act: the unitive and the procreative meaning.
16 9
Family planning, while important, must be restricted to natural means,
such as following the rhythm method.
Directive 52 of the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic
hospitals says "Catholic health facilities may not promote or condone
contraceptive practices, but should provide, for married couples and the
166. Fred Rosner, "Contraception in Jewish Law," in Jewish Bioethics, pp. 86-
96 (eds. Fred Rosner & J. David Bleich, 1979)
167. Id.
168. Stanley S. Harakas, "Eastern Orthodox Bioethics," in Theological
Developments in Bioethics, 1988-1990, pp. 85-101 (eds. Brody, Lustig, Engelhardt,
and McCullough, 1991); and Chrysostom Zaphiris, The Morality of Contraception:
An Eastern Orthodox Opinion, 11 J. ECUMENICAL STUDIES 661 (1974).
169. Paul VI, Enc. Humanae Vitae (Human Life), trans. 66 Catholic Mind 35-
48 (1968).
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medical staff who counsel them, instruction both about the church's
teaching on responsible parenthood and in methods of natural family
planning. ' ' 7° Whether Catholic hospitals may provide information and
counseling to patients, without technically promoting or condoning it,
however, remains problematic.
Within Protestant Christianity the first break in the anti-contraception
tradition occurred in 1930, when the Lambeth Conference of the Anglican
Church, by a vote of 193 to sixty-seven, adopted a resolution recognizing a
moral obligation to limit or avoid parenthood, and proposing complete
abstinence as the primary and most obvious way, while also accepting
other methods.17" ' Later the major Protestant churches and ethicists such
as Reinhold Niebuhr and Karl Barth accepted contraception as a way to
ensure responsible parenthood. 17 Today there is little controversy and no
moral distinction made between contraceptive methods in the mainline
Protestant churches.
5. Sterilization
The morality of contraceptive methods determines the morality of
sterilization in Jewish, Eastern Orthodox and the major Protestant
Christian traditions. In Catholic theology, because of the permanent
nature of sterilization, it is evaluated more strictly than temporary use of
contraceptives.
For Catholic hospitals Directive 53 prohibits "direct" sterilization of
men or women when performed solely for contraceptive purposes.173
Medical or surgical treatment of pathological conditions that may also
cause sterility as a side effect are, of course, permitted.
6. Counseling HIV-Infected Patients
There is no longer any doubt that information on safe-sex practices is
vital to prevent the spread of AIDS. Containment of the transmission of
the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV), the cause of Acquired
Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS), is, in fact, the only way to hold in
check the contagion. Public health officials are in agreement that, where
170. "Catholic health institutions may not promote or condone contraceptive
practices, but should provide, for married couples and the medical staff who
counsel them, instruction both about the church's teaching on responsible
parenthood and in methods of natural family planning." Id. at 458.
171. RICHARD M. FAGLEY, THE POPULATION EXPLOSION AND CHRISTIAN
RESPONSIBILITY (1960).
172. Id.
173. "Direct sterilization of either men or women, whether permanent or
temporary, is not permitted in a Catholic health care institution when its sole
immediate effect is to prevent conception." Id.
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a cure is not in sight, the point of transmission is where avoidance
counseling is crucial as a matter of public policy.7 4 Many states, in fact,
mandate counseling for HIV infected patients that includes information
on a variety of ways to prevent HIV transmission.
75
The treatment of HIV-positive patients by religious hospitals dates to
the onset of the infection and continues to be extensive and fully in
compliance with public health policies, state laws and regulations. There
remain, however, serious variances in preventive counseling, particularly,
in advocacy of the use of condoms by sexually-active infected patients or
their partners.1
76
Non-Catholic religious thought presents no serious ethical dilemma in
counseling sexually-active HIV patients about the use of condoms to
prevent the spread of AIDS.
The United States Catholic Conference Board listing of programs and
services that should be implemented to fight the spread of AIDS includes
opposition to "safe sex" counseling on grounds that making it "safe" to be
promiscuous is misleading."' The Board did, however, add a note of
explanation allowing broader education to include safe sex details:
In such situations educational efforts, if grounded in the broader
moral vision outlined above, could include accurate information
about prophylactic devices or other practices proposed by some
medical experts as potential means of preventing AIDS. We are
not promoting the use of prophylactics, but merely providing
information that is part of the factual picture. Such a factual
presentation should indicate that abstinence outside of marriage
and fidelity within marriage are the only morally correct and
medically sure ways to prevent the spread of AIDS. 17"
7. Fertility Enhancement Technologies
The most common assisted conception methods, in addition to artificial
insemination, are in vitro fertilization, gamete intrafallopian transfer or
174. Antonia C. Novello, Herbert B. Peterson, J. Thomas Arrowsmith-Lowe,
Joseph Kelaghan & Jeffrey A. Perlman, From the Surgeon General, U.S. Public
Health Service, 269 JAMA 2840 (1993).
175. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. 16-41-14-10 (1997); N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW §
2781(5) (McKinney, 1993).
176. See Mireya Navarro, Ethics of Giving AIDS Advice Trouble Catholic
Hospitals, N.Y.TIMES, Jan 3, 1993, at Al.
177. U.S. Conf. Admin. Board, The Many Faces of AIDS: A Gospel Response,
17 ORIGINS 481,485.
178. Id. at 486. See James F. Keenan, Lisa S. Cahill, Jon D. Fuller, Kevin Kelly
(eds.), Catholic Ethicists On HIV/AIDS Prevention (2000).
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GIFT, or zygote intrafallopian transfer or ZIFT.' 9 The introduction of in
vitro fertilization in 1978 precipitated an intense debate among ethicists
about the harm the new technologies could bring to children, families and
the general societal understanding of procreation and parenthood.' 0 As
healthy children were born from these procedures ethical committees in
at least eight countries issued statements accepting use of IVF in
. • 181
principle. Louise Brown, for example, the first person born of IVF,
resulted from the union of the gametes of her biological parents. The use
of these techniques was assumed to provide assistance for reproduction,
usually in cases of women with blocked or damaged fallopian tubes,
within the structure of traditional family life. Since then the variety of
other uses of IVF for single women, and non-married couples, plus the
specter of a future of parthenogenesis, cloning and ectogenesis, have
intensified the debate on acceptable limits to the use of IVF. 8
Preimplantation diagnosis, including embryo biopsy and sex preselection,
adds further ethical variables, such as correcting genetic flaws after they
have been diagnosed."'
In 1987 the Roman Catholic Church declared the use of the new
reproductive technologies morally unacceptable because they separate the
procreative, life-giving aspects of human intercourse from the unitive,
lovemaking aspects, which in Catholic theology are morally inseparable.
Fertilization outside the body is "deprived of the meanings and the values
which are expressed in the language of the body and in the union of the
179. A good review of the technologies and suggestions for regulatory
initiatives can be found in:Keith A. Byers, Infertility and In Vitro Fertilization: A
Growing Need for Consumer-Oriented Regulation of the In Vitro Fertilization
Industry, 18 J. LEGAL MED. 265 (1997).
180. See RICHARD A. MCCORMICK, "Ethical Considerations of the New
Reproductive Technologies," 46 FERTILITY AND STERILITY, Supplement 1:82
(1991); THOMAS A SHANNON & LISA S. CAHILL, RELIGION AND ARTIFICIAL
REPRODUCTION: AN INQUIRY INTO THE VATICAN INSTRUCTION ON RESPECT FOR
HUMAN LIFE IN ITS ORIGIN AND ON THE DIGNITY OF HUMAN REPRODUCTION
(1988).
181. See LeRoy Walters, Ethics and New Reproductive Technologies: An
International Review of Committee Statements," 17 HASTINGS CENTER REPORT 3
(1987).
182. See also Chaim Povarsky, Regulating Advanced Reproductive
Technologies: A Comparative Analysis of Jewish and American Law, 29 U. TOL. L.
REV. 409 (1997).
183. See Alan L. Traunson, Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis--Counting
Chickens Before They Hatch, 7 HUMAN REPRODUCTION 583 (1992).
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human person." '84 Furthermore, fertilization of multiple ova outside the
body and cryogenically freezing them for possible later use threaten
• 185
indiscriminate use and destruction. Oocyte and sperm donation by third
parties, embryonic implantation and surrogacy add to the ethical concerns
for the new reproductive technologies as undermining the essential unity
of marriage.
Lutherans, 1, 6 Episcopalians, 187 Eastern Orthodox, and some Jewish189
groups have given limited approval to IVF. Some view the new
technologies as an increased range of options for women;' 90 others have
branded the new technologies as demeaning to women, stigmatizing them,
for example, as "fetal containers."'1 9'
Ethicists argue that the notion of the nuclear family is threatened by
the new technologies 192 and that the potential for confusion and harm to
children is immediate. Children may be considered as consumer products
in the new economy. Traditional prohibitions upon adultery and incest
are often violated by the use of third parties in the processes. Debate
continues regarding the special status of the embryo and special respect
184. Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, "Instruction on Respect for
Human Life in Its Origin and on the Dignity of Procreation: Replies to Certain
Questions of the Day," UNITED STATES CATHOLIC CONFERENCE, 28 (1987).
185. See Jean Cohen, The Efficiency and Efficacy of lVF and GIFT, 6 HUMAN
REPRODUCTION 613 (1991). The birth of the first infant to have been frozen as an
embryo took place in Australia in 1984. Embryo freezing is now a routine option
in IVF. Id.
186. Lutheran Church, Missouri Synod: Commission On Theology and
Church Relations. Social Concerns Committee, Human Sexuality: A Theological
Perspective (1981).
187. Episcopal Church, General Convention. Journal of the General
Convention of the Protetant Episocpal Church in the United Stat4s of America
(1982).
188. STANLEY S. HARAKAS, HEALTH AND MEDICINE IN THE EASTERN
ORTHODOX TRADITION: FAITH, LITURGY AND WHOLENESS (1990).
189. DAVID M. FELDMAN, HEALTH AND MEDICINE IN THE JEWISH TRADITION:
L'HA YYIM- TO LIFE (1986).
190. RUTH MACKLIN, SURROGATES AND OTHER MOTHERS: THE DEBATES
OVER ASSISTED REPRODUCTION (1994).
191. ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, FAMILY BONDS. ADoPTION AND THE POLITICS
OF PARENTING (1993); In Vitro Fertilization: The Construction of Infertility and of
Parenting, ISSUES IN REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY: AN ANTHOLOGY, at 253-260,
(ed. Helen Holmes, 1992); Linda Williams, Biology or Society? Parenthood
Motivaion in a Sample of Canadian Women Seeking In Vitro Fertilization ISSUES
IN REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY at 26-274.
192. Daniel Callaghan, Bioethics and Fatherhood, UTAH L. REV. 735 (1992).
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due to it.'93
Several Catholic Directives concern issues related to fertility
enhancement technologies. Drugs used to stimulate ova and sperm
production are permitted, as well as some methods of assisted conception
for married persons, following or in conjunction with natural
intercourse.'94 Directive 40 disallows use of assisted fertilization methods
of unmarried persons. 95 Similarly, the use of ova or sperm donated by
third parties is prohibited. 96 Surrogacy is generally prohibited under
Directive 42.'9'
III. LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVES TO MANDATE DELIVERY OF
COMPREHENSIVE REPRODUCTIVE MEDICAL SERVICES
A. Congress
The first attempt to use the authority of Congress to force all hospitals
participating in federally-funded health care programs to provide the full
array of reproductive medical services, including abortion, contraception
and sterilization, was written into the failed National Health Security Act
when introduced by the Clinton Administration in November, 1993.'98
After strident debate on the issue, twenty-nine members of Congress and
Senators signed a manifesto, that abortion and contraceptive services
must be a part of any prospective National Health Plan. Opposition
galvanized immediately in the religious sector. In the hearings, the
Catholic Health Association , etc., while supporting a inclusive national
health plan, opposed the initiative to force private hospital provision of
abortion, contraception and sterilization services. The United States
Catholic Conference added to the opposition the threat that the Catholic
Church would close its hospitals rather than permit their use for abortion
services.199
193. See Elizabeth L. Gibson, Artificial Insemination by Donor: Information,
Communication and Regulation, 30 J. FAM. LAW 1-44 (1991).
194. Generally, any method that separates marital intercourse from
conception is consider unethical. Thus, artificial insemination by a nonspousal
donor, and any in vitro fertilization method, including zygote intrafallopian
transfer and intracytoplasmic sperm injection. See DIRECrIVEs 38, 41, supra note
51.
195. "Heterologous fertilization (AID)... is prohibited because it is contrary
to the covenant of marriage, the unity of the spouses and the dignity proper to
parents and the child." Id.
196. "Homologous artificial fertilization (AIH) ... is prohibited when it
separates procreation from the marital act in its unitive significance .... ." Id.
197. Id.
198. H.R. 3600, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1993).
199. U.S. Catholic Bishops' Conference, Resolution On Health Care Reform,
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There is no doubt that this bitter debate between advocates of abortion
on demand and protagonists for the protection of the religious rights of
institutional health care providers was a salient factor in the ultimate
defeat of the Clinton national plan. What is particularly poignant in this
episode was that, until this point in the debate, the strongest and most
vocal proponents of national health care reform in the private sector, and,
indeed, the most consistent supporters of single-payer health care reform
were the religiously affiliated hospitals and the churches that sponsored
them.' °° The advocacy of leaders in the religious ministries of healing
formed the staunchest support of the Clinton Administration in the early
stages of the Congressional hearings. Once it appeared that the Clinton
Plan would force all private medical service providers to perform
abortions their support vanished. Defeat of the Clinton National Health
Plan, with its forced abortion agenda, set the stage for the wholesale entry
of commercial health maintenance organizations into the hospital
"industry".
In 1997 Senator Barbara Boxer and Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi,
both Democrats of California, introduced in Congress The Family
Planning and Choice Protection Act.' °1 This Act, again, would have
forced all hospitals and health care facilities receiving federal funds, e.g.,
for Medicare, Medicaid, Social Security Disability, etc., to provide the full
array of reproductive services, including direct abortion and in vitro
fertilization, as a strict condition of qualification and compliance. The
202Act did not come to a vote in the 103rd Congress.
23 ORIGINS 97 (1993); Peter Steinfels, Bishops Plot Stance If Health Plan Covers
Abortion, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 1993, at 14.
200. The Catholic Health Association and the United States Catholic
conference supported national health care reform as a way to provide blanket
health care access to the poor. See, e.g., Lynn Wagner, CHA Reform Agenda
Finds An Ally In Clinton Plan, MODERN HEALTHCARE, Oct. 11, 1993, at 26;
Bishop John Richard, The Church and Future Health Care Reform, 24 ORIGINS
615, 618 (1995).
201. H.R. 2525; S. 1208 (103rd Congress). Medicaid currently provides funds
for rape and incest abortions. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396(a), 1396(a)(5),(17), (21) (1994); 42
C.F.R. § 440.210 (1995). See also Hern v. Beye, 57 F.3d 906, 909 (10th Cir. 1995);
C. Lewis Borders, Rape and Incest Abortion Funding Under Medicaid--Can the
Federal Government Force Unwilling States to Pick Up the Tab?, 35 U.
LoUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 121 (1996).
202. The Equity in Prescription Insurance and Contraceptive Coverage Act,
H.R. 2174, 105th Congr. (1997), introduced by Senator Olympia Snowe, which
would have mandated that all private insurers paying for prescription drugs also
cover contraceptive drugs and methods has not been voted on.
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The Patients' Bill of Rights, brought to Congress and shelved in the
105th Congress, was debated and finally passed narrowly by the Senate in
the 106th Congress. In an effort to get the stronger House version
through the Senate, however, Senator Edward Kennedy re-introduced it
as an amendment to the Republican bill. On reconsideration, the bill
failed to get sufficient support in a fifty-three to forty-seven vote on June
11, 2000.203
The clash of Democratic and Republican versions of the Bill was
consistently shadowed by efforts of the abortion lobby in Congress to
attach federal demands for abortion rights to reverse the federal
conscience clauses protecting religious institutional providers and force
hospitals participating in both public and private health maintenance
plans to provide abortions. These efforts lacked sufficient support in
Congress to pass. Thus, the Patients' Bill of Rights, failed in 2000,
provided no federal initiative, aside from its general information
disclosure mandates, to force the reversal of the federal or, indeed, state
conscience clauses.2°
1. Medicare, Medicaid and Related Programs
The federal Medicaid statute clearly provides that recipients shall have
205
access to family planning services. Indeed, the Medicaid regulations
adopted by the Department of Health and Human Services and
presumptively applicable to the states, require states to provide funding
for abortions when the pregnancy results from rape or incest or threatens
203. See supra note 4.
204. Id.
205. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(4)(C) (1994). Medicare, with its companion
legislation, Medicaid, began in 1966. Medicare provided basic hospital and
physician care insurance for all elderly entitled to Social Security. Medicaid is a
program of medical assistance for the low-income patients, covering all ages.
Between 1966 and 1972 Medicare's administrators met the demands of medical
providers for a largely hands-off stance by public regulators. Out of this period
emerged rapid inflation of Medicare's expenditures and ineffective efforts to
control costs. Between 1972 and the early 1980's there was a dispersal of
government regulations among federal and state agencies. The Health Care
Finance Agency (HCFA) took over administration in 1977. In 1983 a new form of
hospital reimbursement, the diagnosis-related group (DRG) method of
prospective payment, was adopted to cut costs. Two new federal oversight
institutions were established in the mid-1980's as peer review agencies, the
Prospective Payment Commission (to monitor DRGs) and the Physicians
Payment Review Commission. Lawrence A. Brown, Technocratic Corporatism
and Administrative Reform in Medicare, 10 J. POL. POL'Y & LAw 579 (1985);
DAVID G. SMITH, PAYING FOR MEDICARE: THE POLITICS OF REFORM (1992).
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the life of the mother.Y In 1997, however, Congress expanded the scope
of the federal conscience clause statutes to cover religious providers of
Medicaid, Medicare and related federal programs.2°7 Thus, religious
hospitals, as well as Medicaid and Medicare managed care plans, are
permitted to refuse to provide reproductive health care services to which
they object on religious or moral grounds. Federal Medicaid and
Medicare statutes; however, require managed care and insurance plans to
inform all potential subscribers of any services not covered due to
provider religious beliefs.8
The legislative history of the 1997 Congressional amendments reveals
an intent by Congress that states provide alternative service facilities for
referral, as well as information, for subscribers to obtain reproductive
services where those are restricted by a primary provider due to religious
objections:
If the managed care provider with which a beneficiary is enrolled is
unwilling or unable to provide a particular service (such as a full range of
nondirective counseling, referral, and services for reproductive health
care), the State must treat such a service as having been 'carved out' of its
contract with the organization and take positive steps to ensure that the
service is truly available without burden to beneficiaries through another
system or provider and that the beneficiaries know of this availability
9
It is very important to note, therefore, that under the federal health
care funding programs the burden of referral and provision of alternative
providers and facilities for restricted reproductive medicine is on the
states. The burden in federal law upon referral and provision of
alternative reproductive health care service facilities is not on the
individual religious hospital as a federal/state contract provider. It is on
the public, through the agency of the states.
B. State Legislatures
On a state level, however, there appears to be growing support for
some limitations upon the ethical autonomy of private hospitals and
institutional health care systems in the area of reproductive medical
services. Mandated coverage of family planning services in health
206. Dept. of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education
Appropriations Act, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-78, tit. V, §§ 509-510, 111 Stat. 1467,
1516 (1997).
207. Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, tit. IV, § 1852(j)(3), 111
Stat. 251, 295-97.
208. Id.
209. H.R. Rep. No. 105-149, at 598-99 (1997).
Private Religious Hospitals
insurance plans, for example, is a part of state law in Virginia,1
211 212 21 214 215Maryland, 'Hawaii, Montana, 'Rhode Island, and West Virginia.
Both California and Illinois, while providing coverage for a broad
spectrum of fertility treatments as well, provide conscience clauses
216
allowing employers to exclude such services for conscientious reasons.
Subscriber notification requirements, at least in information brochures
on Medicare and Medicaid plans, appear now in the laws of California,
Illinois, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New York, North Dakota, Oregon,
217Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Washington, and Wyoming. Many states
provide now also for open access mechanisms, whereby alternative
provider services may be made available to insurance enrollees by referral
or contract .
In 1999, California legislators defeated the most extensive re-writing of
state law to force delivery of contraception, sterilization and abortion by
all hospitals, including private religious institutions. Subsequently, purged
of its stigmatizing features, the proposal was re-introduced as a disclosure
provision for health insurance plans and enacted into law without
opposition of the churches in September 2000.
210. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-3407.5:1 (Michie 1999).
211. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. II § 19-701(e)(2)(vii) (2000).
212. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN §§ 431.10A-116.6, 432:1-604.5 (Michie 1998).
213. MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-31-102(2)(h)(iv) (1997).
214. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-18-30(a)(1998).
215. W. VA. CODE § 33-25A-2(1),(11) (2000).
216. CA. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1374.55 (West Supp. 1999); CAL. INS.
CODE § 10119.6(a) (West 1993); 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/35 m(a), (b)(1)(A)
(West 1993 & Supp. 1998). In the past few years a number of non-profit religious
managed care organizations have been created to serve Medicaid managed care
patients, targeted populations, such as the poor, uninsured, or marketed primarily
to co-religionists in conjunction with health care provider systems. For a
discussion on the interface of state mandated coverage requirements for insurance
plans and the conscience clauses, see White, supra note 8, at 1738-42.
217. See Rachel B. Gold, Special Analysis: Provider 'Conscience' Questions
Re-emerge in Wake of Managed Care's Expansion, STATE REPRODUCTIVE
HEALTH MONITOR 18 (1997).
218. For example, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 48.43.065(2)(c) (West, 1999)
("The insurance commissioner shall establish by rule a mechanism... to recognize
the right to exercise conscience while ensuring enrollees timely access to services
and to assure prompt payment to service providers.") See also N.Y. Soc. SERV.
LAW § 364-j(4)(a)(iii)(c) (McKinney, Supp. 1999) (providing reimbursement on a
fee-for-service basis when patients use Medicaid providers outside their managed
care plans).
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On June 4, 1999, the Kuehl-Thomson Health Benefits Act of 1999,
219
was defeated in the California Assembly by a vote of thirty-nine noes to
thirty-one ayes.22 The eighty-seven page bill would have mandated
extensive changes in state law and deprived religious hospitals of various
exemptions and programmatic qualification requirements for
participation in state health service plans if these hospitals refused toS 221
provide or contract out a definitional array of reproductive services. It
would have further stigmatized non-conforming hospitals by creating
public lists of "limited service health care providers. 222  The Kuehl-
Thomson Bill was reconsidered on June 10, 1999, and then placed in the
inactive file in the Assembly on the sponsors' promise to re-introduce the
223legislation in the next session.
Between February 8 and June 10, 1999, the Kuehl-Thomson Bill was
read and debated three times in the Assembly, underwent extensive
winnowing and amendment, but before final defeat went before the state
Assembly substantially intact. Because this legislation mirrors, in whole
or in part, initiatives currently pending in several other states, it is
important to provide a careful and accurate analysis of its provisions to
assess the strength of state public policy concerns. Articulation of these
concerns and the public policy changes advocated are extensive and
precise in the bill. Thus, the Kuehl-Thomson bill supplies a basis for
reflection upon the prospective role of states in the absence of strict,
compensating federal laws, in forcing the issue of ethical autonomy for
224
religious hospitals.
The Kuehl-Thomson Health Benefits bill revolved around a
219. AB 525 (Cal. 1999).
220. Co-authors of AB 525 in the Assembly with Assembly Members Kuehl
and Thomson were Members Aroner, Calderon, Firebaugh, Honda, Jackson,
Keeley, Longville, Mazzoni, Romero, Shelley, and Wildman (all Democrats), and




224. The basic premise of state mandated disclosure requirements of hospital-
provided services, of course, is that the present health care plans involving
religious hospitals do not fully inform consumers of restrictions on expected
services in policies purchased. While there is a great deal of anecdotal evidence in
advocacy literature to this effect, to date, however, there is no record of successful
litigation on the basis of fraudulent or deceptive representation (Restatement,
Torts, § 531 (ALI 1999)) or unfair trade practices against religious hospitals for
failure to disclose restrictions in the area of reproductive medicine in their
primary contracts.
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definitional re-writing of Section 1345 of the California Health and Safety
Code, to amend Section (c) "Comprehensive reproductive health
services" to read:
(c) "Comprehensive reproductive health services" means all
services relating to patient counseling, diagnosis, and treatment
for reproductive health including, but not limited to, any of the
following:
(1) Preconception services.
(2) Pregnancy-related services, including prenatal care, surgical,
and medical abortion, and surgical and medical sterilization,
including, if medically appropriate, at the time of labor and
delivery.
(3) Fertility management.
(4) Sexually transmitted infections.
(5) Emergency contraception.
(6) Breast and reproductive health cancers.
(7) Coverage for federal Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
approved prescription and nonprescription contraceptive
-- . 221
methods.
A new section then was added, to read:
1367.105. (a) On or after July 1, 2000, where a health care
service plan provides a list of providers to potential enrollees,
enrollees, or contracting providers, the health care service plan
shall list all licensed facilities with which the health care service
plan is contracting...
(b) The provider listing described in subdivision (a) shall
indicate with an asterisk (*) those licensed hospital and
ambulatory surgical centers that do not provide sterilizations,
emergency contraception for rape victims, or abortions.
(c) The provider listing described in subdivisions (a) and (b)
shall include a statement on each page where a facility is
identified with an asterisk (*), as required in subdivision (b), in
no less than 12-point type and shall read as follows:
This hospital or ambulatory surgical center does not provide one
or more of the following services: emergency contraception for
rape victims, sterilizations, or abortions. If you need these
services, you should talk with your doctor about how you can
get them. You can also call your health plan at (insertS \226
membership services telephone number).
225. AB 525, 1999-2000 Gen. Sess. § 9 (1999) (emphasis added).
226. AB 525, 1999-2000 Gen. Sess. § 11.
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Around this basic description of comprehensive reproductive health
care services to include provision for abortion, sterilization and
contraception, the bill wove a tight net of coercion and disclosure
requirements. It amended the Corporations Code to add consideration to
the provision for comprehensive reproductive health care services
mentioned to the factors the Attorney General must consider in giving
consent to the transfer of control, responsibility or governance of the
assets of a non-profit public benefit health care corporation to another
. 227
entity. It prohibited the California Health Facilities Financing
Authority from issuing revenue bonds to assist any health care facility
that does not provide directly or arrange for the provision of the
designated reproductive health services.2 8 It amended the Public
Employee's Medical Hospital Care Act to prohibit the board from
approving a health benefits plan that excludes, limits, or restricts the
provision of reproductive health services unless the plan also contracts
with and makes available and accessible to its enrollees a similar licensed
229facility that does not exclude, limit, or restrict the service. Moreover,
the bill would have mandated the board to require any plan that provides
a list of providers to employees, annuitants, or contracting providers to
include, as provided under the bill, designated information in the listing,
including identifying those licensed hospitals and ambulatory surgical
centers that do not provide the designated reproductive health services.
230
Similar disclosure requirements would have been laid on every disability
insurer in the state.231
The Kuehl-Thomson bill also would have changed the fundamental
licensure and regulatory structure of health care service plans, as provided
232in the Knox-Keene Health Care Service Plan Act of 1975, 2 to require a
health care service plan, as a condition for licensure by the Commissioner
of Corporations, to provide a list of providers to potential enrollees, or
227. AB 525, 1999-2000 Gen. Sess §§ 1-3, amending CAL. CORP. CODE §§
5914, 5917 and 5919 (West 1999).
228. AB 525, 1999-2000 Gen. Sess. § 4, amending CAL. Gov. CODE §§ 15438.5,
15459 (West 1999).
229. Id.
230. AB 525 1999-2000 Gen. Sess. § 6-8, amending Cal. Gov. Code §§ 22774,
22778, and 22790 (West 1999).
231. AB 525, 1999-2000 Gen. Sess. §§ 16-18 (amending CAL. INS. CODE §§
10123.12, 10140 (West 1999), and adding §§ 10123.22, 10291.5, 10604.1, and
10702.2).
232. AB 525, 1999-2000 Gen. Sess. §§ 19-22, amending CAL. INS. CODE §
10198.71.
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contracting providers to include information in the listing, identifying
those licensed hospital and ambulatory surgical centers that do not
provide the designated services.233 Requirement for licensure would also
require proof of contract services for the plan or arrangements for these
provided in other similar licensed facilities.
The California Health Facility Construction Loan Insurance Law,
administered by the Office of Statewide Health Planning and
Development, would be similarly changed to exclude insurance coverage
for loans to nonconforming health care facilities. It would require the
Commissioner of Insurance to provide a list of providers that identifies
hospitals and ambulatory surgical centers that do not provide the
reproductive services designated.23
The Medi-Cal program, administered by the State Department of
Health Services would have required licensed facilities restricting
reproductive services to contract with and make available to enrollees
similar licensed facilities that do not exclude the services."'
The Kuehl-Thomson Health Benefits bill, in effect, was a coercive
regulatory effort designed to stigmatize religiously affiliated hospitals with
a penalty of second-class categorization and deprival of rights to
participate in state-sponsored public finance programs and insurance
plans.
After defeat in June, 1999, the Kuehl-Thomson Act was remanded to
committee where substantial amendments were made to change the bill
simply into a disclosure mandate for health care service plans, disability
insurance plans, and California's version of Medicaid, Medi-Cal
subscription lists.
Hospitals and other providers of health services, such as physicians,
health facilities and other organizations licensed directly to deliver or
furnish health care services were exempted from coverage. Furthermore,
all direct disqualifying provisions that would have created a second-class
category of religious hospitals, cutting them off from participation in
public contracts and financing programs, were dropped. With these
amendments, the religious hospital providers dropped their opposition.
The Kuehl-Thomson Act, with disclosure requirements for health
233. AB 525, 1999-2000 Gen. Sess. § 23, adding CAL. INS. CODE § 10705.1.
234. AB 525, 1999-2000 Gen. Sess. §§ 4-5, amending CAL. Gov. CODE §§
15438.5 and 15459.
235. AB 525, 1999-2000 Gen. Sess. § 7, amending CAL. Gov. CODE §§ 22778,
22790.
236. AB 525, 1999-2000 Gen. Sess. §§ 24-27, amending CAL. WELF. & INS.
CODE §§ 14016.5, 14016.71, 14016.8 (West 1999), adding Section 14016.9.
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service plans, disability insurance policies and Medi-Cal programs, was
passed, approved by the Governor on September 2, 2000, and filed with
the Secretary of State on September 8, 2000."'
California law now requires the following paragraph, with appropriate
variations, to be inserted in 12-point boldface type, and posted in a
prominent location on the websites of (1) health care service plans that
cover hospital, medical and surgical benefits; 238 (2) disability insurance
plans covering hospital, medical or surgical benefits which provide lists of
239
network providers to prospective insureds and insureds; and (3) Medi-
Cal service plans to ensure that all Medi-Cal beneficiaries receive and all
Medi-Cal managed care plans include:
Some hospitals and other providers do not provide one or more
of the following services that may be covered under your plan
contract and that you or your family member might need: family
planning; contraceptive services, including emergency
contraception; sterilization, including tubal ligation at the time
of labor and delivery; infertility treatments; or abortion. You
should obtain more information before you enroll. Call your
prospective doctor, medical group, independent practice
association, or clinic, or call the health plan at (insert the health
plan's membership services number or other appropriate
number that individuals can call for assistance) to ensure that
you can obtain the health care services that you need.
Subject licensed health care service plans may omit this disclosure
requirement where they contract for services with providers which already
supply all these reproductive health services.
In addition to legislative schemes requiring disclosure, classification
and disqualification of hospital participation in programmatic public
financing and health insurance plans, state initiatives mandating coverage
of reproductive services should be mentioned, though they touch religious
hospitals only tangentially, not as providers, but rather as employers.
In California again, for example, the Contraceptive Equity Act of 1999
includes most religious organizations in a requirement that employers pay
241for contraceptives in prescription insurance plans. Catholic Charities of
Sacramento filed suit on July 21, 2000, arguing that the law, which took
effect January 1, 2000, violates the California Constitution, as well as the
237. CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE §1363.02 (West 1999).
238. Adding § 1339.80 to the Cal. Health and Safety Code.
239. Adding § 10604.1 to the Cal. Insurance Code.
240. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367.25; CAL. INS. CODE § 10123.196
(West 2000).
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First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution."' Plaintiffs
request a permanent injunction barring enforcement of the Act and a
declaration that the law is unconstitutional.
The law is written so that insurance companies are held responsible for
including contraceptives in employer policies. The law's "conscience
clause," narrows the definition of "religious employer" to worshipping
communities, deliberately excluding religiously affiliated organizations
providing health care, social service and educational programs to the
public, i.e., hospitals, public benefit charitable organizations, such as
religious charities, and colleges and universities.242 Among all mandated
service statutes in states adopting them, only California's fails to embrace
public benefit religious organizations under the protection of its
conscience clause.
Plaintiffs argue the statute constitutes a crimped state definition of
"religion," imposing upon the churches that sponsor public benefit
charities its own definition of what constitutes "religious" and what
constitutes "secular" activities. This would force religiously affiliated
hospitals, for example, to pay for insured services to which they have
241
moral and religious objections.
Several states have passed similar legislation in the past two years.
The District of Columbia's bill on contraceptive coverage, with no
conscience clause, was pocket-vetoed by Mayor Williams.2" On the other
hand, Maryland passed contraceptive insurance coverage legislation, with
broad conscience clause exemptions in 1996, without strong objection
from the churches.245
241. Catholic Charities of Sacramento v. California, N. 00AS03942, filed
August 28, 2000.
242. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367.25(b)(1); CAL. INS. CODE §
10123.195 (d)(1).
243. The legislative record of this bill indicates targeting of Catholic hospitals,
legislative distinctions among religious organizations and attempts at theological
distinctions, all clearly violations of the First Amendment. Church of Lukumi
Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U. S. 520 (1993); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S.
228 (1982); Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Latter-Day
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
244. David A. Fahrenthold, Council Recess Mixes Business, Pleasure, THE
WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 2000, at J.03.
245. See supra note 211. To date, thirteen states have passed legislation
mandating insurance coverage of contraception where a policy covers prescription
drugs or devices. See CAL. INS. CODE 10123.196 (West 2000); DEL. CODE ANN.,
title 18, 3559 (2000); 1999 Conn. Acts 99-79 (June 3, 1999); GA. CODE ANN. 33-24-
59.6 (2000); HAWAii REV. STAT. 431:10A-116.6, 431:10A-116.7, 432:1-604.5
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IV. HOSPITAL REFERRALS, CONTRACTING OUT SERVICES, AND THE
PROBLEM OF MORAL COOPERATION
Many religious hospitals and acute care systems sponsored by churches
or religious organizations have affiliated with or share management
resources with public or private hospitals that are either non-religious or
sponsored by other religious organizations permitting medical procedures
prohibited in the primary facility. In this way the hospitals may offer
counseling and referral services to patients, directing them for the
disapproved services to other facilities. This is particularly true in the
area of medical practice involving reproductive health care decisions. The
model, of course, resembles the common practice of sharing expensive
technical and scientific resources in other areas of medical practice, or
cooperative financial and managerial resource-pooling schemes. Right
now the ethical problems of referral and cooperation in the provision of
reproductive medical services are intensely controversial.
Of solutions offered by advocates of open access to private, religious
health care providers for the array of reproductive medical treatments
and procedures not currently available, most fix upon the need for the
religious hospitals to accommodate themselves to specific patient
requests.2 46  "Creative accommodations" by private hospitals, using
referrals, contracted out services, creation of separate facilities, financing
and sharing resources with out-patient clinics, etc. are catalogued and
appraised by their proponents.
2 47
These solutions overlook the requirements of federal law. Federal law
provides the burden of accommodation, at least under federally-financed
241health care plans, is on the state. Private accommodations are more
severely limited, from an ethical perspective, than their advocates seem to
realize. To be very blunt, at least abortion on demand runs against the
moral traditions of all the major religious denominations in this country as
an intrinsically moral evil. To suggest "creative accommodations" of
health care professionals in the direct termination of fetal life, without
(Michie 2000); IOWA CODE 514C.19 (2000); ME. REV. STAT. ANN., tit. 24, 2332-J,
ME. REV. STAT. ANN., title 24-A, 2756, 2847-G, 4247 (West 2000); MD. CODE
ANN. INS., 15-826 (2000); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 689A.0415 et seq. (Michie 2000);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN., tit. 37, 415:18-i (2000); 1999 N.C. SESS. LAWS 90 (June 30,
1999); R.I. GEN. LAWS 27-18-57, 27-19-48, 27-20-43, 27-41-59 (2000); 8 VT. STAT.
ANN. 4099c (2000). Insurance plans offered to federal employees must meet
similar requirements. See Pub. L. No. 106-58-113 Stat. 430 (1999).
246. See supra notes 6-8.
247. See, e.g., Boozang supra note 8.
248. See Balanced Budget Act, supra note 207.
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moral limitations upon development, circumstances, reasons, alternative
options or conditions, is simply unrealistic. Biological technologies of
anti-conception or fertility enhancement pose less drastic ethical
challenges, while still skirting the peripheries of "pro"-creation, touching
religious conscience where the quintessentially individuated mystery of
divine love in giving human life is concerned.
"Creative accommodations" eroding the most basic religious
commitments of private health care professionals, thus, are not a final
answer. In most cases they are not really feasible. Where tried, they
leave a trail of misgiving, temporizing and moral ambivalence.
The largest hospital in Arkansas, for example, St. Vincent Infirmary
Medical Center in Little Rock, is operated by St. Vincent's Health
System, owned by Denver-based Catholic Health Initiatives. Under an
arrangement with the Arkansas Women's Health Center, St. Vincent's
operated a sterilization unit under the terms of its purchase in June, 1998,
of Doctors' Hospital, a non-religious, private hospital across the street
from St. Vincent's. Prior to the purchase, the doctors of Doctors'
Hospital performed abortions and sterilizations. After acquisition, St.
Vincent's stopped abortion services, but agreed to allow sterilizations to
continue in a special facility near the obstetrics ward. The room at the
new St. Vincent's Doctors' Hospital was leased by Arkansas Women's
Health Center, which paid rent to the hospital, along with a set fee for
each sterilization to compensate the hospital for supplies used.
When the sterilization unit opened on July 1, 1998, a storm of protest
arose within the Catholic community, with hospital administrators
justifying the arrangement under the terms of the ethical principles of
material cooperation, while the head of the Catholic Medical Association
condemned the arrangement, saying he had never heard of an
arrangement like the one in Arkansas.
The referral program at St. Vincent's Doctors Hospital ended in 1999
after Pope John Paul II told the local bishop and other American bishops
visiting Rome that permitting sterilizations is a "grievous sin and source
of scandal.249
Referral and contracted out services are not a principled solution to the
dilemma persons face who request services refused by the selected health
care provider. Can the states require licensed hospitals to provide neutral
counseling or refer out patients for services the hospitals themselves do
not provide because of their own ethical restraints? The moral problem is
far more complex than those who propose referral and contract services
249. Deborah Halter, 35 THE NAT. CATH. REPORTER, October 15, 1999 at 10.
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as an easy solution to the comprehensive public access dilemma seem to
think. Ultimately, referral largely overlooks the difficult straits of already
existing patients by forcing them into situations of grave inconvenience,
and expense, to say nothing of pain. For these patients, full disclosure of
the limited obstetrical services offered by the hospital before admission is
the only reasonable alternative.
The referral solution for covered contract services, whereby a religious
hospital refers patients who seek reproductive health services, such as
nontherapeutic abortion, not provided by the primary facility, to other,
neutral hospitals or clinics for treatment, is both temporary and arbitrary.
Because individual counselors and referral agents may not be required to
make the reference under the protection of the various conscience clause
provisions, in fact, mandated referral systems will not work. Counseling
provided by the same persons who wish to deny the treatment desired
initially, may be both distasteful and morally objectionable. A referral in
many cases may be made, but must not be made; may be made with
sympathy, understanding and provision of necessary information, or may
be made reluctantly and with overtones of personal disempowerment.
Referral away from the primary provider means, in many cases, more
than simply embarrassment and discomfort for patients requesting these
services. It may be more dangerous, medically risky, more painful and
more expensive. One need only consider the human cost to a patient
requesting postpartum tubal ligation after a caesarian section in a primary
facility. The tubal ligation may have to be performed later, entailing new
surgery, at a distant, strange facility and at additional expense to the
HMO or insurance provider. The convenience of both delivery and
sterilization procedure together, a usual sequence of surgical procedures,
will necessarily be forfeited by the patient. Or what of the rape victim
brought into a primary emergency facility, told after completion of
forensic tests, that she must go elsewhere for state-mandated therapeutic
care? Examples could be multiplied.
Affiliations of Catholic and non-Catholic hospitals or facilities are
governed by Part 6 of the Ethical and Religious Directives, "Forming New
Partnerships With Health Care Organizations and Providers."25  Four
guidelines are provided for negotiating health care mergers: (1) Directive
67 states that "[d]ecisions that may lead to serious consequences for the
identity or reputation of Catholic health care services or entail the high
risk of scandal should be made in consultation with a bishop"; (2)
Directive 68 states that any partnership affecting the identity of Catholic
250. See ETHICAL DIRECTIVES, supra note 48.
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health care institutions "must respect church teaching and discipline"; (3)
Directive 69, states that "[w]hen a Catholic health care institution is
participating in a partnership which may be involved in activities judged
morally wrong by the Church, the Catholic institution should limit its
involvement in accord with the moral principles governing cooperation;"
and (4) Directive 70 states that "[tithe possibility of scandal ... is an
important factor that should be considered when applying the principles
governing cooperation."
The moral principle involved in the cooperation and referral situations
is called the principle of moral cooperation."' This principle differentiates
the action of the provider of ethically-prohibited services from the action
of the cooperator in making the referral in two ways; the first is between
formal and material cooperation. If the referring cooperator actually
intends the object of the prohibited act, the cooperation is ethically wrong.
Formal cooperation can be explicit, as, for example, when the referring
agent intends an abortion to be procured. Implicit formal cooperation is
attributed when, even though the cooperator denies intending the
wrongful act, i.e., the abortion, no other explanation can distinguish
between the cooperator's intent or purpose and that of the abortion
provider.
On the other hand, if the cooperator does not intend the object of the
wrongdoer's activity, the cooperation is said to be material and can be
morally licit. Thus, the attenuation of ethical complicity does not occur
simply because the act of generic referral is more remote from the evil
than physically participating in the evil itself, but rather from ignorance of
the outcome or the referring agent's non-direct intention. Some sort of
on-balance judgment, a weighing of values, must occur to justify the
material involvement. Only very serious consideration of patient well-
., .252
being justifies the remoteness of moral involvement. A person who
251. BERNARD M. ASHLEY & KEVIN O'ROURKE, HEALTH CARE ETHICS: A
THEOLOGICAL ANALYSIS, 283-284 (3d ed. 1989); BERNARD HARING, II THE LAW
OF CHRIST 496 (1963); C. HENRY PESCHKE, I CHRISTIAN ETHICS 251-252 (1981);
GERMAIN GRISEz, 3 THE WAY OF THE LORD JESUS: DIFFICULT MORAL
QUESTIONS, App. 2, 876-884 (1997).
252. See James F. Keenan, Cooperation, Principle of, NEW DICTIONARY OF
CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT 232, 234 (Judith A. Dwyer, ed., 1994). This may be
similar to Governor Mario Cuomo's reasons for his pro-choice stance on abortion
as a political principle. Cuomo argued that, to promote social harmony and leave
open the possibility that Catholic moral teachings would become much more
widely held in the long run, Catholic public officials should not use their offices to
advance those religious teachings that are now highly contentious in society.
Mario M. Cuomo, Religious Belief and Public Morality: A Catholic Governor's
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suspends his or her moral judgment in referral sets his or her conscience
aside for a greater good.
The Supreme Court in three vital decisions regarding medical
-54 255
assistance at the termination of life, Cruzan,25 Vacco and Glucksberg,
weighed into the traditional and accepted jurisprudence of cooperation
and causality, the so-called double effect rule, to flesh out in practical
terms differences between direct and indirect, or formal and material in
the terms of religious moral teaching on cooperation, that are more than
abstract.
The ethical problem of material cooperation, however, cannot rest at
this point. Within the churches themselves, there is great controversy
over the issue. One must have a very short memory, indeed, to have
forgotten the intensity of church lobbying that went into the so-called
"gag orders" of the Public Health Services Act of 1988,"' tried on free
.. 257
speech grounds in Rust v. Sullivan.
In 1970 Congress added Title X to the Act, authorizing the Secretary of
the Department of Health and Human Services to "make grants to and
enter into contracts with public and non-profit private entities to assist in
the establishment and operation of voluntary family planning projects
which shall offer a broad range of acceptable and effective family
planning methods and services.""" Section 1008 of the Act, however,
provided that "none of the funds appropriated under this subchapter shall
be used in programs where abortion is a method of family planning." 259
By 1986 widespread abuses of Title X funds prompted an extensive
audit by the Government Accounting Office, followed by congressional
action suspending the program. Among the findings were that 117
hospitals receiving Title X funds and eighty-five percent of Planned
Parenthood Clinics were using the funds in programs featuring counseling
and referral for abortions. Furthermore, funds were being used to pay
dues in organizations lobbying for programs advocating abortion as an
acceptable method of family planning. Hearings on Senate Bill 1366,
providing a four-year reauthorization of the funding bill, with new, more
Perspective, 1 NOTRE DAME J. C. ETHICS AND PUB. POL'Y 13 (1984).
253. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990).
254. Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
255. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
256. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300 et seq.; Senate Hearings 100-378, Senate Committee on
Labor and Human Resources, S. 1366. July 30, 1987.
257. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
258. 42 U.S. C. § 300 (a).
259. 42 U.S. C. § 300 (a)-6.
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stringent regulations, were conducted in the summer of 1987.26
0
The Department of Health and Human Services issued amended
regulations for the reauthorized program on February 2, 1988,261 in
general, prohibiting activities that encourage, promote or advocate
abortion.' 62 Counseling and referral for abortion services were clearly
inconsistent with the ethical principles of a majority of prospective private
agency funding recipients.
The new regulations provided "clear and operational guidance" to
grantees about how to preserve the distinction between Title X programs
and abortion as a method of family planning.263 The regulations attached
three principal conditions on the grant of federal funds for Title X
projects. First, the regulations specify that a "Title X project may not
provide counseling concerning the use of abortion as a method of family
planning or provide referral for abortion as a method of family
planning., 264 Title X projects must refer every pregnant client "for
appropriate prenatal and/or social services by furnishing a list of available
providers that promote the welfare of the mother and the unborn
child. 265 The list may not be used indirectly to encourage or promote
abortion,
such as by weighing the list of referrals in favor of health care
providers which perform abortions, by including on the list of
referral providers health care providers whose principal business
is the provision of abortions, by excluding available providers
who do not provide abortions, or by 'steering' clients to• • 266
providers who offer abortion as a method of family planning.
The Title X project was expressly prohibited from referring a
267pregnant woman to an abortion provider, even upon specific request.
Second, the regulations broadly prohibited a Title X project from
engaging in activities that "encourage, promote or advocate abortion as a
method of family planning.,
268
Third, the regulations required that Title X projects be organized so
260. Senate Committee, supra note 256.
261. 42 C.F.R. Pt. 59.
262. President Clinton signed an order misspending these regulations.
263. 42 C.F.R. Part 59, 53 Fed. Reg. 2922 (Feb. 2, 1988).
264. Section 59.8 (a)(2) and 59.8 (v)(2) of the Public Health Service Final
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that they are "physically and financially separate" from prohibited
abortion activities. To be deemed physically and financially separate, "a
Title X project must have an objective integrity and independence from
prohibited activities. Mere bookkeeping separation of Title X funds from
other monies," the regulations add, "is not sufficient."
Rust v. Sullivan involved a facial challenge under the free speech clause
of the First Amendment to the prohibition of counseling and referral
services involving abortion. Finding the regulations a fair interpretation
by the Secretary of Congressional intent under the Act, the Court then
addressed the issue of viewpoint discrimination involved in the
regulations' prohibition of "all discussion about abortion as a lawful
option--including counseling, referral, and the provision of neutral and
accurate information about ending a pregnancy--while compelling the
clinic or counselor to provide information that promotes continuing
pregnancy to term." '269 The Court held the prohibition constitutional, as a
valid implementation of congressional choice favoring childbirth over
abortion.
My purpose in citing Rust v. Sullivan is not to re-examine the Supreme
Court's upholding of viewpoint-based suppression of speech as a
condition for acceptance of public funds in this case. It is, rather, to note
that the prohibition against "counseling and referral" of abortion-related
services was put into the regulations implementing the Public Health
Service Act in 1988 precisely at the insistence of the religious lobbyists
who at that time argued before Congress that the very people to oppose
abortion on ethical grounds also oppose attempts to counsel and refer
pregnant women for that very purpose.27 In other words, ten years ago
Congress included the "gag order" in a publicly-funded health services
program because Congress was told that, in the moral judgment of its
opponents, counseling and referral shared equally the ethical evil of
abortion itself.
Prior to Rust v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court examined the AdolescentS 271
Family Life Act, providing federal funds to public and nonpublic private
organizations and agencies for services and research in the area of
premarital adolescent sexual relations and pregnancy. In Bowen v.
Kendrick... in 1987 the Supreme Court upheld the Act's provision of
federal funding to church-related private agencies against a challenge
269. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
270. 42 C.F.R. Part 59, Public Health Service Final Rules, 53 Fed. Reg. 2922
(Feb. 2, 1988).
271. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300z et seq. (1982 ed. and Supp. V).
272. 487 U.S. 589 (1987).
Private Religious Hospitals
under the Establishment Clause.
Not expressly discussed by the Supreme Court in Bowen v. Kendrick,
however, is a similar gag order. The Adolescent Family Life Act
restricted the awarding of grants to "programs or projects which do not
provide abortion or abortion counseling or referral," except that the
program may provide referral for abortion counseling if the adolescent
and her parents request such referral."' Once again, the restriction on
counseling and referral of abortion services found its way into the Act
because of the churches' religious ethical concerns expressed to Congress.
The Adolescent Family Law Act was enacted by Congress in 1982; the
Public Health Services Act regulations was implemented in 1988. Both
prohibit, at the insistence of the churches that operate hospitals and
related health service agencies, the very counseling and referral that many
hospitals affiliated with these same churches now want to engage in to
allow mergers and acquisitions to go ahead without strong local
community opposition. The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality
of both Acts, including their respective gag orders, against challenges
under the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. One wonders now how
serious ethical challenges to counseling and referral services may be. It
seems strange that within just one short decade religiously affiliated
hospitals could do an about-face on a doctrine alleged to be grounded in
the natural law itself. If the "about-face" is just an expediency, however,
then one wonders about the extent of its longevity.
In 1995 the U.S. Senate and the House passed different versions of the
Medical Training Nondiscrimination Act of 1995.74 Both bills provided
exemption for medical students and institutions to opt out of the
requirement that OB-Gyn programs train residents to perform elective
abortions. The training requirement forms part of the policy
implemented by the Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical
Education.275
Both bills added to the conscience clauses an amendment eliminating
the requirement for accreditation that students desiring abortion training
be referred to other provider institutions. Referral requirements were
276
also represented to Congress as conscientiously objectionable 7.
273. Id. at 597; 42 U.S.C. § 300z-10(a).
274. S. 971, 104th Congr., 1st Sess. (June 20, 1995); H.R. 1932, 104th Cong., 1st
Sess. (June 27, 1995). Codified at 42 U.S.C. § 238N (1996).
275. The policy was unsuccessfully challenged in St. Agnes Hospital of
Baltimore, Inc. v. Riddick, 748 F. Supp. 319 (D. Md. 1990).
276. It should also be mentioned that the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1988
overturning Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984), and applying Title IX
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The problem of material cooperation by way of referrals in cases in
which patients seek the medical services of church-related providers
where reproductive medicine is concerned, has been accentuated by the
recent experience of the religious social service providers in Germany.
2 77
The story is one of great personal hurt, outrage, compromise and
indignation caused by referral measures taken under political pressure for
what majoritarian political parties deemed perfectly good reasons.
Nanette Funk, several years ago, prepared an insightful analysis of the
278German referral system for legally permissible first trimester abortions.
For those who wish to provide abortion access in this country through
state-mandated referral services, Funk's recording of the profound
personal trauma caused to pregnant women by state-mandated referrals
under the German Pregnancy and Family Assistance Act of 1995 is eye
opening. Even without the counseling antecedent required in Germany
before referral, a system of enforced referrals can easily become a social
nightmare.
State enforcement, like state agency verification of claims against
workers' compensation funds, of course, would require not only records,
but periodic access by public agencies to private hospital records. State
review of patient records, in turn, necessitates that the contents of the
records be mandated, storage and confidentiality are assured, and proper
indexing be provided. Thus, pregnant women seeking abortion referrals
would be put to the task, in the presence of hospital staff whose religious
commitment is to avoid the destruction of the fetus altogether (a position
arguably at odds with that of the petitioner) creating a record of their
request. The content of the record may include a brief medical history,
plus the reasons the patient may have for the referral, as well as notice of
what stage she is in in her pregnancy at the time. In Germany referral
records also noted whether the petitioner had had previous abortions.
The bottom line in any scheme of state enforcement of referral services is
that the mechanism of sanction makes women dependent upon the person
charged with providing referral, in a public context, in which there is no
ultimate assurance of how the record produced may be used. More than
that, it required a woman to give and explain her reasons for desiring the
to entire institutions of higher education rather than simply discrete programs, is
"abortion neutral", i.e., the Act expressly states that the failure of a college or
university to provide abortion services to students is not a form of "gender
discrimination" - 20 U.S.C. § 1688 and statutory notes (1988).
277. "On File," 27 ORIGINs 546 (1997).
278. Nanette Funk, Abortion Counseling and the 1995 German Abortion Law,
12 CONN. J. INT'L. L. 33 (1996).
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abortion to an entirely unsympathetic person.
State mandated referral services by the very organizations that
themselves have deep ethical objections to abortion was so profoundly
humiliating to women petitioning that it set off strident opposition in
Germany that continues until today. So vociferous has been the
opposition that Caritas, the international Catholic social service
organization, and the Catholic Women's Social Services Agency (SKF),
which together had supplied 259 of the 1625 certified referral centers in
Germany, simply pulled out of the system altogether. Neither religious
organizations charged with referral nor women seeking abortions want
the system to continue.
In the United States if a referral system were state-sanctioned, even
without overt counseling components, the element of explanation of
reasons and dependence could not be avoided. One can hardly imagine in
this country, furthermore, a defendant hospital in litigation to protect its
accreditation against a surveillant health department placing before a
court cartons of records of abortion referrals, with attendant discovery
orders to go after the abortion providers to ascertain the outcomes of
these cases--while the names, addresses and histories of petitioning
women become a matter of public record.
Rather than state mandated referrals, it is better simply to get the state
entirely out of the coercion process in the area of sensitive reproductive
choices. Only in this way can the consciences of both hospitals and
patients be respected. Mandated records and surveillance by the state
would simply cut off any other avenue of creative service to the public
which the different religious hospitals can provide according to their
circumstances.
V. MONOPOLIZATION AND HOMOGENIZATION OF HEALTH CARE
SERVICES ARE NOT COMPELLING STATE INTERESTS
Non-profit hospitals developed out of the charitable hospital
movement of the nineteenth century.28 °  As changes in medical
technology, scientific progress and industrial growth expanded, voluntary
hospital missions were enlarged to provide facilities to the general public
for the care of the sick, rather than simply tending the indigent sick of
particular communities. The government stepped in to share the costs of
expanding operating budgets around the turn of the century. Since then
the growing presence of federal, state and municipal governments in
hospital care has provided an empirical basis for the social role of
279. Id.
280. PAUL STARR, supra note 31, at 145.
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government in general welfare programs.18' That role today is
• • 282
indispensable. It stops short, however, of complete absorption of the
churches' role in the voluntary sector providing disinterested charitable
services.
Public monopolization of the delivery of health care services in this
country would demand suppression of the private sector, whether non-
profit, religious, secular or community-oriented, or for-profit. This, of
course, would require massive governmental funding of a national plan,
however worked out with the states on a block grant or direct pay basis.
Such a system, in the foreseeable future, does not appear imminent.
Ratcheting down from public ownership to more intense regulation and
surveillance, however, approaches homogenization of health care instead
of government monopolization. The issue then is one of degree. How
much tightening of licensure and accreditation standards for private
hospitals around a mandated provision of medical services is feasible?
Too much, of course, would simply start the clock ticking towards a total
withdrawal of churches and private philanthropic organizations from
institutionalized health care. Existing religious hospitals and hospital
chains would be sold off to the for-profit sector, leaving health care in this
country to be divided among the "haves" with private group or individual
insurance plans and the "have-nots" to be relegated to public facilities.
Even the most extreme zealots of majoritarian public policies must see
that such a move would be both politically infeasible and socially
disastrous.
In this country there are four systems for the provision of
institutionalized health care services, all tightly regulated by both federal
and state governments and serving the public on non-discriminatory
bases. Permutations in the religious non-profit sector match the vast
changes in for-profit insurance and hospital merger activities in public
awareness. In addition to these two contrasting systems, are publicly
supported hospitals, local and community service oriented and non-profit,
secular hospitals founded and operated by private or corporate
philanthropies. All serve the public nondiscriminatorily and depend,
more or less, upon the provision of overarching public medical plans, such
281. For an analysis of social factors influencing the development of health
care systems since World War II, see ELI GINZBERG, THE MEDICAL TRIANGLE:
PHYSICIANS, POLITICIANS, AND THE PUBLIC (1990).
282. Forty percent of current health care expenditures involve government
funds. In many states the elderly are the dominant consumers of medical care.
Medicaid funds compose the bulk of nursing home revenues. The Impact of
Medicaid Managed Care On the Uninsured, 110 HARV. L. REV. 751 (1997).
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as Medicare, Medicaid and state counterparts!" To an uneven degree all
receive financial support from the provision of managed care services.
The tax advantages, as well as the exemption privileges of ERISA-
regulated, employer-based plans provide the largest source of incentives
284driving managed care using all of these hospital resources.
Private institutions contract with the government for the delivery of
governmental services- because the government cannot or has decided
285
not to monopolize the field.
286Pluralism in delivery of health care, therefore, crosses two axes,
public and private, non-profit and for-profit. It is both competitive and
complementary.
The non-profit sector provides cost-saving, flexibility, personalization,
experimentation, creativity, community orientation and community
loyalty. The for-profit sector is driven to hold down escalating costs,
thereby providing the competitive quality services that enable
comprehensive health care to come within the reach of the broadest
possible public. It is in the best interests of society to secure the health of
each sector, and the integrity of each competing system.
There is a vital role for private non-profit hospitals to play in the health
care enterprise. A decade ago Dean Robert Clark of Harvard wrote of
the disfunctionality of the private non-profit hospital corporation. He
thought it should disappear from the health care scene as an anachronism
in a market dominated by public and for-profit players. The reasons he
gave, largely turning upon the difficulty of competing and fragmented
private institutions securing access to the financial resources necessary to
continue in this market, lose their cogency as shared resources achieved
through creative hospital mergers provide market strengths formerly not
predictable.
Studies of the hospital market since that time, however, have
vindicated a valuable niche for the private hospital, as well as for
283. Title XIX of the Social Security Act of 1965 established the Medicare and
Medicaid programs. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396v (1994).
284. Jerry L. Mashaw & Theodore R. Marmor, The Case for Federalism and
Health Care Reform, 28 CONN. L. REV. 115,118, 125 (1995).
285. CARL ESBECK, THE REGULATION OF RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS As
RECIPIENTS OF GOVERNMENTAL ASSISTANCE (1996); Gail D. Edson, Medicare and
Managed Care, 44 U. KAN. L. REV. 807 (1996).
286. See John V. Jacobi, The Ends of Health Insurance, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
311 (1997).
287. Robert Clark, Does the Nonprofit Form Fit the Hospital Industry?, 93
HARV. L. REV. 1416 (1980).
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pluralism in hospital services. The wholesale state imposition of public
policies upon religious dissenters in the health care fields would create the
social and scientific downside of lost initiative and destruction of already-
proven creativity in providing financially sound medical services.
Changes in the contemporary market have not undercut the increased
ability of private non-profit hospitals to price their services below
market,"-' serve the poor and indigent, and add flexibility to their care
services.
America has achieved a level of medical service that is unequalled
precisely because of the pluraformity of health care systems serving the
public. Federal government challenges to mergers of non-profit hospitals,
beginning in 1988, were pinned on the prospective loss of competitive
flexibility in holding down prices." 9 Empirical studies since that time,
however, have shown that not only do non-profit hospitals and health
maintenance organizations behave differently than for-profits, but that,
overall, they generally set lower prices for services provided.2  Moreover,
the unique values of religious non-profit hospitals, in concern for local
community, provision of care for the poor and uninsured, loyalty of staff,
physicians and patients, and the profile of disinterested public service
support their very strong fundraising profile. The best examples of loyalty
and support are the private non-profit hospitals sponsored by members of
local communities and overseen by boards of directors drawn from those
same communities. The equity holder of the non-profit organization,
Frank Sloan says, is not a remote shareholder, but the community itself,
however defined . 91
The bottom line in non-profit hospital conversions to for-profit status,
of course, is the loss of community control of the institutions and
restraints in the flexibility permitted hospital administrators to provide
288. See William J. Lynk, Nonprofit Hospital Mergers and the Exercise of
Market Power, 38 J. LAW & ECON. 437 (1995); David J. Behinfor, Exclusive
Contracting Between Hospitals and the Use of Economic Credentialling, 1 DEPAUL
J. HEALTH CARE L. 71 (1996).
289. See United States v. Carilion Health Sys. and Roanoke Valley Hospital,
892 F.2d 1042 (4th Cir. 1989); United States v. Rockford Memorial Corp., 898 F.2d
1278 (7th Cir. 1990). Earlier lawsuits to stop hospital mergers involved for-profit
hospitals. See, e.g., American Medical Internat'l, 104 F.T.C. 1 (1984).
290. The most recent study to verify these conclusions, as applied to HMOs, is
David U. Himmelstein et al, Quality of Care in Investor-Owned vs Not-for-Profit
HMOs, 282 J.A.M.A. at 159 (July 14, 1999).
291. Frank Sloan, Property Rights In the Hospital Industry, HEALTH CARE IN
AMERICA: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HOSPITAL AND HEALTH INSURANCE 106
(H.E. Frech III ed. 1988).
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below-cost services to the poor. What, in effect, a for-profit conversion
does is to give up community control to investors. The desire for rising
profits directly clashes with disinterested service of the poor, as well as the
interests of those who pay monthly premiums enabling them to use the
hospital as a service provider. It directly undermines the freedom
religious hospitals need to refuse to provide some services, otherwise
profitably delivered, for ethical reasons, making them less competitive in
the markets they serve.
The loss of the religious sector in the administration of non-profit
hospitals serving the public, which an excessive regulatory frenzy would
force, thus, would be a serious loss of efficient and creative health care in
this country.
A. Institutionalized Health Care Ministries Are Protected Free Exercise
of Religion
Since 1940 in Cantwell v. Connecticut,z9 the Supreme Court has
compiled an impressive list of activities that it considers to be essentially
exercises of religious faith, protected under the free exercise clause of the
First Amendment. For example, the Court has protected as core
exercises of religious belief the right to worship, 293 the right to preach and
294disseminate religious literature, the right to donate, own and dispose of
291property for religious purposes, the right to provide for the education of
296 29
children, the right to certify, ordain and assign ministers of religion,
298the right to organize religious communities, the right to conscientious
objection to public policy decisions,299 and the fundamental right to belief
and expression of belief. °  A religious hospital, in reality, is, for the
sponsoring churches, the institutionalized locus of all these rights and
functionalities. This list has been augmented in federal courts. Lower
courts, indeed, have added further elucidations of public service as
protected religious ministries. For example, recently the Federal District
292. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
293. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
294. Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296 (1940); repeated in dicta in Texas Monthly v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989).
295. Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Hull
Memorial Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969); Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
296. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
297. Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the United States and Canada v.
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
298. Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
299. Gillette v. United States and Negre v. Larsen, 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
300. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
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Court for the District of Columbia in Westminister Presbyterian Church v.
Board of Zoning Appeals"' held that feeding the hungry is a core religious
exercise that can be curtailed by the state only to serve compelling state
interests.
In addition to the activities listed, the Supreme Court has also listed a
number of organizations that, while performing services that are also
performed by secular organizations, are themselves considered
pervasively religious. The list runs from parochial primary and secondaryS • 302 -- 30330
schools, through publishing houses, even to gymnasiums.3 4 The lower
305 306
courts have added newspapers and retirement homes. Both
California3°7 and the state of Washington, until this time, have considered
religiously affiliated hospitals 3°s and nursing homes as religious
• • 301
organizations.
As we shall explain in the next section of this essay, Congress itself, in
enacting the Church Amendment (the federal conscience clause) clearly
intended to protect religious decisions in private religiously affiliated
hospitals in health care where there may be some doubt about their
310
constitutional protection. That concern is now more attenuated, as free
exercise protections have expanded since the early 1970s.31 '
Concurring in Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church ofa 312
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, Justice Brennan said in
301.862 F. Supp. 538 (D.D.C. 1994).
302. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 602 (1971); Wolman v. Walter,
433 U.S. 229 (1977); and Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
303. Texas Monthly v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989).
304. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
305. Feldstein v. Christian Science Monitor, 555 F. Supp. 974 (D. Mass. 1983).
306. E.E.O.C. v. Presbyterian Ministries, Inc., 788 F. Supp. 1154 (W.D. Wash.
1992).
307. Kelly v. Methodist Hospital of Southern California, 22 Cal. 4th 1108, 95
Cal. Rptr. 2d 514 (2000).
308. See City of Tacoma v. Franciscan Foundation, 972 P.2d 566 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1999).
309. Farnam v. CHRISTA Ministries, 807 P.2d 830 (Wash. 1991).
310. See infra Section V.C.
311. All "living wills" or advance health care directive statutes, as well as
those providing durable powers of attorney for health care decisions, contain
"conscience clauses," relieving health care professionals of the obligation to act
against their conscientious beliefs. See Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of
Health, 497 U.S. 261, 289 n.2-4. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
312. 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
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specific reference to the religious motivation of non-profit activities of
public service offered by church-related charities:
The risk of chilling religious organizations is most likely to a rise
with respect to nonprofit activities. The fact that an operation is
not organized as a profit-making commercial enterprise makes
colorable the claim that it is not purely secular in orientation. In
contrast to a for-profit corporation, a nonprofit organization
must utilize its earnings to finance the continued provision of
the goods or services it furnishes, and may not distribute any
surplus to the owners. This makes plausible a church's
contention that an entity is not operated simply in order to
generate revenues for the church, but that the activities
themselves are infused with a religious purpose. Furthermore,
unlike for-profit corporations, nonprofits historically have been
organized specifically to provide certain community services,
not simply to engage in commerce. Churches often regard the
provision of such services as a means of fulfilling religious duty
and of Providing an example of the way of life a church seeks to
foster.
The standard First Amendment jurisprudence setting the definitional
limits upon the content of the free exercise of religion may also be derived
from the Supreme Court's direction in cases involving protected core
manifestations of religious faith, such as preaching and solicitation,
conscientious objection to war, the refusal of employees to work in
violation of their religious conscience and the direct state abridgment of
the right to worship.314
The free exercise of religion is a personal right of individuals, as well as
a collective right of individuals through the organizations they create as
vehicles for cooperation in the expression of their religious faith.315
Churches and church organizations, as well as individuals, are protected
by the First Amendment's free exercise clause.31 6
A careful re-read of the Supreme Court's decision in Pierce v. Society
313. 483 U.S. 327, 344 (1987) (emphasis in opinion).
314. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 217 (1993).
315. See Frederick M. Gedicks, Towards a Constitutional Jurisprudence of
Religious Group Rights, 1989 Wis. L. REV. 99 ; Liza W. Hanks, Justice Souter:
Defining 'Substantive Neutrality' In An Agenda of Religious Politics 48 STAN.
L.REv. 903 (1996).
316. See generally Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (1872); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas
Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Larson v.
Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982); Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah,
508 U.S. 520 (1993).
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of Sisters31 7 in 1925, indicates that the basis of the Court's judgment that
Oregon's law restricting parental rights to choose private religious schools
for the education of their children is not an expansive disquisition on
parental rights to control their children's schooling, such as might later be
derived from a reading of Wisconsin v. Yoder,"" nor was it the First
Amendment's guarantee of the free exercise of religion by the Sisters of
the Holy Names. It was, rather, that state monopolization of elementary
and secondary school education violates the taking clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment by abridging the rights of those owning and
administering existing private schools. The Fourteenth Amendment in
1925 was undoubtedly applicable to the states. The Court said:
[Aippellees asked protection against arbitrary, unreasonable,
and unlawful interference with their patrons, and the
consequent destruction of their business and property. Their
interest is clear and immediate, within the rule approved ...
where injunctions have issued to protect business enterprisese . 319
against interference with the freedom of patrons or customers.
Only in dicta do parental rights appear.320 The free exercise clause is
hardly mentioned, because at that time application of the religion clauses
., • 321
of the First Amendment to the states was problematic.
If patients have a right to choose the health care providers they want
and can afford, do they not also have the right to choose religious, private,
non-profit health care institutions? Is this right any different than the
parental right to choose the appropriate schooling of their children?
Furthermore, if religion motivates the choice, is the choice not also
protected under the free exercise provisions of the First Amendment
against state burden or confiscation? Of course, it is. Conversely, no
doubt, the choice would be meaningless if institutional care givers were
317. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
318. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
319. 268 U.S. at 536 (citations omitted).
320. The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in
this
Union repose excludes any general power of the state to standardize its
children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only.
The child is not the mere creature of the state; those who nurture him and
direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize
and prepare him for additional obligations.
Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S.
510, 535 (1925).
321. The free exercise clause was applied to the states in Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
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prohibited by the state from exercising their religious conscience in
matters of health care provision.
The suggestion urging monopolization and homogenization of
institutionalized health care by the state is not only short-sighted, it would
also violate the taking clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,"' as well as
the free exercise clause of the First Amendment, made applicable to the
states by the Fourteenth. Under our federal constitution the state is
limited to licensure, accreditation, enforcement of medical and health
protection standards, and securing full and complete disclosure of hospital
services.
Whether religious hospitals have a free exercise right to ethical
autonomy as organizations in refusing to provide desired and legal
medical procedures to the general public, however, may not be clearly
evident from the history of judicial protection of either free exercise or
challenging religious establishment individually. On the other hand,
under the "hybrid" rights analysis the Supreme Court announced in
13
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith, and
then affirmed in City of Boerne, Texas v. Flores,324 combining religious
conduct with another or other constitutionally-protected rights, such as
freedom of association, the constitutionally-protected liberty interest in
privacy and informed consent, may bring medical-moral decisions under
the strict scrutiny test of the free exercise clause of the First Amendment.
This would require a compelling state interest and least restrictive means
justification for significant burdens placed by the state upon religious
hospitals' ethically prohibitive choices.32'
The religious choices of patients to select health care providers must be
respected. This axiom is as true as is the choice by adults of prescribed
medical services. Any new service alignment or structural change in the
institutions providing health care must ensure that members of the public
have access to services which respect their own religious beliefs. This, I
take it, is the radical public policy purpose behind the "conscience
clauses," to protect both institutional and personal choices of conscience.
Persons have a First Amendment right under the free exercise clause to
chose religious organizations for their health care needs, as well as for
322. "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law."
323. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
324. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
325. See Heather L. Carlson, Freedom At Risk: The Implications of City of
Boerne v. Flores On the Merger of Catholic and Non-Catholic Hospitals, 17 ST.
Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 157-181 (1997).
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their collateral religious decisions. While federal and state regulatory
compliance rules in programmatic funding plans must be followed by all
providers, the radical right to a religious ambience for medical care is
unquestioned.'
If conscientious health professionals are coerced into violating their
religious conscience either by state regulation or by the pressures of the
market, it is likely that they will abandon or sell their hospitals. While
religious ministry to the sick and dying will remain as a voluntary service
in hospitals by patient demand, institutionalized health care ministry in
the private sector will cease to exist. This would be an incalculable loss to
the country.
Private, disaffiliated acute care facilities competing nose to nose with
the for-profit sector would not last long without the stimulus to sacrifice
provided by transcendent faith commitment. The end result would be a
for-profit health delivery system for those who could afford the insurance
premiums and a public health system for the poor. Private charity would
have disappeared from that area of social interaction which historically
was quintessentially and definitionally "charity" itself.
Standardization of health care by running roughshod over the
individualized religious sensitivities of health care professionals will
assure the pullout of the voluntary sector. This, I believe, will destroy a
vitally important part of this society. Maintenance and protection of the
rights of conscience of religiously-motivated health care providers is a
compelling state interest. There is no equally compelling state interest in
destroying this right.
The recent jurisprudence of the Supreme Court in the matter of
patients' rights, in fact, strengthens the argument for the religious ministry
of care for the sick by putting it into the category of a core exercise of
faith protected by the First Amendment. This appears, not so much in the
case law involving institutions, such as seen in the parochial school cases,
but, rather, in the case law forming around patients' rights, particularly
the right to determine medical care or its withdrawal in end-of-life
situations.327
B. Corporate Configurations Masking the Private Religious Mission
What does a religious hospital look like? A generation ago the
question would have been facetious. When federal and state conscience
326. See Children's Healthcare Is a Legal Duty, Inc. v. Vladeck, 938 F. Supp.
1466 (D. Minn. 1996) (Christian Science exemption from several Medicare
requirements may violate the Establishment Clause).
327. See Cruzan v. Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
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clauses were first enacted to protect the moral choices of health care
professionals, the definition of a "religious" hospital was unnecessary.
The answer was obvious. Today the question preoccupies state and
federal legislators and judges. The religious identity of private hospitals a
generation ago was apparent in their names, public display of religious
symbolism, uniformed personnel, chapels and prominent religious
services. The persons who had given their lives to the religious ministry to
the sick in all the churches were esteemed members of faith communities;
their calling attracted thousands of the most idealistic and generous
women and men. Today vocations are few, average ages are rising, and
the visibility of religious personnel in the hospitals is dimming.
The buildings that housed the religious ministry of that time have now
been torn down and replaced with faceless mirrors of replicative hospital
architecture, cookie-cutter business boxes; meditation rooms replaced
chapels; billing and records offices employ crowds of clerks; medical
technology and treatment efficiencies have abbreviated hospital stays;
chaplaincies are ecumenical and, sometimes, part-time. Costs,
competition, the budget constraints of public programs such as Medicare
and Medicaid, advanced scientific and technical progress, marketing and
public relations needs, and increased public involvement, however, are
not the only factors responsible for changes in the facade of the private
religious hospitals. More important, I believe, has been the consistent
attempt by private religious hospitals to separate themselves out from
their pervasively religious sponsors, so that they may continue to qualify
for federal and state loan, financing and contract program funding
without running afoul of a serious Establishment Clause challenge. With
Medicare and Medicaid in 1965, added to already-existing federal and
state construction and financing programs in place to subsidize hospital
construction, there was a real concern in the late 1960s that religious
hospitals would be disqualified constitutionally from participation.
Pervasively-religious elementary, secondary and higher education were
about to lose any chance of public assistance in the Supreme Court.""
In order to preserve federal funding, hospitals were advised to expand
their boards of directors to seek broader public participation, open their
hiring policies for staff and administration and blunt the religious imagery
to dampen the appearance of religious influence. The Supreme Court's
precedent, set in the last century in Bradfield v. Roberts,"9 provided
authority for private religious hospitals to keep a religiously-motivated
328. See e.g., Horace Mann League v. Board of Public Works, 220 A.2d 51
(Md. 1966).
329. 175 U.S. 291 (1899).
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ministry while at the same time garnering public funds for health care
services as a secular benefit to society.
The financial life of the hospitals depended not only on scientific
progress and administrative efficiencies; it depended also on their
continuing qualification to share in the rich stream of money coming from
federal and state agencies and programs. This story needs to be retold
briefly to understand how the religious hospitals that have survived have
grown in professional excellence and esteem as public benefit
corporations, while at the same time seeing their success mixed with a
very worrisome loss of public understanding of their essentially religious
ministries of love and concern for the sick and the poor.
In 1899 the Supreme Court decided affirmatively the constitutionality
of public funding of private, religiously affiliated hospitals in Bradfield v.
Roberts.33 In so doing, the Court set precedent for the legal nature of the
hospital corporation. The legal character of the corporation is derived,
the Court held, from the law of its incorporation, its charter, by-laws and
the law of the incorporating state or jurisdiction, not from the nature of
the sponsoring religious denomination.
Federal funds had been used to build a wing of Providence Hospital in
the District of Columbia. The hospital was conducted by the Daughters
of Charity, a religious congregation of women of the Roman Catholic
Church. Answering a challenge to the constitutionality of the grant under
the Establishment Clause, the Supreme Court in an opinion written by
Justice Rufus Peckham stated:
Whether the individuals who compose the corporation under its
charter happen to be all Roman Catholics, or all Methodists, or
Presbyterians, or Unitarians, or members of any other religious
organization, or of no organization at all, is of not the slightest
consequence with reference to the law of its incorporation, nor
can the individual beliefs on religious matters of the various
incorporators be inquired into. Nor is it material that the
hospital may be conducted under the auspices of the Roman
Catholic Church... That fact does not alter the legal character
of the corporation, which is incorporated under an act of
Congress, and its powers, duties and character are to be solely
measured by the charter under which it alone has any legal
existence.331
The corporation itself is governed by the internal law of its
incorporation under the laws of the state in which it has its legal existence.
330. Id.
331. Id. at 298.
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The Court added:
This corporation "is not declared the trustee of any church or
religious society. Its property is to be acquired in its own name and
for its own purposes; that property and its business are to be
managed in its own way, subject to no visitation, supervision or
control by any ecclesiastical authority whatever, but only to that of
the Government which created it.
332
Thus, regardless of the faith commitments of administration and staff to
a religious ministry to the sick, hospitals as such were considered secular
entities performing similar services.
The hospital is an entity separate from the church or religious order
which operates it. The corporate assets and properties belong to the
hospital itself, and not to the sponsoring church. Thus, a hospital
operated "under the auspices of a church" is not a church itself, nor is it
pervasively religious. The religious faith of the hospital staff was a private
matter, of which the courts need take no cognizance.
The Supreme Court ruled in Bradfield that the Establishment Clause
was not violated by a grant of public funds to a hospital managed under
the auspices of a church. Bradfield remains unchallenged in the First
Amendment jurisprudence of the Supreme Court and has been cited 239
times for the proposition that church-related hospitals are public benefit
corporations, unlike the churches themselves, which are primarily
religious in character.333 Incorporation of a hospital under state law
subjects the governance of the hospital to state law, and, thus, to some
extent separates it from the pervasive control of church law and
ordinances.334 The corporation essentially is a public benefit corporation,
sponsored by a church, administered by its own law and cognizable on a
"neutral principles" basis by the civil courts. 335 Thus, there is a clear legal
difference between a public benefit corporation administered under the
auspices of a church and a religious organization as such. The use of the
denominational name by the corporation is not legally conclusive of its
nature.
Bradfield v. Roberts established an unbroken precedent, putting health
332. Id. at 299.
333. See, e.g., Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 323 F.2d 959 (4th
Cir. 1963); Lynch v. Spilman, 431 P.2d 636 (Cal. 1967); Seale v. Jasper Memorial
Hosp. Foundation, 1997 Tex. App. LEXIS 5248 (1997) (WL 606857 (Tex. App)).
334. JOHN J. MCGRATH, CATHOLIC INSTITUTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES:
CANONICAL AND CIVIL LAW STATUS (1968).
335. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979). See also Hazen v. Catholic Credit
Union, 681 P. 2d 856 (1984); cf. Farnam v. Crista Ministries, 807 P. 2d 830 (1991).
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care ministry into a different dimension of legal classification than the
religious services of churches, parochial schools, shelter facilities, etc.
Bradfield's depiction of medical care as secular service, and incorporated
hospitals as secular entities, was essential for the justification of massive
amounts of federal and state funds that went into private hospital
construction under the Hill-Burton Act and subsequently, as well as the
administration of tax-funded programs through the private religious
sector in health care.
Because of Bradfield and its consistent subsequent citation, religious
hospitals both qualified as recipients of governmental funding, and
became subject to employment discrimination statutes without general
exemption. The business of religious hospitals, in public terms, came to
be more closely parallel to that of commercial counterparts, not the
churches. It is for this reason that special statutory protections for
religious hospitals and their ethical choices became necessary and were
enacted by the Congress and the states in the middle 1970's as the
"conscience clauses".
The use of secular nonprofit incorporation statutes to separate out
public benefit institutions operated by the churches, therefore, created
entities of a mixed classification. They remain subject to the canon law
and ordinances of the church from the vantage point of the church itself,
as it may enforce by consensual arrangements the discipline of its own
faith and belief. In the eyes of the law, however, such corporations are
not wholly religious entities in character and operation. Without control
of religious identity in general hiring, the hospitals have developed
physician, nursing and administrative staffs, in many cases, lacking in
personal loyalty to the doctrinal beliefs of the sponsoring churches.
Where nonprofit charitable corporations are funded almost entirely by
fee-based services, and are recipients of federal, state and local
government programs, and where these same organizations are required
by public regulations to serve the public on a nondiscriminatory basis, the
corporations are clearly different from the parishes, synagogues, religious
orders and religious training institutions of a strictly religious nature of
the denomination itself. They are technically nonprofit charitable
corporations operated under the auspices of the churches as affiliated
sponsoring bodies, not owned by the churches as such.
From the point of view of the state, public benefit corporations fulfill a
primarily secular purpose in serving the needs of society and, thus, from
the government's viewpoint are secular in nature. Thus, when Congress
enacted the Hill-Burton Act in 1946 to provide federal funding for
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hospital construction 31 6 constitutional objections to the use of these funds
by religious hospitals had already been resolved.
From the vantage point of the church itself, however, hospitals remain
permeated with religious values and vital parts of the churches' overall
religious mission to the world. The services they perform are religiously
motivated; the loyalty they retain to the moral values of the church
sponsor is deeply treasured, but not unquestioned. Most hospitals and
acute-care health services facilities, such as hospices and long-term
convalescent organizations related to the churches are really mixed
corporations.
With these general principles in mind religious hospitals began a major
corporate reconfiguration in the 1970s, which continued with amendments
and restructuring alterations through the 1980s. Because of perceived
threats to their continuing ability to contract for public services, receive
public funds and undertake federally-subsidized research and training117
programs, the endangerment of religious assets due to exposure to
liability suits with the decline or demise of charitable immunity
protections,3 38 and the need to enlarge their boards of directors to include
community leaders with expertise in health-care administration and fund-
raising, the hospitals began to metamorphose through various forms of
corporate reorganization. 3 9 This has significantly altered their religious
appearance.
Concern that religious hospitals could be lumped together with
336. The Hospital Survey and Construction Act of 1946, 78 Stat. 447, 42
U.S.C. §§ 291 et seq. (1964).
337. Four major federal funding programs were of interest to the hospitals: 1)
The Hospital Survey and Construction Act of 1946 (Hill-Burton Act), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 291 (1964) (providing construction grants and low-cost, long term federally-
guaranteed loans for hospital construction and improvement), augmented and
refined by the National Health Planning and Resource Development Act of 1974,
42 U.S.C. §§ 300(o)-(t); 2) the Medicare and, later, Medicaid, Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
1396 et.seq., providing federal funds in terms of contracted services; 3) the Social
Security Disability Act, §§ 401 et seq.; and 4) the Research Appropriations Acts,
42 U.S.C. §§ 280b et seq. providing research and training funds to hospitals under
various of the programs operated by the Department of Health and Human
Services.
338. See EDWARD GAFFNEY ET AL, ASCENDING LIABILITY IN RELIGIOUS AND
OTHER NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS (1984).
339. This "incorporation" movement is chronicalled with particular emphasis
upon institutions of higher education by J. R. Preville, Catholic Colleges, the
Courts and the Constitution: A Tale of Two Cases," 58 CHURCH HISTORY 204
(1989).
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parochial schools 340 and religious colleges and universities3 4' by a skittish
and not-too-predictable Supreme Court was not allayed by the Court's
decision in Tilton v. Richardson342 and Chief Justice Burger's majority
decision, which almost verbatim paralleled Bradfield v. Roberts3 43 in
application of the separate incorporation principle to colleges and
universities. As vast amounts of money were needed to sustain quality,
perceived as coming primarily from governmental sources, the hospitals
themselves saw an urgency in separate, expanded incorporation to create
independent public benefit corporations that would reflect the community
constituencies upon which they depended.344 Not only the Hill-Burton
Act,3 45 by now running the course of its legal existence, but the adoption
of Medicare as a part of the Social Security System in 1965346 could be
disallowed religious hospital participation if the hospitals appeared to be
too narrowly religious and exclusionary. Hospital construction and
financing had gone public. Even religious hospitals were no longer
"pervasively sectarian" in structure or constituencies, so could share in
the provision of publicly-funded medical service contracts and programs.
In hospitals and shelter facilities, 47 the twin civil exigencies of
accommodation for public funding and protection from civil liability
340. See, e.g., Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947); Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Committee for Public Education and Religious
Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980).
341. Horace Mann League v. Board of Public Works, 220 A.2d 51 (Md. 1966).
342. 403 U.S. 672 (1971) (holding the Higher Education Facilities Act of 1965,
as modified, constitutional as applied to religiously affiliated higher education).
343. 175 U.S. 291 (1899).
344. In this setting the Catholic Hospital Association was instrumental in
obtaining a grant from the Danforth Foundation to fund a study of the juridic
nature of civilly incorporated charitable institutions conducted under church
auspices. That study was published in 1968 by John J. McGrath, who had joint
appointments to the School of Law and the School of Canon Law of the Catholic
University of America as CATHOLIC INSTITUTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES:
CANONICAL AND CIVIL LAW STATUS (1968). McGrath concluded that charitable
corporations administered under church auspices were essentially civil, not
religious entities. McGrath suggested that the religious affiliation of the
corporation could be retained only by quorum provisions in corporate charters to
permit board and officer selection from among members of the sponsoring
religious bodies, who could permeate the "spirit" of the corporation by their
personal faith.
345. See supra note 205.
346.42 U.S.C. §§ 301 etseq.
347. See Arneth v. Gross, 699 F. Supp. 450 (1988); Wilder v. Bernstein, 848
F.2d 1338 (2d Cir. 1988).
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merged. To address these demands religious hospitals opened up their
staffing and admissions policies, as well as reconfigured their directing
boards of trustees, and set new qualifying criteria for high administrative
offices, open to lay men and women, not always of the church
membership, as ways of making themselves more attractive to the public
and constitutionally more acceptable to receive public funding.348
Hospitals, unlike churches and their closely-related primary and
secondary schools, 34'9 fell under the jurisdictional expansion of the
National Labor Relations Board in the 1970's. Courts held the
unionization of hospital staff and professional medical personnel did not
involve sensitive religious burdens as would state entanglement with the
education of children.
Similarly, the proliferation of federal and state decisions applying Title
VII anti-discrimination in employment standards351 to religious hospitals
effectively crippled the private hospitals in their ability to make
employment and retention decisions with a view towards retaining their
religious identity. To this extent the hospitals were clearly without
privilege, as distinguished from the churches themselves."'
The result of this re-incorporation movement was not only to prepare
the hospitals to take part in the mergers and developing systems of the
present. It was also to make them less religiously homogeneous than they
had been in the past. Hiring policies, board memberships and even
hospital chaplaincies and chapel services have become more attuned to
their secular counterparts in public and non-profit hospitals.
The re-incorporation movement, separating hospital facilities as
independent corporations from their sponsoring religious bodies, and
348. The criteria laid down by the Supreme Court for disposition of funds
under the Higher Education Facilities Act of 1965 in Tilton v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 672 (1971), namely, that public monies can only be used for secular purposes,
i.e., not construction or subsidy for chapels, chaplaincies or religious services and
that the facilities be open and available to the public on a nondiscriminatory basis,
set parallels in the uses of public funds by private hospitals. The key seems to be
the "pervasively sectarian" complexion of institutions disallowed public funding
under the Establishment Clause.
349. National Labor Relations Board v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
350. See Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRP, 437 U.S. 483 (1978); supra note 58.
351. Title VII is Section 700 et seq. of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, containing
the prohibitions against unfair labor practices including discrimination in
employment based on race, national origin, or ethnicity, religion, sex or, later,
disability. 42 U.S.C.§§2000 et seq.
352. See Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
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dampening religious symbolism and religious control in hiring to meet
public construction loan and programmatic conditions, in just one
generation, has hidden the religious ministry to the sick behind bland
neutral facades. For prospective hospital patients and insurance
purchasers today it is not always easy to distinguish a religious hospital
from another private, community or, in many cases, commercial health
care franchises. The building and the billing lack the lofty compunction of
faith and the symbolism of disinterested love.
C. Conscience Clauses: A Limited Legislative Pre-Condition to a Free,
Competitive and Pluralistic Health Care Market
Whether the free exercise clause of the First Amendment required the
state to accommodate the religious beliefs of cooperating individuals by
exemptions to facially-neutral state laws imposing substantial burdens on
that belief, or whether such accommodations were matters of prudence
and legislative choice, a theory currently espoused by the majority of the
Supreme Court in Smith,353 and carried over but not expressly affirmed in
Flores,'54 conscience clause exemptions for religiously-motivated moral
choices by private church-related hospitals were necessary for the healthy
maintenance of a free, competitive and pluralist health care system
overall.
The "conscience clauses" of federal and state provenance began to
appear in the early 1970's when three converging factors in publicly-
available religiously affiliated health care became operative. These
factors were: 1) The loss of obvious religious symbolism and structures in
hospital construction funded largely out of federal monies available
through the Hill-Burton Act; 2) the expansion of hospital governance
boards under the impetus of the ecumenical movement and local support
imperatives; and 3) shifts in scope of service from local, faith-based
communities to the general public by hospital personnel no longer
obviously cloaked in religious habits and symbolism. Religious hospitals,
and related health care institutions, particularly the almost 2000 affiliated
with the Catholic Health Association, changed administrative modalities,
reached out to the public and became less obviously religious.
In 1973 the Federal District Court for Montana in Taylor v. St.
Vincent's Hospital355 enjoined a Catholic hospital from refusing to allow
353. Employment Division, Dep't. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
354. City of Boerne, Texas v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
355. 369 F. Supp. 948 (D. Mont. 1973). Earlier patient challenges to hospital
refusals to provide reproductive health services had been directed at public
hospitals. See generally, McCabe v. Nassau County Medical Ctr., 453 F.2d 698
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post-partum tubal ligation procedures in its facilities.356 Under the
sponsorship of Senator Frank Church (D. Idaho), Congress responded
quickly to the request of several church-related hospital systems by
enacting legislation, generally known as the federal "Conscience Clauses,"
or the Church Amendment."' The Conscience Clauses initially protected
hospital recipients of federal funds and their staffs from being required to
participate in abortion or sterilization procedures that conflict with the
providers' religious or moral beliefs."'
One year later, Congress expanded the Conscience Clauses to permit a
health care provider to refuse to perform any health services or research
that conflicts with personal religious or moral beliefs. The federal statute,
in its broadest form, now reads:
No individual shall be required to perform or assist in the
performance of any part of a health service program or research
activity funded in whole or in part under a program
administered by the Secretary of Health and Human Services if
his performance or assistance in the performance of such part of
such program or activity would be contrary to his religious
beliefs or moral convictions. 9
The 1974 amendment extended the scope of the protective clauses to
health care providers receiving funds under any program administered by
the Secretary of Health and Human Services.36°
The legislative history of the federal conscience clause exemption
reveals two basic suppositions in the law: 1) that the exempt medical
decisions are genuine products of religious beliefs or moral convictions;
and 2) that the conscience clauses protect medical personnel from
constraints forced upon them by courts, public officials or other public
(2nd Cir. 1971) (patient suing public hospital for refusal to sterilize her on her
request); Doe v. Pickett, 480 F. Supp. 1218 (S.D. W. Va. 1979) (suit against public
health services for denying birth control services to minors without parental
consent); Doe v. Mundy, 378 F. Supp. 731 (E.D.Wis. 1974) (suit against county
hospital for refusal to permit elective abortions).
356. Taylor, 369 F. Supp. 948.
357. 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7 (1988).
358. 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(b),(c) (1988). After Congress passed the Church
Amendment the district court in Montana dissolved its injunction. The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. Taylor v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 523 F2d 75, 78
(9th Cir. 1975). A later case instituted by several women to force a religious
hospital to provide sterilization services was dismissed on summary judgment in
favor of the hospital. Ham v. Holy Rosary Hospital, 529 P. 2d 361 (Mont. 1974).
359. 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(d).
360. See also 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(e).
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authority.' Patients' requests for exempt services are not in any way
privileged.
A careful review of the later-enacted corresponding state exemption
statutes including hospitals as such along with individuals, and elimination
of the federal funding limitations, reveals a uniform condition that the
hospitals be religious or church-related. There are no exemptions for for-
profit health care organizations or secular facades that serve as cultural or
residual appendages of churches shielding commercial enterprises. Nor is
the issue of monopolized community healthcare even addressed in
generalized legislation that is nearly a quarter of a century old.
The constitutionality of the federal conscience legislation under the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment was upheld by the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals in Chrisman v. Sisters of St. Joseph of Peace that362
same year. The right of a religious hospital to refuse staff privileges to a
doctor to perform abortions in the hospital was upheld by the Ninth
Circuit in Watkins v. Mercy Medical Center.3 63 The right of a nurse to
obtain compensatory and punitive damages, as well as attorney fees,
under a state conscience clause for having been demoted and harassed by
a hospital administration for her refusal to participate in abortions was
vindicated by the Florida Court of Appeals in Kenny v. Ambulatory
Centre of Miami.3
64
Following the lead of Congress, forty-four states adopted their own
conscience clauses to protect health care providers from being required to
365provide services that conflict with their religious and moral beliefs.
Twenty-eight states provide protection only in refusing to perform
abortions. Nine states cover abortion and contraception. Five states
provide cover against patient demands for abortion and sterilization. One
state protects refusal of abortion, contraception, sterilization, euthanasia
and similar practices. One state's conscience clause mentions abortion,
sterilization, and artificial insemination. Illinois provides comprehensive
protection to religiously affiliated hospitals against patient or public
361. See §§ 300a-7(b),(c).
362. 506 F.2d 308 (1974) (Hill-Burton Act hospital recipients are not required
to perform sterilization). Chrisman was later interpreted in Wisconsin Health
Facilities Authority v. Linder, 280 N.W. 2d 773 (1979), as having held that hospital
recipients of Hill-Burton funds are not required to perform sterilization or
abortions.
363. 364 F. Supp. 799 (D. Idaho 1973) (the doctor's argument that hospital
refusal was a deprivation of his constitutional rights failed).
364. 400 So. 2d 1262 (Fla. App. 1981).
365. See Wardle, supra, note 6.
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demands for all morally objectionable medical procedures. 66
Among state statutes most cover both individuals and institutions. A
minority protect only individual health care professionals. For those that
protect or mention institutions, some only cover hospitals, while a
minority of statutes cover only private, not public, health-careproviders.367
In 1977 the United States Supreme Court in Poelker v. Doe368 held that
a city-owned public hospital was not required to fund nontherapeutic
abortions for indigent women.
The Supreme Court upheld the Hyde Amendment, 69 which refused to
provide federal funds to pay for abortions under "Medicaid," in Harris v.
McRae in 1980.370
The fate of federal and state conscience clauses in the lower courts has
been uncertain. In some cases they have received strict or even hostile
interpretations. For example, the California Court of Appeals held in
Erzinger v. Regents of the University of California that the federal
conscience clause protects only persons directly and immediately involved
in abortion services. 37 ' Thus, the University of California could require
students to participate in a comprehensive health-care program that
included provision for abortions. The Court noted:
The crucial words [in the federal conscience clause] are
"performance of abortions or sterilizations." The proscription
applies when the applicant must participate in acts related to the
actual performance of abortions or sterilizations. Indirect or
remote connection with abortions or sterilizations are not within
the terms of the statute.372
Likewise, in Spellacy v. Tri-County Hospital,3 73 a Pennsylvania court held
that a part-time admissions clerk who claimed that she was fired by the
hospital as a result of her refusal to participate in the admission
366. Id. at 179-180.
367. Id. at 182-184.
368. 432 U.S. 519 (1977).
369. Pub. L. No. 96-123, 93 Stat. 923, 926 (1979).
370. 448 U.S. 297 (1980). In a companion case to McRae, Williams v. Zbaraz,
448 U.S. 358 (1980), the Court upheld an Illinois statute prohibiting state medical
assistance payments for all abortions except those necessary to preserve the life of
the woman.
371. 137 Cal. App. 3d 389, 187 Cal. Rptr. 164 (1982).
372. Id. at 394.
373.18 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) § 8871 (Pa. C.P. De.Cty), affd, 395 A. 2d 998
(Pa. 1978).
20011
Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 17:455
procedures of abortion patients was not protected by the state's
conscience clause because her position was one of mere "ancillary" or
"clerical" assistance.
In California a rape victim sued a private religious hospital because it
refused to provide her with information about the "morning-after" pill.
374
The court declined to apply the state's conscience clause37 because it
opined that the pill was not an abortifacient, notwithstanding the weight
of medical testimony to the contrary.
The New Jersey Supreme Court in 1976 in Doe v. Bridgeton Hospital
Association76 held that private, nonreligious hospitals may not refuse to
allow first trimester elective abortions. The Court reasoned that the three
private nonprofit hospital defendants, as nonprofit institutions, were
organized to serve the general public and could not discriminate in the
provision of their services. The Court held that New Jersey's conscience
clause did not apply to nonsectarian private hospitals.
Public hospitals and their professional staffs were stripped of their
protection by the First Circuit Court of Appeals in Doe v. Hale
Hospital,"" stating that the policy of a public hospital that totally
prohibited elective abortions violated the privacy rights of women who
wanted first trimester abortions. In Gray v. Romeo,379 the federal district
court in Rhode Island held that employees of a health care institution did
not have a federally protected right to refuse to participate in the court-
ordered withdrawal of a feeding tube and life support system from a
patient, because the federal conscience clause applied only to participants
in federal health service programs. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
in Doe v. Charleston Area Medical Center38° refused to protect a
community hospital under the federal conscience clause because it held
the hospital had not proved its objections to elective abortions were based
374. Brownfield v. Daniel Freeman Marina Hosp., 208 Cal. App. 3d 405, 256
Cal. Rptr. 240 (1989).
375. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25955.(West 1999).
376. 366 A.2d 641 (N.J. 1976).
377. The court cited dicta from Justice Blackmun's strict interpretation of the
Georgia conscience clause in Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 197-98 (1973): "These
provisions obviously are in the statute in order to afford appropriate protection to
the individual and the denominational hospital." (emphasis added). Georgia's
statute contained no such limitation.
378. 500 F. 2d 144 (1st Cir. 1974).
379. 697 F. Supp. 580 (D.R.I. 1988).
380. 529 F.2d 638 (4th Cir. 1975).
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on moral grounds.38
Hodgson v. Lawson382 in the Eighth Circuit was a case dealing with a
state conscience clause which was part of a larger challenge by physicians
and patients who argued that Minnesota's abortion law was
unconstitutional. Although the case focussed mostly on abortion
guidelines and procedures, the Eighth Circuit held that the state
conscience clause applied only to private hospitals, and not to public
hospitals. The conscience clause stated: "No person or hospital or
institution shall be coerced, held liable or discriminated against in any
manner because of a refusal to perform, accommodate, assist, or submit to
an abortion for any reason. 383
Besides stating that public hospitals must perform abortions, the court,
in a footnote, recognized the well-established principle that the receipt of
public funds alone does not change a private hospital into a public
hospital.3A Therefore, in this case the private hospital was not required to
perform abortions.
The most recent case in this line, however, is Valley Hospital Ass'n v.Mat-u Caliion or ' "385
Mat-Su Coalition for Choice, in which the Supreme Court of Alaska
upheld a permanent injunction against a non-religious, non-profit hospital
which had adopted a policy prohibiting abortions at the hospital. The
Court held the hospital was a quasi-public entity because it operated
under a state certificate of need program, received construction and
operating funds from the state, was the only hospital in the local
community and its board was elected by a public membership. As a
quasi-public entity the hospital could be liable under state action
principles for depriving citizens of their constitutional rights. The court
noted that the Alaska constitution protects reproductive autonomy more
broadly than does the federal constitution and the hospital's policy
prohibiting abortions violated the fundamental state right to privacy.
Since Valley Hospital Association was not affiliated with any religious
denomination, it could not raise a free exercise defense or claim the
381. See also the two dissenting opinions in the Montana Supreme Court's
case, Swanson v. St. John's Lutheran Hospital, 597 P.2d 702 (Mont. 1979), in which
a wrongful termination suit was won by a nurse refusing to participate in hospital
sterilization and abortions. For a contrary holding, see Free v. Holy Cross
Hospital, 505 N.E.2d 1188 (I11. App. 1987) (nurse discharged for refusal to evict a
bedridden patient on what the court terms "emotional," not religious grounds).
382. 542 F.2d 1350 (8th Cir. 1976).
383. Id. at 1356 (emphasis added).
384. Id.
385. 948 P.2d 963, 965-73 (Alaska 1997).
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protection of the state conscience clause.
In 1991 the New Jersey Supreme Court in Hummel v. Reiss386 in dicta
suggested that a religious hospital may have an obligation to discuss
abortion with a patient in the context of genetic counseling and, then, on
advice of her physician, provide transfer services to other facilities for the
patient-requested abortion. The Hummel court intimated that conscience
clauses may not protect a religious hospital from liability for failure to
inform a patient of otherwise generally acceptable medical practices, even
if those practices are contrary to the hospital's religious and moral
standards. The Court grounded its assertion on the common law doctrine
of informed consent, i.e., the professional health care provider's common
law duty to obtain a competent patient's informed consent before
387
commencing treatment.
Protection of the rights of health care professionals and institutions of
their religious and moral choices cannot depend in the future upon the
courts' interpretation of local conscience clauses or the applicability or
scope of the Smith-Flores standards. It must involve state and federal
legislation to secure against patient demands all morally objectionable
procedures and services that offend the religious conscience of
providers.'8
On that note, let it be clear that the conscience clauses and the case law
interpreting them are directed to the protection of "religious" hospitals,
and to the integrity of moral choices by objecting individuals. In neither
federal nor state statutes is there a general safeguard of public, secular or
commercial hospitals.
VI. THE COUNTERVAILING PRINCIPLE: THE PATIENT'S RIGHT TO
FREE AND INFORMED CHOICE
Religious exemptions that are institutional in nature cannot remain
absolute if the reality behind names and affiliations becomes increasingly
less religious, less charitable and more monopolistic than when
exemptions first were granted. Put another way, church-related hospitals
and acute care facilities risk loss of moral autonomy the more secular, the
larger, the more monopolistic and the more commercial they become.'"
The reason for this is that the institutional right to limit the choice of
medical services provided is directly correlated to patients' rights
386. 589 A.2d 1041 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991).
387. See PAUL S. APPELBAUM ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY
AND CLINICAL PRACTICE 57 (1987).
388. See Wardle, supra note 6, at 219-230.
389. THE CATHOLIC HEALTH ASS'N, supra note 111.
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meaningfully to choose care providers.
Aside from the obvious inequity in HMO contracts enrolling persons
induced to pay for health care insurance plans covering medical services
and procedures in provider hospitals that subsequently refuse to provide
these services, or, indeed, contract them out to other providers, the largest
incentive to reexamination of the limitations upon choice contained in the
conscience clauses is the counterbalance of patients' rights to free and
informed choice.391
Patient autonomy derives from the accepted philosophical premise of
our democratic form of government that each human being is individual,
free and has the fundamental right (whether derived from God, natural
law, or other basis) to control his or her own person, so long as that
person's acts do not interfere with others.39' The law recognizes self-
determination in the health care context through the doctrine of informed
consent,393 as well as under the protected individual liberties enumerated
under the Fourteenth Amendment.394 These principles empower the
individual patient to control the decisions made about his or her medical
care.395 The right to control individual medical decisions extends even to
the point of refusing life-sustaining treatment to the point of death.9
The principle of informed consent is the very linchpin of medical ethics
today. "Consent implies freedom from any external and internal
compulsion," as the Health Care Ethics Code of the Catholic Health
Association of Canada says.391 "Informed consent exists when an
individual possesses the competence, freedom and information required
in order to make a reasonable decision for her or his own best interest.,
398
390. Thomas R. Eller, Informed Consent Civil Actions for Post-Abortion
Psychological Trauma, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 639-670 (1996).
391. See Susan M. Wolf, Toward A Systemic Theory of Informed Consent in
Managed Care, 35 Hous. L. REV. 1385, 1631 (1999).
392. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 13 (ed. Stefan Collini, 1989) (1859).
393. See ALAN MEISEL, THE RIGHT TO DIE, 15 (2d ed. 1995).
394. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 286-87
(1990).
395. PAUL S. APPLEBAUM ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY AND
CLINICAL PRACTICE (1987); Ruth R. Faden & Tom L. Beauchamp, A HISTORY
AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT (1986).
396. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 261; State v. McAfee, 385 S.E.2d 651 (Ga. 1989);
McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617 (Nev. 1990).
397. CATHOLIC HEALTH Assoc. OF CANADA, HEALTH CARE ETHICS CODE 71
(1991).
398. See also ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES, supra note 48, Directives
26,27.
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Informed consent is the counterpart of the principle of self-
determination, lying at the very heart of the American legal system.
Perhaps the most rigorous tests of self-determination we have
experienced in recent years, and the most clear and, indeed, poignant
articulation of its centrality in medical ethics is found in situations where
the patient's will is not explicit. The most dramatic examples of the great
pains courts will take and legislatures will mandate3. may be the right-to-
die cases, when authorities struggle to ascertain what a person who has
become incompetent would want others to do to care for her. The
Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of Missouri law providing
procedure and clear and convincing evidence standards to find out the
preference of a person who had lost the capacity to articulate that
preference in Cruzan v. Missouri Department of Health.4 The Court
said:
[T]he choice between life and death is a deeply personal
decision of obvious and overwhelming finality. We believe
Missouri may legitimately seek to safeguard the personal
element of this choice through the imposition of heightened
evidentiary requirements. It cannot be disputed that the Due
Process Clause protects an interest in life as well as an interest
in refusing life-sustaining medical treatment.. .A State is
entitled to 4uard against potential abuses in such
situations ....
Similarly, in the two right-to-die cases decided in 1997, Vacco v. Quil' 2
and Glucksberg v. Washington, 3 the Supreme Court expressed a serious
concern for the free and informed choices of terminally-ill patients before
the pressure of outside forces. Once again the Court said:
[t]he State has an interest in protecting vulnerable groups--
including the poor, the elderly, and disabled persons--from
abuse, neglect, and mistakes. The Court of Appeals dismissed
the State's concern that disadvantaged persons might be
pressured into physician-assisted suicide as 'ludicrous on its
face'. We have recognized, however, the real risk of subtle
399. A list of state by state informed consent statutes until 1991 is found in
Leonard J. Nelson, III, Informed Consent, 2 MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, 22.11
(David W. Louisell & Harold Williams, eds., 1987). See also, Cruzan, 497 U.S. 261,
at 290-91 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (1990). Informed consent is usually seen as a
court-made area of the law, not one dominated by the legislatures.
400. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
401. Id. at 284.
402. 521 U.S. 793, 808 (1997).
403. 521 U.S. 702, 731 (1997).
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coercion and undue influence in end-of-life situations .... The
risk of harm is greatest for the many individuals in our society
whose autonomy and well-being are already compromised by
poverty, lack of access to good medical care, advanced age, or
membership in a stigmatized social group. New York Task
Force 120 .... ("[Aln insidious bias against the handicapped-
again coupled with a cost-saving mentality--makes them
especially in need of Washington's statutory protection"). If
physician-assisted suicide were permitted, many might resort to
it to spare their families the substantial financial burden of end-
of-life health-care costs.40
It must not be forgotten that the Supreme Court tied the principle of
informed consent to the moral autonomy of the person herself 405 in each
of the decisions it rendered in the five abortion cases coming after Roe v.
Wade.406 Roe, and its companion case, Doe v. Bolton407 depicted the states
as protectors of human life, but forbade them from preventing abortions
in the first trimester of pregnancy. Abortion was made a fundamental
right, requiring a standard of strict scrutiny to judge the validity of state
legislation burdening the woman's right. Roe also allowed the states very.
little authority to restrain later abortions even after viability of the fetus. 48
The states were allowed broad powers, however, which the Court set out
in detail, to protect the health of women.409
In fact, the Court referred to the preambles to the American Medical
Association resolutions which "emphasize 'the best interests of the
patient', 'sound clinical judgment', and 'informed patient consent,' in
contrast to 'mere acquiescence to the patient's demand. 4 ' 0 The Court's
decision in Roe v. Wade, controversial as it was, subordinated the
woman's right to privacy to the professional judgment of physicians,
reminiscent of the discarded professional rule of physician discretion in
providing patient information. It did, however, provide the background
404. Id. (citations omitted).
405. Cathy J. Jones, Autonomy and Informed Consent in Medical
Decisionmaking: Toward a New Self-Fulfilling Prophecy, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
379, 379-380 (1990); Lisa Napoli, The Doctrine of Informed Consent and Women:
The Achievement of Equal Value and Equal Exercise of Autonomy, 4 J. GENDER
& LAw 335 (1996).
406. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
407. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
408. See, e.g., Stenberg v. Carhart, 120 S. Ct. 2597 (2000) (Supreme Court
strikes down Nebraska's partial birth abortion prohibition).
409. Id. at 149-51.
410. Id. at 143.
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for the states to enact legislation providing women with information
necessary to make the abortion decision.
Beginning with Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth,411
and followed by City of Akron v. Akron Center For Reproductive41. 413
Health,4 1' Thornburg v. American College of Ostetrics and Gynecolgists,
and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,41 4 the
Court struggled with the issue of women's right to informed choice in the
abortion situation.
Prior to Casey the Court assumed that the patient's position in abortion
cases was articulated by the abortion provider and that opposition to the
woman's right to an abortion was represented by the states.15 After
upholding an informed choice statute in Danforth, striking one down in
Akron and another in Thornburg, as excessive burdens on the woman's
right to choose, over sustained dissenting opinions, the Court in 1989, with
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,4 6 by a plurality changed the
Court's position that abortion was a fundamental right. It held that the
right was a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Constitution. The Webster decision upheld another Missouri statute
restricting abortion, except where the woman's life or health was in
danger, after a physician had determined that the fetus was viable. This
decision split the Court again, even as to the continuing meaning and
significance of Roe v. Wade.
In 1992 in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,
Justice O'Connor wrote for the plurality of the court, ruling that a• • 417
Pennsylvania informed consent statute was constitutional. The Court
stated:
In attempting to ensure that a woman apprehend the full
consequences of her decision, the State furthers the legitimate
purpose of reducing the risk that a woman may elect an
abortion, only to discover later, with devastating psychological
consequences, that her decision was not fully informed. If the
information the State requires to be made available to the
woman is truthful and not misleading, the requirement may be
411. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
412. 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
413. 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
414. 505 U.S. 83 (1992).
415. Thomas Eller, supra note 390, at 654.
416. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
417. Id. at 881-887.
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permissible.418
Thus, in the context of abortion, which the Court in Casey finally
acknowledged as a serious medical, moral and psychological decision for
both patient and attending physician, with potentially devastating after-
effects upon a woman, the Justices affirmed the patients' fundamental
right to informed consent. The Court put aside the implication that
abortion is a minor medical procedure, largely placed under the direction
of the attending physician, and repealed the trimester approach as
basically flawed.4" 9  On the right of informed consent, the Court
concluded: "Thus, a requirement that a doctor give a woman certain
information as part of obtaining her consent to an abortion is, for
constitutional purposes, no different from a requirement that a doctor
give certain specific information about any medical procedure." Casey
required that women must be fully informed when making subjective
decisions on abortion and their subjective decisions are unreviewable. It
both protected the right to an abortion and secured in the jurisprudence
of the Supreme Court the fundamental right to patient autonomy. It is an
autonomy protected against coercion, duress, fraud, ignorance and false
information. Casey affirmed a concept of patient's rights consistent with
the patient rule in informed choice decisions in majority tort rulings in the
courts below, rejecting the paternalism that diminished patient's right to
information under the so-called professional rule of physician's disclosure
obligations. "At the heart of liberty," the Court said, "is the right to
define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of
the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define
the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the
State.,,42
In the lower courts the evolution of tort law towards protection of1 21
patients' choices is clearly rooted in patient self-determination. In the
landmark case of Canterbury v. Spence42  the D.C. Circuit articulated the
418. Id. at 882.
419. Id. at 872-73.
420. Casey, 505 U.S. at 851; Pauscher v. Iowa Methodist Medical Ctr., 408
N.W.2d 355 (Iowa 1987).
421. Among the many significant studies published on patient choice, we may
mention those of Susan Renfer et al., The Woman's Right to Know: A Model
Approach to the Informed Consent of Abortion, 22 LoY. U.CHI. L.J. 409
(1991)(containing the Model Woman's Informed Choices Act); Alan Weisbard,
Informed Consent: the Law's Uneasy Compromise With Ethical Theory, 65 NEB.
L.REv. 749 (1986).
422. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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value of self-determination as the fundamental reason for adopting a
reasonable person rule: "[tihe root premise is the concept, fundamental to
American jurisprudence, that 'every human being of adult years and
sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own
body."
423
Informed choice is absolutely necessary to patient power. "A patient
should not only be given the information necessary to be a party to
decisions about her care," Lisa Napoli has written,
but also the information necessary to have a position of equality
with her doctor. Instead of being acted upon, women would
make their own decisions about what is best for them and would
achieve, in addition to increased happiness and physical well-
being, a great measure of autonomy than they previously have
been accorded.424
In the leading case articulating the "patient rule" of choice, namely,
that the patient, not the doctor, is entitled to measure the amount of
information necessary for an informed decision whether to submit to a
particular medical procedure, the Iowa Supreme Court made a necessary
distinction between "medical" choices and "personal" choices:
[T]he patient's right to make an intelligent an informed decision
cannot be exercised when information material to that decision
is withheld. Although most aspects of the physician-patient
relationship necessarily must be dominated by the superior skill
and knowledge of the physician, the decision to consent to a
particular medical procedure is not a medical decision. Instead,
it ordinarily is a personal and often difficult decision to be made
by the patient with the physician's advice and consultation. In
order to make his or her informed, decision, the patient has the
right to expect the information reasonably necessary to that
process will be made available by the physician.425
Case law out of which the prevailing jurisprudence on informed choice
has developed to this point is fixed on the patient-doctor relationship. It
is the doctor who is required to assist the patient with pertinent
423. Id. at 780 (quoting Judge Cardozo in Schloendorff v. Society of New York
Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914); see also, Marjorie Maguire Shultz, From
Informed Consent to Patient Choice: A New Protected Interest, 95 YALE L.J. 219
(1985).
424. Lisa Napoli, supra note 405, at 358-59.
425. Pauscher v. Iowa Methodist Medical Ctr., 408 N.W.2d 355, 359-60 (Iowa
1987). The Supreme Court of Iowa exonerated the hospital in this case, holding
the duty to provide information necessary to assess the risks of medical
procedures is on the attending physicians, not the hospital as such.
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information on the risks and benefits of suggested medical procedures.
The next step is to extend the obligation to curtail misinformation allowed
to continue in health insurance plans that, effectively, burdens the
patient's right to choose which procedures will or will not be possible in
preferred provider hospitals.
Hospitals' ethical independence must be measured by the informed
right and feasibility of choice of those contracting for their services.426 The
corollary, of course, is that the greatest contemporary threat to religious
autonomy in health care comes from within the hospitals and their care
delivery systems themselves. To remain free to curtail otherwise legally-
permissible medical procedures the hospitals must accentuate their
religious identity in unmistakable terms so that patients know what their
choices are, avoid monopolization of general health services in particular
communities, and restrain the semblance of competitive
commercialization. Patients must know in advance what services are or
are not available from contract health care providers and practically and
feasibly be able to act on those choices.
A. The Free Exercise Clause Does Not Preclude Reasonable Regulations
to Protect Patient Rights Where Hospitals Themselves Impair the
Possibility of Informed Choice
There is no doubt that the churches in America have a constitutional
right as religious organizations to sponsor and operate institutions
reflecting their religious beliefs. They have a constitutional right to
maintain control over the kinds of medical services they provide. The
427legally protected right of religious choice in belief is absolute, in conduct
is conditioned by compelling state interests.4" The right belongs to
persons, as well as to groups of persons cooperating in religious
organizations to conduct ministries to their membership429 as well as to the
public. 4 ° The right, however, is not without limit. The Supreme Court
put the limit upon free exercise in conduct prohibited by generally-
426. In general, a person's consensual adherence to the discipline and
practices of a church constitutes a waiver of what otherwise may amount to an
actionable tort, e.g., defamation in the shaming cases. See Guinn v. Church of
Christ, 775 P.2d 766 (Okla. 1989).
427. See note 5, supra.
428. Reynolds v. U.S., 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
429. Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the United States and Canada v.
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
430. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
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applicable laws or injurious to others.43'
The First Amendment free exercise clause supports a limited claim of
privilege and exemption from generally applicable laws where an
organization is obviously religious and patients are free to chose its
services among other alternatives. Otherwise not.
Where patients cannot reasonably know that hospital services they
have requested will not be provided because of a disguised hospital
choice, the institutional privilege must cede to patients' rights. The
compelling state interest in forcing hospitals and health care systems to
provide full and complete disclosure of their affiliations and restrictions
upon service clearly derives from the state's interest in curtailing fraud,
coercion and duress.
B. The Limitations Upon Institutional Autonomy
From what we have been able to gather of the policies and the
jurisprudence of the courts under the free exercise clause of the First
Amendment, the autonomy of private health care organizations in the
scope of their protected ethical decisions is not unlimited. There are at
least five indisputable pre-conditions to institutional liberty interests in
the public provision of reproductive health care services. These are the
boundaries required by the right of patients freely to consent to the
medical services they choose.
1. Where Health Care Services Are Monopolized and No Viable
Alternative Is Provided to Patients
Where there are alternative providers easily and economically available
to patients, state coercion of moral choices in religious hospitals is not the
least restrictive means to achieving generally accessible and
•432
comprehensive patient care.
The monopolization of health care services caused by hospital mergers
and acquisitions is the most serious single reason to limit the breadth of
organizational discretion in ethical medical choices. The problem has
been intensified and aggravated where pre-acquisition negotiations have
proceeded in secrecy and information dribbled out to the press piecemeal
before final announcement of the fait accompli. This, of course, excludes
the very people most intimately affected, namely, the public who serve as
the patient base, rendering their personal anxieties moot before
431. Employment Div., Dep't. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872 (1990).
432. Michael S. Jacobs, When Antitrust Fails: Public Health, Public Hospitals,
and Public Values, 71 WASH. L. REV. 899 (1996); William G. Kopait & Tanya B.
Vanderbilt, Unique Issues In the Analysis of Non-Profit Hospital Mergers, 35
WASHBURN L. J. 254 (1996).
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immovable long-distance decision-makers.
In Amelia E. v. Public Health Counci 33 the Center for Reproductive
Law and Policy brought suit against the New York State Department of
Health and the Public Health Council, alleging their failure to consider
the "public need" of the Troy, New York, community in allowing the
merger of a Catholic and a non-Catholic hospital. The merger would
eliminate entirely the family planning services offered by the non-Catholic
hospital. This diminution of services would have a direct impact on low-
income, rural and young women in the community.
Where rural or small community hospitals are acquired by large
religiously affiliated hospital chains the euphemism "sharing resources"
must be fleshed out in the hardship, particularly to local women, in
continued loss of reproductive health care services. Since, as I have
previously stated, many religious hospitals cannot provide ethical
justification for referral or provision of contracted out services in these
areas, the only reasonable solution is for state hospital accreditation
agencies simply to prohibit acquisitions and mergers that substantially
destroy a community's base of reproductive health care, until such time as
the public may be able to provide these services in alternative, accessible
public facilities.
The obvious corollary, of course, is that the burden of continuing
provision of reproductive health services that would be curtailed by the
ethical restraints of religious hospitals, is on the state, not on the private
hospital. Prevention of monopolization of hospital services, therefore, is
not adequately addressed by simply prohibiting rural or community
hospital acquisitions. And it cannot be achieved by state enforced referral
or licensure requirements. 3 Not only would this alternative be financially
unrealistic, but it would legislatively eliminate the possibility for local
communities to acquire quality health care in most other areas of
medicine. The acquisitions may go forward, as many of the cases cited
433. No. 7062-94 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., filed Jan. 20, 1995).
434. See Ikemoto, supra note 6, at 1127.
435. To this extent I differ with the solutions proposed by Professor Katherine
Boozang, supra note 6: "When the sectarian facility continues to adhere to
religious beliefs that interfere with patient access to care, however, the state
should require the religious hospital to provide the care, deny licensure, or the
refuse regulatory approval for the category of services that raise potential
conflicts." (at 1509) State power cannot force the conscience of health care
providers to act against their sincerely-held beliefs. This will simply destroy the
system of private health care rather than change it, as the experience of this
decade has borne out.
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indicate, simply to continue acute care coverage. The religious hospital
cannot, however, be forced to finance and provide services it finds
morally reprehensible. That is the task of the state, as clearly intimated in
federal Medicaid instructions.436
2. Where Health Care Organizations Disguise TheirReligious Identity
The track record of mergers and acquisitions in this past decade has
been marred by hidden negotiations and several notorious incidents of
less than forthcoming publication to affected patient communities of the
terms and conditions under which the transactions take place. When,
after the fact, public scrutiny reveals the result in critically curtailed
services, the response of the public is usually unmistakably negative."'
Whether negotiators for health care insurance coverage for patient
bases are fully informed of the religious restraints upon hospital service
providers or not is clearly the moral obligation of the hospitals
themselves. The same is true of negotiations between religious hospital
chains and rural or community hospitals. The hospitals must clearly and
publicly identify themselves as religiously affiliated. Thus, the growing
problem of the secularization of religious hospitals, with staff employment
decisions and operating procedures becoming increasing the mirror of
their commercial counterparts, becomes not only a question of the loss of
religious relationship to the sponsoring churches. It becomes a question
of justice once a religiously affiliated hospital is no more than a facade
behind which ethical decisions are made formally and without the sincere
convictions of staff and employees.
To retain the protected right of religious autonomy in ethical
judgments in the sensitive balance of patients' rights and institutional
protections it is necessary for religious hospitals to regain their religious
missions, including, of course, the use of their resources for
uncompensated service of the poor and uninsured. This may be
achievable by careful training and management decisions. If not, since
neither the government nor the churches themselves have an essential
interest is maintaining secular businesses as tax-exempt and affiliated
organizations, these hospitals should simply become secular, private non-
profit health care organizations rather than perpetuate the false image of
religious conviction. The integrity of religious ministry to the sick cannot
be allowed to become so diluted by entrepreneurial goals that sensitive
436. See Section III.A., supra, and note 180, supra.
437. See, e.g., Shari Roan, When the Church and Medicine Clash: More
Hospitals are Merging with Catholic Facilities to Survive, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1995,
at Al, on the negotiations between Mercy Healthcare Sacramento and Sierra
Nevada Memorial Hospital in Nevada County, California.
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moral choices in reproductive medicine are made, not out of theological
conviction, but rather to continue a pathway of ecclesiastical conformity
at the cost of patients' otherwise reasonable expectations for the delivery
of comprehensive health care services.
3. Where Restricted Services Are Not Clearly Disclosed and Discounted
In Participatory Health Care Payment Plans
Payment for individual health care services in provider hospitals
through group insurance or health maintenance organization plans is an
evolving complexity. For example, St. Joseph's Hospital in Syracuse, New
York, is a preferred provider of in-patient and out-patient hospital
services with twenty-seven managed care companies, including the
following: Aetna US Healthcare, Anheuser Busch EAP, Beech Street,
Blue Cross Blue Shield of Central New York (Blue Point & Orange
Point), CIGNA, Community Care Network, Fidelis Health Care, GHI
(Hospital Benefits Only), HealthNow New York, HMO-CNY,
Independent Living Services, Integra, MagnaCare, MediChoice,
MultiPlan, MVP Health Plan, North American Administrators, North
Medical Community Health Plan, Partners Health Plan, PHP/UNIVERA,
Plumbers & Fitters Local #79 Welfare Fund, POMCO, Private Health
Care Systems, RMSCO, Statewide Independent PPO, Inc., UNITED
HealthCare, and United Payors & United Providers. These are
employee benefits plans, professional group plans, as well as group plans
providing for single purchasers. Some are nonprofit, others for-profit
health care management organizations. The recent wave of state
mandated Medicaid managed care involves a large number of provider-
sponsored health maintenance organizations using Medicaid
disbursements, that is, hospitals, community health centers or physicians
that sponsor and manage the plans.
Health maintenance organizations do not pay directly for individual
services, but rather on a capitated basis upfront, usually monthly or
quarterly. Thus, the gatekeepers of the management systems, the doctors,
hospitals or ancillary providers, assure quality and cost effectiveness.
St. Joseph's also announced that it will accept fee-for-service payments
from a list of a dozen traditional health insurance plans. These are all for-
profit, commercial health insurance companies. State workers'
compensation funds, Medicare, Medicaid, and Champus (medically
necessary services provided military personnel) are also accepted by the
Hospital directly, that is, outside organizational healthcare payment
438. St. Joseph's Healthcare, St. Joseph's Hospital Managed Care, available at
http://www.sjhsyr.org/managedcare (last visited May 6, 2001).
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systems.
St. Joseph's is a private 431-bed comprehensive medical center with a
medical staff of more than 600, representing a broad spectrum of
specialties. The Hospital has an annual operating budget of more than
$200 million.
By contrast, Cedars-Sinai Medical Center in Los Angeles, more than
three times the size of St. Joseph's, lists as contract payors twenty-four
PPO/POS/EPOs, fifteen HMOs, eight Senior HMOs, three Medi-Cal
HMOs, and three federal government plans, Medicare, Medi-Cal (state
equivalent of Medicaid) and Champus.
I mention these contrasting hospitals and their service payment sources
to illustrate the variety and complexity of players in the individual
medical finance markets surrounding hospital services. Hospitals, or
more frequently now, hospital systems negotiate advance fees for their
services with a staggering array of nonprofit and commercial
organizations. 4 9 Each has its own margins, bottom line and projected
costs.
When the services of religious hospitals are put out to bid, there is no
question that full disclosure of restricted services must be provided across
the board. Any other strategy would be disastrous for all involved. The
issue of disclosure to insurance carriers, HMOs, physician groups and
governmental agencies is assured by the constraints of the market and the
integrity of the participants.
The problems arise, however, in the role of intermediate managers in
passing on that information to individual purchasers of the various
systems. Employers are charged with informing employees of the exact
coverage of the various packages they offer. Physicians and health care
professionals, as well as administrators of HMOs, must fully inform
prospective purchasers of their choices of hospital providers and the
services offered by each. Anecdotal evidence suggests, however, two
sources of dissatisfaction at this level. Neither directly involves the
hospitals themselves, but peripherally taints their service missions.
The first is the unfortunate disappointment when patients seek acute
care reproductive medical or surgical services that are denied them on
ethical grounds by hospital administrators after they have enrolled in
payment plans, or, in some cases, been admitted by their attending
physicians.
The second derives from situations in which purchasers pay for
439. THE HMO/PPO DIRECTORY, (12th ed. 2000), lists 1200 HMO and PPOs
this year.
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comprehensive health care services, which, when sought, are not
delivered. Since traditional health insurance policies are risk-sharing
instrumentalities contracting to pay for services provided on an individual
basis, these policies and their disclosure practices are not problematic.
Most provide comprehensive coverage.
The current problem comes, however, from health management
organizations which pay on a per person or capitated basis for
comprehensive services and then contract with hospital providers who will
not supply the services advertised. In some circumstances religiously
affiliated HMOs, not easily apparent to potential subscribers, neither pay
for reproductive health services, nor adequately inform subscribers of
other providers, or, in the case of Medicaid recipients, tell them of state
"access" laws enabling them to use other services.
As a result of the attempts of state and federal governmental agencies
to lower Medicaid costs by forcing Medicaid recipients into managed care
programs the need for clear disclosure of services has become even more
acute.
New York, for example, is one of sixteen states which adopted
mandatory Medicaid managed care programs for its recipients. This has
resulted in a possible limitation of freedom of choice for such patients.
Women who have been assigned to managed care plans which refuse on
moral or religious grounds to provide comprehensive reproductive
services or to inform patients where else they can go to receive them, are
deprived of services available to all other residents of New York State.
State regulations requiring full disclosure of services by health service
providers, insurance policies and Medicaid agencies for the information of
beneficiaries, unobjectionable by religiously affiliated hospitals," should
be enacted by state law.
4. Special Relationship--Where Life or Comparable Values Are Put Into
Jeopardy By Custodial Choices
Religious hospitals providing trauma or emergency room services for
victims of sexual assault assume a "special relationship" of trust over the
injured patient. The legal liability arising out of a special hospital-client
relationship is non-waivable. 44'
The California Court of Appeals in Brownfield v. Daniel Freeman
Marina Hospital, '4 suggested that a rape victim who was damaged by ahospital's refusal of treatment or referral might have a viable claim for
440. See Section IlI.B., supra.
441. See Tunkl v. Regents of the Univ. of Calif., 383 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1963).
442. 208 Cal. App. 3d 405, 256 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1989).
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medical malpractice against the hospital. The court found that the
patient's common law right to receive information necessary to exercise
her right to self-determination in medical treatment could be the basis of
a malpractice claim.
There is a long and solid jurisprudence supporting the intervention of
state authority to protect the health and well-being of children, as well as
incompetent adults, placed in life-threatening situations by the religiously-
motivated choices of others.443 In other words, emergency care for the
developmentally disabled and minors--circumstances of unique
vulnerability wherein the individual patient is unable to make personal,
informed choices--is a special exception to custodial religious choice.
Special relationship jurisprudence falls along three lines: 1) The right of
children to receive adequate health care where the religious faith of the
parents prompt them to neglect it, as in the blood transfusion, inoculation
and faith-healing line of cases;444 2) the right of children to be protected
against exposure to dangerous or hazardous activities motivated by their
parents' religious beliefs;"' and 3) the right of persons to be protected
when they are involuntarily committed to the custody of others in special
relationships of trust."6 In each situation, the religious freedom of the
custodian must cede to the right of the incompetent person in need of
medical attention to receive the care necessary to sustain life or achieve a
value comparable to that of life itself.
This line of jurisprudence would allow the state to intervene in
abridging the institutional religious freedom of church-related hospitals in
four cases: 1) In the medical care of child and handicapped victims of rape
or incest;47 2) in the medical and forensic treatment of adult female
victims of sexual crimes; 3) in the provision of blood transfusions, organ
transplants or medically routinized and standard care procedures, such as
dialysis, or to save or prolong the life of mentally incompetent adults
443. See Ann M. Massie, The Religion Clauses and Parental Health Care
Decisionmaking for Children: Suggestions For a New Approach, 21 HASTINGS
CONST. L. Q. 725 (1994); L. Greenberg, 'In God We Trust': Faith Healing Subject
to Liability, 14 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 451 (1998).
444. Appl. of President and Directors of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000
(D.C. Cir. 1964); Walker v. Superior Ct., 763 P.2d 852 (Cal. 1988).
445. Prince v. Massachusetets, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
446. See, e.g., Stropes v. Heritage House Childrens' Ctr., Inc., 547 N.E.2d 244
(Ind. 1989).
447. See C. Lewis Borders, Rape and Incest Abortion Funding Under
Medicaid--Can the Federal Government Force Unwilling States to Pick Up the
Tab?, 35 J. FAM. LAW 121(1996-97).
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entrusted to the care of a hospital; and 4) in the care and counseling of
sexually-active AIDS patients."'
Emergency services for adult victims of rape or sexual assault routinely
indicate d & c (dilation and curetage of uterus) procedures, etc., to protect
the victim from pregnancy, infection and further injury from disease-
causing pathogens, such as HIV or sexually-transmitted diseases, preserve
DNA evidence of the perpetrator for prosecution, and promote rapid
healing and restoration of health. Emergency hospitals, working with
social service agencies and the criminal justice system, provide physical
treatment as well as counseling, and/or, referral services for the victim's
well-being. 449 In today's health care market it is almost inconceivable that
a victim can exercise choice among emergency facilities available to her
and a knowledgeable decision regarding her own treatment in the short
window of time in which treatment has to be given to achieve all the
410
above purposes.
The paradigm for religious exemption is the exemption of parents from
the demands of the state in the religious education and training of their
children. Forty-three states have statutes protecting parents who choose
spiritual healing for their minor children, from the reach of regulatory or
criminal statutes pertaining to dependent, abused, or neglected children. 5'
While these statutes are extremely controversial 452 and have been set aside
448. See Barry R. Furrow, Forcing Rescue: The Landscape of Health Care
Provider Obligations to Treat Patients, 3 HEALTH MATRIX 31 (1993); Barry R.
Furrow, Managed Care Organizations and Patient Injury: Rethinking Liability, 31
GA. L. REV. 919 (1997); Shirley A. Padmore, California's Limits On the Right to
Refuse Life Saving Treatment--No Holds Barred? (Thor v. Sup. Ct., 855 P. 2d 375
(1993), 46 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 369-380 (1994); Barbara Radford &
Gina Shaw, Beyond Roe and Abstract Rights: American Public Health and the
Imperative for Abortion As a Part of Mainstream Medical Care, 13 ST. Louis U.
PUB. L. REV. 207-20; Margaret S. Russell, A Taxing Tale: Unconstitutional
Conditions and Abortion Subsidy, 3 HEALTH MATRIX 459-484 (1993).
449. Jose Gonzalez, A Managed Care Organization's Medical Malpractice
Liability for Denial of Care: The Lost World, 35 Hous. L. REV. 715 (1998).
450. See Frances Lexcen & N. Dickon Reppucci, Effects of Psychopathology
On Adolescent Medical Decision-Making, 5 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 63
(1998).
451. See Prayer-Treatment Exemptions to Child Abuse and Neglect Statutes,
Manslaughter Prosecutions and Due Process of Law, 30 HARV. J. LEGIS. 135, 140
(1993).
452. The "prayer treatment" exemption in the federal Child Abuse Prevention
and Treatment Act of 1979 was eliminated in 1983. 45 C.F.R. § 1390 (1991).
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411by state courts with some regularity in recent years, the jurisprudence
justifying the intervention of the state to protect children from dangerous
and unhealthy conditions or medical neglect, is entirely consistent. Where
state prosecutions of parents for neglect of adequate medical care leading
to death or the permanent injury of the child are challenged, those
prosecutions have been set aside, for the most part, only on due process
grounds, that is, where parents lacked notice.4 4 Defenses based on the
free exercise of religion have been unsuccessful. Indeed, six states
specifically allow courts to order medical treatment over religious
objections. If parents are limited in their ability to impose their
religious norms upon their children, can such an exemption exist for
institutions sought out specifically by public authorities for the emergency
care of traumatized victims of rape or sexual abuse?
Children and the developmentally disabled, as Lawrence Tribe notes,
456in this society are a politically powerless minority. The common law
concept of the government as parens patriae, however, has been
repeatedly upheld where states have intervened for the welfare and
protection of the rights of children.457 Since children cannot give consent
to their own treatment, the guardianship role of parents may be
superseded by the government when detrimental decisions are made for
them.458
The Supreme Court in 1944 in Prince v. Massachusetts459 recognized the
state's right to restrict otherwise constitutionally protected parental
decision-making when a child's welfare is at stake. Characterizing the
state's powers, the Court specifically stated that "[t]he right to practice
453. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Twitchell, 617 N.E.2d 609 (1993);
Hermanson v. State, 604 So. 2d 775 (Fla. 1992); Newmark v. Williams, 588 A.2d
1108 (Del. 1991).
454. See, e.g., State v. McKown, 475 N.W. 2d 63 (Minn. 1993), cert. den., 503
U.S. 1036 (1992).
455. Florida, Iowa, Michigan, Missouri, North Dakota and Rhode Island.
456. Lawrence Tribe, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 16-31 at 1588-89
(2d 3d. 1988).
457. See Samuel Davis & Mortimer Schwartz, CHILDREN'S RIGHTS AND THE
LAW, 51-78 (1987).
458. See Angela Holder, Special Categories of Consent: Minors and
Handicapped Newborns," in 3 TREATISE ON HEALTH CARE LAW §§ 19.01, 19.05
(Michael MacDonald et al. eds. 1991); Karen Rothenberg, Medical Decision
Making for Children, 1 BIOLAw. A LEGAL AND ETHICAL REPORTER ON
MEDICINE, HEALTH CARE, AND BIOENGINEERING, § 8-2.1 (James Childress et al.
eds. 1989).
459. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
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religion does not include liberty to expose the community or the child to
communicable disease or the latter to ill health or death."' 6 The Court
sustained the applicability of state child labor laws against a woman
whose niece helped her distribute religious literature, holding:
Parents may be free to become martyrs themselves. But it does
not follow they are free, in identical circumstances, to make
martyrs of their children before they have reached the age of
full and legal discretion when they can make that choice for
themselves.
"6
In 1972, the Supreme Court reiterated the rule of permissible state
intervention in Wisconsin v. Yoder, " stating that "the power of the
parent, even when linked to a free exercise claim, may be subject to
limitation under Prince if it appears that parental decisions will jeopardize
the health or safety of the child." 46'
Both Prince and Yoder cite a 1905 Supreme Court decision confirming
the goal of universal immunization of children, even over the objections
of parents, Jacobson v. Massachusetts.4
The states have consistently rejected parental free exercise claims to
prevent governmental intervention in behalf of children. The California
Supreme Court, for example, citing Prince, characterized the lives and
health of children as "an interest of unparalleled significance." 46'
"Regardless of the severity of the religious imposition," the Court stated,
"the governmental interest is, plainly adequate to justify its restrictive
effect." 66 The Court, on that basis, affirmed denial of a motion to dismiss
charges of involuntary manslaughter and felony child endangerment
against a Christian Science mother under circumstances where her four-
year-old daughter died of acute meningitis after having been treated
solely with prayer. The Court held that neither the federal Constitution
nor the state's own religious exemptions for Christian Scientists protected
parents whose children's lives were threatened by serious illness. Similar
reasoning has been used in other state court decisions ordering medical
intervention for children over the objections of parents.6 7
The Supreme Court's strong assertion of state powers to protect
460. Id. at 166-67.
461. Id. at 170.
462. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
463. Id. at 233-34.
464. 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
465. Walker v. Superior Court, 763 P. 2d 852, 869 (Cal. 1988).
466. Id. at 870.
467. See cases cited in note 396, supra.
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children, with the concurrence of the state courts, enables us to conclude
that the interest of the state in protecting children is a "compelling state
interest."
The Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment and Adoption Reform Act
of 1978,46' amending the previous legislation of the same name adopted by
Congress in 1974, 469 was followed by new Regulations issued by the
Department of Health and Human Services in 1983. These regulations
enlarged the definition of "negligent treatment or maltreatment" of
,470
children to include "failure to provide adequate medical care, and now
reads:
Nothing in this Part should be construed as requiring or
prohibiting a finding of negligent treatment or maltreatment
when a parent practicing his or her religious beliefs does not, for
that reason alone, provide medical treatment for a child;
provided, however, that if such a finding is prohibited, the
prohibition shall not limit the administrative or judicial
authority of the State to insure that medical services are
provided to the child when his health requires it.
471
There is a parallel line of state cases holding hospitals, sanitoria and
protective institutions liable for injuries to patients resulting from the
negligence of the custodial institution. A "custodial" or "protective" role
is assumed by law in the hospital-patient relationship as one of almost
strict liability, posited upon entrustment by the patient to the care of a
hospital and powerlessness in that situation of the patient to protect
herself.
The Supreme Court itself has not ruled on the constitutionality or
scope of religious exemptions for health care organizations in patient
care. In general, however, the Court has affirmed in other contexts that
the limits upon religious accommodation in the face of generally
applicable and neutral state laws is the requirement that non-beneficiaries
• . •472
not be markedly burdened by the accommodation to the religious actor.
468. 42 U.S.C. § 1501.
469. Id.
470. 48 Fed. Reg. 3,698 (1983), codified at 45 C.F.R. § 1340.2(d)(3).
471. Id. at 3702 (codified at 45 C.F.R. § 1340.2 (d)3)(ii)).
472. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 398 (1963). See also, Michael
McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a Response to the Critics,
60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685, 692, n.28 (1992) ("Of course, the [religious exercise]
right is limited by the rights of others..."). Id., Accommodation of Religion, 1985
SUP. CT. REV. 1, at 31 ("Where the government determines that it can make an
exception without unacceptable damages to its policies, there is no reason for a
court to second-guess that conclusion unless the constitutional rights of other
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"The right to religious exemptions from regulation cannot be absolute;
the state must be able to override it for sufficiently compelling reasons,"
171
as Professor Douglas Laycock says.
5. Where a Private Nonprofit Hospital Is Sold to a Commercial
Enterprise
Non-profit hospitals may choose to abandon noncommercial status in
order to improve their access to capital money markets. Instead of
community obligations, they assume duties to provide profits by way of
dividends for private and corporate purchasers of their stock.474 Without
profits, of course, there is no capital marketability to attract investors.
Commercial health care providers, in turn, purchase the assets of
converting nonprofit providers in order to increase market share of local
service areas, which in turn strengthens their ability to compete, negotiate
medical plans and contracts, and set prices to produce additional levels of
profit. There is, of course, neither altruism nor disinterest in this
• 471
scenario.
Church law generally provides hierarchical authorities the right to
review, approve or disapprove, or, indeed, sanction the outright sale of
ecclesiastical properties to commercial entities.476
In 1999 St. Louis University Medical Center, affiliated with the Jesuit
University, on vote of the University's Board of Trustees, without
consultation with the Archbishop of St. Louis, and then over his
subsequent objection, was sold to Tenet Healthcare, Inc. 477 The Board's
vote to approve sale of the Catholic hospital, the original anchor health
care facility of the Catholic Health Association, to Tenet Healthcare, Inc.,
secularized the hospital, while retaining its relationship as the teaching
hospital for the medical faculty of the University. Under Catholic Health
Association rules, the hospital is no longer a member and no longer may
persons are adversely affected.").
473. "The Remnants of Free Exercise," 1990 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 30.
474. David W. Young, Ownership Conversions In Health Care Organizations:
Who Should Benefit? 10 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L., 765, 767 (1986).
475. Shelley A. Sackett, Conversion of Non-For-Profit Health Care Providers:
A Proposal For Federal Guidelines On Mandated Charitable Foundations, 10
STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 247 (1999).
476. See, e.g., Directive 68 of the ETHICAL AND RELIGIoUS DIRECTIVES, note
50, supra, reflecting Canons 1295 et seq. of the Code of Canon Law. JOHN BOYLE,
THE STERILIZATION CONTROVERSY: A NEW CRISIS FOR THE CATHOLIC
HOSPITAL? 73 (1977).
477. See supra note 35.
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identify itself as Catholic.
48
Where a religious hospital has been sold to a for-profit commercial
health-care corporation there have been instances in which either the
public relations bulletins, or an actual contractual arrangement has been
made to retain the religious character of the hospital. Essentially, of
course, this would mean that the hospital retains its dedication to below-
cost service of the poor, the mission of special care and concern for the
community, advocacy of the rights of the poor and uninsured to social
provision of health-related welfare rights, and the right to restrict
otherwise legally permissible medical services by exercise of religiously-
motivated moral choices. 479
Such arrangements, I believe, are legally unenforceable, thus
temporary, cosmetic and chimerical.4 ° Serving the poor is incompatible
481
with board directors' duties to shareholders to produce dividends.
Where full disclosure of ethical restrictions made in negotiating for
patient bases causes contractual losses, directors will be made liable to
shareholders for squandering assets. Contracts to deprive persons of
constitutionally-protected reproductive rights are against public policy
and to that extent void.1 The only statutory exemptions for religious
choice are for religious hospitals. The administration of publicly-funded
478. Catholic Health Association rules are explained by J. Stuart Showalter
and John H. Miles, Restructuring Health Care Organizations While Retaining
Recognition As a Catholic Hospital, 32 ST. Louis U. L. J. 1111, 1121-28 (1988).
Tenet Healthcare, Inc., now owns and operates six St. Louis area hospitals.
479. See Mark Krause, First, Do No Harm: An Analysis of the Nonprofit Sales
Acts, 45 UCLA L. REV. 503-568 (1997).
480. See Lawrence E. Singer, The Conversion Conundrum: The State and Federal
Response to Hospitals' Changes In Charitable Status, 23 AM. J. L. & MED. 221-250
(1997).
481. Glenn Wilson, a professor of Social Medicine at the Cecil G. Sheps
Center for Health Services Research at the University of North Carolina, said it
was unrealistic to expect market forces to provide for the poor because a free
market economy does not redistribute money:
"The market may make hospitals and health care more efficient, but it
will not provide for the poor," Mr.Wilson said. "At some point, we will
do without care or we will raise the money. The hospitals can't give it
away."
He added: "Whether the hospital is public or private, someone is going to
have to pay for the people who have no money. Until we quit fantasizing
that that is not true, we are not going to make any progress."
Preston, supra note 33.
482. See supra note 118, discussing Bob Jones University v. United States, 461
U.S. 574 (1983).
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programs, such as Medicare and Medicaid, for example, which must
continue if the hospital is to remain financially viable, contains
exemptions under federal law only for religious hospitals or religious
conscientious objection.483 Institutions organized and operated for profit
are the antithesis of tax-exempt organizations under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
Indeed, sale to for-profit enterprises radically shifts the governance and
control of religious nonprofit organizations from the sponsoring church to
individual shareholders. This is a radical departure from the rights of the
public, exercised through the states' attorney generals, over public benefit
charities and their financing.
The Supreme Court itself has acknowledged the incompatibility of the
for-profit model of enterprise with religious exercise protected under the
free exercise clause and exemptions statutorily granted in federal law.
For example, the Tony and Susan Alamo Foundation was a nonprofit
religious organization incorporated under the laws of California. Among
its primary purposes, as stated in its Articles of Incorporation, were to
"establish, conduct and maintain an Evangelistic Church; to conduct
religious services, to minister to the sick and needy, to care for the
fatherless and to rescue the fallen, and generally to do those things
needful for the promotion of Christian faith, virtue, and charity.
484
The Alamo Foundation derived its income, not from contributions or
public benefit services, but, rather, from the operation of commercial
businesses staffed by the Foundation's "associates", most of whom were
drug addicts, derelicts, or criminals before their rehabilitation by the
Foundation. These workers received no salaries, but, instead, were
provided by the Foundation with food, clothing, shelter, and other
benefits. The Secretary of Labor filed an action against the Foundation,
alleging violations of the minimum wage, overtime, and recordkeeping
provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act.
On appeal from an adverse decision in the federal district court, the
Foundation argued religious exemption from the provisions of the Act.
The Supreme Court affirmed. The Court held the commercial businesses
operated by the Foundation in competition with ordinary commercial
enterprises made the Foundation itself an "enterprise" within the
483. See supra note 123.
484. Tony and Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290,
292 (1985).
485. The Alamo Foundation operated four businesses in California, thirty
businesses in Arkansas, three businesses in Tennessee, and a motel in Tempe,
Arizona. It received additional income from the donations of its "associates."
486. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq.
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meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 203(r),487 and gave its employees protection under
the Act. The "economic reality" test of employment used by the Court
under the Act divested the Foundation of its religious identity for
purposes of federal law, despite the motivation of both its founders and
associates to use its resources for religious and public benefit purposes.
The Foundation, thus, lost its right to use religious exemptions to
employment law, by its operation as a commercial enterprise. Citing dicta
in the district court opinion, that "by entering the economic arena and
trafficking in the marketplace, ' '481 the Foundation lost its religious
exemptions to federal employment law, the Court concluded:
The Foundation's commercial activities, undertaken with a
'common business purpose', are not beyond the reach of the
Fair Labor Standards Act because of the Foundation's religious
character, and its associates are 'employees' within the meaning
of the Act because they work in contemplation of
compensation. Like other employees covered by the Act, the
489
associates are entitled to its full protection.
Statutory exemptions, granted to nonprofit and religious organizations
for the common benefit of society, are lost by commercialization. The law
is entirely consistent in this regard. 490 The New Jersey Supreme Court, for
example, in Doe v. Bridgeton Hospital Association491 in direct response to
the question, held that a nonsectarian hospital may not limit access to
medical treatments based upon the religious views of its board members
and administrators. In this case, the issue was nontherapeutic abortion
requested by a patient. The court stated that a nonsectarian hospital,
even with nonprofit status, is licensed to serve the public. It is operated
for the public, rather than private ends.4" Thus, the court concluded,
487. 29 U.S.C. §203 (r)(1) defines "enterprise" in pertinent part as
the related activities performed (either through unified operation or
common control) by any person or persons for a common business
purpose, and includes all such activities whether performed in one or
more establishments or by one or more corporate or other organizational
units including departments of an establishment operated through leasing
arrangements, but shall not include the related activities performed for
such enterprise by an independent contractor.
Id.
488. Tony and Susan Alamo Foundation v. Sec. of Labor, 471 U.S 289, 294
(1988).
489. Id. at 306.
490. See De La Salle Institute v. U.S., 195 F. Supp. 891 (N.D. Cal. 1961).
491. 366 A.2d 641 (N.J. 1976).
492. Id. at 646.
Private Religious Hospitals
secular hospitals may not adopt policies based upon religion or morality
that interfere with the otherwise legitimate use of their facilities by the
general public.
There has been a suggestion by some that religious health care
ministries, in the canon law, can continue their institutionalized existence
in the for-profit, as well as the nonprofit corporational form.49' The
suggestion is based upon the absence of such an express prohibition in the
general canon law, as well as the fact that many nonprofit corporations,
particularly in the health care fields, have created and manage for-profit
subsidiaries, such as technical, research and diagnostic facilities, on the
income of which they pay unrelated income taxes.494 This suggestion rests
upon a fundamental misunderstanding.
The canon law requirements for the dedication and uses ofS• 491
ecclesiastical properties, the prohibitions against secular occupations for
priests and members of religious orders and the control exercised by
church officials over sponsored ministries are totally incompatible with
the notion of a corporation organized and operated primarily to pay
dividends to its shareholders. Religion and religious organizations are
definitionally nonprofit. 49 The churches, in general, are not dedicated to
competing in their ministries with secular commercial entities for profit.
Nonprofit does not mean that an organization cannot be operated in a
financially sound and solvent way, paying comparable compensation to
staff and employees. It means, rather, that the primary motive for which
it is organized and operated as a corporation is not to produce dividends
for its owner-shareholders, but to serve the public by performing an
acknowledged charitable service.
In the canon law, to maintain its religious identity, a sponsored health
care organization must have an institutional formation and operation in
which, at least, six elements are operative: (1) It must be under the
direction of competent ecclesiastical authority and acknowledged as a
constituent part of the church;4 9 ' (2) the principles of moral theology and
medical ethics adopted officially by the church must be observed in all
493. See JOHN R. AMOS ET AL., THE SEARCH FOR IDENTITY: CANONICAL
SPONSORSHIP OF CATHOLIC HEALTHCARE 61 (1993).
494. I.R.C. §§ 511-513 (West 2000). See, generally, I.R.S. Publication 598;
Queen of Angels Hospital v. Younger, 66 Cal. App. 3d 359, 136 Cal. Rptr. 36
(1977); Mutual Aid Ass'n v. United States, 759 F.2d 792 (10th Cir. 1989).
495.1983 Code C. 1254, CODE OF CANON LAW.
496. 1983 Code C. 285, 286.
497. I.R.C. § 501 (c)(3).
498. 1983 Code C. 300, 803 § 1 (1983).
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activities of the hospital; '9 (3) the sponsoring organization within the
church must be recognized by the church itself as authentic, or clearly
identified religiously with the church;"O (4) proper church authorities must
have what is called the right of visitation, that is, the right to monitor,
investigate and receive an accounting of the organization's books and
activities; 0 ' (5) the pastoral care of patients and practices within the
institution must be subject to the canonical discipline of the sponsoring
church;0 2 and (6) the organization's temporal assets must be administered
according to applicable canonical principles.0 3
This is not an exhaustive list. It does not require ownership of
properties, nor direct involvement of the local bishop, nor adoption of
specific rules and regulations. It does, however, comprise the minimal
standards for official affiliation of a health care organization as religious,
that is, sponsored by a church or religious organization. The quantum of
outside control and accountability, as well as the dedication of assets to
non-lucrative, disinterested service, are both incompatible with the
organizational structure and administration of a for-profit commercial
entity. Thus, creation of a for-profit hospital or conversion of a religious
hospital to for-profit status, whether independently or by transfer or
merger into a commercial health management organization is, per se, a
renunciation of its religious identity. With the loss of religious status
comes the loss of all federal and state protected religious exemptions and
privileges. This transformation is irrespective of the exigencies or
religious motives that may have persuaded the decision initially. In all
cases, the "economic reality test," affirmed by the Supreme Court in the
Alamo Foundation case enables the court to look beyond religious
facades into the reality of the day-to-day operations of health care
institutions.
CONCLUSION
"Conscience clauses," protecting the free exercise of religion in ethical
decision-making by religiously affiliated hospitals, I believe, should
continue to be absolute in reproductive medicine where the hospitals are
clearly and unmistakably religious and patient choices of providers are
free and fully informed. This conclusion is compelled by the free exercise
clause of the First Amendment, as well as by the national interest in
preserving and promoting diversity in the voluntary health care sector.
499. 1983 Code C. 298, 326 (1983).
500. 1983 Code C. 803 § 3; see also 1983 Code C. 300, 305, 313, 325 (1983).
501. 1983 Code C. 804 § 1 (1983).
502. 1983 Code C. 804 § 1 (1983).
503. 1983 Code C. 12 (1983).
Private Religious Hospitals
Religious hospitals waive the right to ethical autonomy in the area of
reproductive medicine, however, to the extent that otherwise medically
indicated and legally permissible treatments are concerned, by engaging
in monopolistic practices, disguising their religious identity to garner
larger patient bases, in emergency services licensed for the care of
children, handicapped adults, in cases of traumatic intervention for
victims of sexual assault, or when the hospitals cease to be nonprofit
corporations.
The terribly difficult problem of access to reproductive health care in
all its dimensions, in my judgment, will not be solved by state legislative
mandates forcing private religious hospitals into ever more stringent
"creative accommodations." The key is full disclosure, and the play of
voluntary organizations in markets where ultimate purchasers are the
final, free arbiters of their own health care needs. The constitutional
mandate to provide for the health, safety and welfare of society, and its
individual members, is primarily a burden upon the state. The state can
meet this burden in respect to patients' constitutionally guaranteed rights
of privacy by itself accommodating to the challenges of the managed care
system by funding alternative facilities, while protecting the integrity of
free institutional choices in the religious ministry to the sick.
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